Concepts, Theories, and Numbers: A Checklist for Constructing, Evaluating, and Using Concepts or Quantitative Measures

The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Goertz, Gary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Aggregating concepts; Aggregation procedures; Gray zone; Homogeneity; Quantitative measures; Structuring concepts; Zero points

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924043364     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.003.0005     Document Type: Chapter

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