Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology

Metaethics after Moore

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages

  Sinnott Armstrong, Walter ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Empirical justification; Empirical psychology; Justification; Moral epistemology naturalized; Moral intuitionism; Naturalized moral epistemology; Non inferential justification

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923056196     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0016     Document Type: Chapter

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