Old Questions and New Answers about Institutions: The Riker Objection Revisited

The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Shepsle, Kenneth A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theoretic; Human agency; Institutions; Interpretations; Micro analytical; Procedural change; Riker objection

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925840375     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0059     Document Type: Chapter

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