Does classical liberalism imply an evolutionary approach to policy-making?

Journal of Bioeconomics

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 53-70

  Schnellenbach, Jan ^a,b  

^a BRANDENBURG UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^b Walter Eucken Institut   (Germany)

Author keywords

Classical liberalism; Cultural evolution; Darwinism; Economic policy; Evolution; Institutional evolution

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; ECONOMIC THEORY; LIBERALISM; POLICY MAKING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 84924598775     PISSN: 13876996     EISSN: 15736989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10818-014-9188-6     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. Aldrich, H. E., Hodgson, G. M., Hull, D. L., Thorbjørn, K., Mokyr, J., & Vanberg, V. J. (2008). In defence of generalized Darwinism. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 18, 577–596.
2. Arnhart, L. (2005). Darwinian conservatism. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
3. Becker, G. S. (1976). Altruism, egoism and genetic fitness: Economics and sociobiology. Journal of Economic Literature, 14, 817–826.
4. Bentham, J. (1864). The theory of legislation. London: Trübner. 2nd revised and corrected edition.
5. Berlin, I. (1950). Political ideas in the twentieth century. Foreign Affairs, 28, 351–385.
6. Berlin, I. (1958). Two concepts of liberty. In I. Berlin (Ed.), Four essays on liberty, vol. 1969 (pp. 118–172). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Buchanan, J. M. (1974). Good economics, bad law. Virginia Law Review, 60, 483–492.
8. Buchanan, J. M. (1991). The foundations for normative individualism. In J. M. Buchanan (Ed.), The economics and the ethics of constitutional order (pp. 221–229). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
9. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
10. Caplan, B. (2007). The myth of the rational voter. Why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
11. Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1–44.
12. Dahrendorf, R. (1999). Ein neuer Dritter Weg? Reformpolitik am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen.
13. Eckel, C. C., Grossman, P. J., & Johnston, R. M. (2005). An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 1543–1560.
14. Eidenmüller, H. (1995). Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts. Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen.
15. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.
16. Feld, L. P., & Kirchgässner, G. (2000). Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: The Swiss experience. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 287–306.
17. Fleming, S. M., Thomas, C. L., & Dolan, R. J. (2010). Overcoming status quo bias in the human brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107, 6005–6009.
18. Glaeser, E. L., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coaseans. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 853–899.
19. Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. Heinemann, F. (2008). Is the welfare state self-destructive? A study of government benefit morale. Kyklos, 61, 237–257.
21. Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 403–418.
22. Hochman, H. M., & Rodgers, J. D. (1969). Pareto optimal redistribution. American Economic Review, 59, 542–557.
23. Hodgson, G. (2002). Darwinism in economics: From analogy to ontology. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 12, 259–281.
24. Hodgson, G., & Knudsen, T. (2006). Why we need a generalized Darwinism, and why generalized Darwinism is not enough. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61, 1–19.
25. Hofstadter, R. (1944). Social Darwinism in American thought 1860–1915. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
26. Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. R. (1991). The endowment effect, loss aversion and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 193–206.
27. Layard, R. (2007). Happiness and the teaching of values. CentrePiece, 12(1), 18–23.
28. Leonard, T. C. (2009). Origins of myth of social Darwinism. The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstadter’s social Darwinism in American thought. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71, 37–51.
29. Levit, G. S., Hossfeld, U., & Witt, U. (2011). Can Darwinism be “Generalized” and of what use would this be? Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 21, 545–562.
30. Matsusaka, J. G. (2004). For the many or the few. The initiative, public policy, and American democracy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
31. McCloskey, D. (2006). Bourgeois virtues. Ethics for an age of commerce. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
32. Mestmäcker, E.-J. (2007). A legal theory without law. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
33. Ng, Y.-K. (1997). A case for happiness, cardinalism and interpersonal comparability. Economic Journal, 107, 1848–1858.
34. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
36. Pigou, A. C. (1912). Wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan.
37. Popper, K. R. (1944–1945). The poverty of historicism. Economica, 11, 86–103, 119–139 and 12, 69–89.
38. Popper, K. R. (1967). The open society and its enemies, vol. 1: The spell of Plato. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
39. Posner, R. A. (2010). Economic analysis of law (8th ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers.
40. Potts, J. (2003). Toward an evolutionary theory of homo economicus: The concept of universal nomadism. In J. Laurent (Ed.), Evolutionary economics and human nature. Cheltenham: Elgar.
41. Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
42. Rothbard, M. N. (2002). The ethics of liberty. New York: New York University Press.
43. Rubin, P. H. (2002). Darwinian politics. The evolutionary origin of freedom. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
44. Ruprecht, W. (2005). The historical development of the consumption of sweeteners—A learning approach. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 15, 247–272.
45. Saint-Paul, G. (2011). The tyranny of utility. Behavioral social science and the rise of paternalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
46. Schmidtz, D., & Brennan, J. (2010). A brief history of liberty. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
47. Schnellenbach, J. (2004). The evolution of a fiscal constitution when individuals are theoretically uncertain. European Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 97–115.
48. Schnellenbach, J. (2008). Rational ignorance is not bliss: When do lazy voters learn from decentralized policy experiments? Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 228, 372–393.
49. Schnellenbach, J., & Schubert, C. (2014). Behavioral political economy: A survey. Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14–03, Freiburg: Walter Eucken Institut.
50. Schubert, C. (2012). Is novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 22, 585–619.
51. Schubert, C. (2013). “Generalized Darwinism” and the quest for an evolutionary theory of policy-making. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 24(3), 479–513.
52. Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
53. Spencer, H. (1851). Social statics, or the conditions necessary to happiness specified, and the first of them developed. London: Chapman.
54. Spencer, H. (1857). Progress: Its law and cause. The Westminster Review, 67, 445–465.
55. Spencer, H. (1860). The social organism. The Westminster Review, 73, 90–121.
56. Spencer, H. (1864). The principles of biology. London: Williams and Norgate.
57. Vanberg, V. J. (2005). Market and state: The perspective of constitutional political economy. Journal of Institutional Economics, 1, 23–49.
58. Vanberg, V. J., & Buchanan, J. M. (1989). Interests and theories in constitutional choice. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 49–62.
59. Vanberg, V. J., & Kerber, W. (1994). Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach. Constitutional Political Economy, 5, 193–219.
60. Vaughn, K. I. (1996). Economic policy for an imperfect world. Southern Economic Journal, 62, 833–844.
61. von Hayek, F. A. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
62. von Hayek, F. A. (1967). Studies in philosophy, politics and economics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
63. von Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law, legislation and liberty: Rules and order. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
64. von Hayek, F. A. (1976). Law, legislation and liberty: The mirage of social justice. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
65. von Hayek, F. A. (1979). Law, legislation and liberty: The political order of a free people. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
66. von Hayek, F. A. (1988). The fatal conceit: The errors of socialism. In W. W. Bartley III. London: Routledge.
67. Vromen, J. (2012). Ontological issues in evolutionary economics: The debate between generalized Darwinism and the continuity hypothesis. In U. Mäki (Ed.), Philosophy of Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
68. Wegner, G. (2004). Political learning: The neglected precondition of constitutional reform. Constitutional Political Economy, 15, 339–358.
69. Witt, U. (1996). Innovation, externalities and the problem of economic progress. Public Choice, 89, 113–130.
70. Witt, U. (2004). On the proper interpretation of ‘Evolution’ in economics and its implications for production theory. Journal of Economic Methodology, 11, 125–146.
71. Witt, U. (2008a). What is specific about evolutionary economics? Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 18, 547–575.
72. Witt, U. (2008b). Observational learning, group selection and societal evolution. Journal of Institutional Economics, 4, 1–24.
73. Wohlgemuth, M. (2002). Evolutionary approaches to politics. Kyklos, 55, 223–246.