Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: A neoclassical realist model

Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 42-74

  Lobell, Steven E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84924169192     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511811869.002     Document Type: Chapter

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