In Defense of Legal Positivism : Law Without Trimmings

In Defense of Legal Positivism : Law Without Trimmings

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-324

  Kramer, Matthew H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

H. l. a. hart; John finnis; Joseph raz; Jurisprudence; Law; Legal positivism; Lon fuller; Morality; Natural law; Ronald dworkin

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922982767     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264834.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (410)

1. H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) ['Postscript'), 238.
2. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 97-9;
3. Nigel Simmonds, 'Why Conventionalism Does not Collapse into Pragmatism', 49 Cambridge Law Journal 63 (1990);
4. Philip Soper, 'Dworkin's Domain', 100 Harvard Law Review 1166, 1167-8, 1170-5(1987).
5. Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 3-9;
6. Charles Silver, 'Elmer's Case: A Legal Positivist Replies to Dworkin', 6 Law and Philosophy 381, 386-7 (1987);
7. John Stick, 'Literary Imperialism:Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in Law's Empire';, 34 UCLA Law Review 371, 376-81 (1986).
8. Michael Bayles, 'Hart vs. Dworkin'. 10 Law and Philosophy 349, 353-61 (1991);
9. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 12-27;
10. Joseph. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 95-6.
11. E. Philip Soper, 'Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute', in Cohen, Dworkin, at 3, 16-19.
12. Matthew H. Kramer, Hobbes and the Paradoxes of Political Origins (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 99-122.
13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) (ed Richard Tuck.), 110.
14. William Boardraan, 'Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 97 Ethics 546, 552-3 (1987).
15. W. J. Waiuchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), chs VI and VII.
16. Eleni Mitrophanous, 'Soft Positivism', 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 621 (1997).
17. Brian Leiter, 'Peterminacy, Objectivity, and Authority', in Andrei Mamior (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 203, 241-78.
18. Hart, 'Postscript', 242-4;
19. H. L. A. Hart, 'Introduction', in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 1, 14-15;
20. Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 275-92;
21. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 175-7;
22. Meir DanCohen, 'Interpreting Official Speech', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 433
23. Matthew H. Kramer. John Locke and the Origins of Private Property:Philosophical Explorations of Individualism, Community, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9.
24. Larry Alexander, 'Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law', 6 Law and Philosophy 419, 427-31 (1987);
25. Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, 'Against Legal Principles', in Andrei. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 279, 284-5, 287-8;
26. Trevor Allan, 'Justice and Fairness in Law's Empire', 52 Cambridge Law Journal 64, 68, 75-4, 84-5 (1993);
27. John Finnis, above, n. 2 , at 373-4;
28. David Lyons, 'Moral Aspects of Legal Theory', in Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 64, 94-5;
29. Nigel Simmonds, 'imperial Visions and Mundane Practices', 46 Cambridge Law Journal 465, 477-80 (1987).
30. Michael Bayles, above, n. 6 , at 375-80;
31. David Lyons, above, n. 22 , at 75-6;
32. Philip Soper, above, n. 1 , at 1181-3;
33. W. J. Waluchow, above, n. 13 , at 45-6, 58-64.
34. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 219-21.
35. Philip Soper, 'Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 31.
36. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1985).
37. Matthew H. Kramer, 'Rights Without Trimmings', in Matthew H. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds. and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 7
38. George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996), 139.
39. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 342(emphasis added).
40. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) (rev. edn.), 148, 151.
41. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 192-4.
42. 'Rights Without Trimmings', in Matthew Kramer, Nigel Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 7, 8-9-I.
43. H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1963), 17-20.
44. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) ['Positivism'], 3, 5-6.
45. Richard Tur, 'Criminal Law and Legal Theory', in William Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) ['Theory'], 195, 208.
46. Jules Coleman, 'On the Relationship Between Law and Morality', 2 Ratio Juris 66, 72 (1989):
47. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) [NLNR], 358-9.
48. Matthew H. Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), ch. 7 .
49. Deryck Beyleveld, and Roger Brownsword, 'Normative Positivism: The Mirage of the Middle-Way', 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 463-73, 488-512 (1989)['Positivism'].
50. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 225-6.
51. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) [Concept], 39.
52. Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruetion: Against Rhadamanthus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 137-9.
53. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 97-9;
54. Nigel Simmonds, 'Why Conventionalism Does not Collapse into Pragmatism', 49 Cambridge Law Journal 63 (1990);
55. Philip Soper, 'Dworkin's Domain', 100 Harvard Law Review 1166, 1167-8, 1170-5(1987).
56. The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) [AL], 153-7;
57. Steven Burton, 'Law as Practical Reason', 62 Southern California Law Review 747, 769-71 (1989);
58. William Edmundson, 'Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation', 17 Law and Philosophy 43, 44, 56-8, 60 (1998);
59. J. D. Goldsworthy, 'Dermoid's "The Unity of Law and Morality" ', 12 Monash University Law Review 8, 17-18 (1986);
60. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism', 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449, 453-60, 461-2 (1990)
61. Leslie Green, 'Law, Legitimacy, and Consent', 62 Southern California Law Review 795, 797-800 (1989);
62. Andrei Marmoer, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 45-7;
63. Michael Moore, 'Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons', 62 Southern California Law Review 827, 837-8, 840 (1989);
64. Stephen Perry, 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 97, 115-16, 126-8;
65. Gerald Postema, 'The Normativity of Law', in edRuth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) ['Normativity'], 81, 88-93;
66. Gerald Postema, 'Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reason', Robert George, (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)['Autonomy'], 79, 84.
67. J, W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1997) (n2nd edn.), 124-7.
68. Other works by Rax to which I refer in this chapter are 'The Morality of Obedience', 83 Michigan Law Review 732 (1985) ['Obedience'];
69. 'The Purity of the Pure Theory', in Richard Tur and William Twining (eds), Essays on Kelsen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) ['Purity'], 79;
70. The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) [MF];
71. Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994) [EPD];
72. 'Intention in Interpretation', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) ['Intention'], 249.
73. Michael Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism (London: Routiedge & Regan Paul, 1984)[ULM].
74. T. R. S. Allan, 'Book Review', 49 Cambridge Law Journal 135 (1990).
75. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 72;
76. Kent Gieenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George (ed), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1, 10.
77. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) (rev. edn.), 122.
78. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) [NLNR], 358-9.
79. George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996), 139.
80. David Lyons, 'On Formal Justice', 58 Cornell Law Review 833 (1973) ['Formal Justice']
81. David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993
82. Neil MacCormick, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 122-4;
83. Kent Greenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), J, 28 n. 28.
84. Brian Bix, 'Recent Publication', 22 Harvard Journal on Legislation 620. 621 (1985);
85. J. D. Goldsworthy, 'Detmold's "The Unity of Law and Morality" ', 12 Monash University Law Review 9, 23-4 (1986) ['Unity'];
86. John Robinson, 'Book Reviewed', 31 American Journal of Jurisprudence 173 (1986);
87. N. E. Simmonds, 'Book Review', 4 Legal Studies 343, 345-6 (1984);
88. Richard Susskind, 'Detmold's Refutation of Positivism and the Computer Judge', 49 Modem Law Review 125, 126-7 (1986);
89. David Wood, 'Review', 63 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 562 (1985).
90. Zenon Bankowski, 'Review', 49 Modern Law Review 138 (1986);
91. Andrew Tettenbom, 'Book Review', 44 Cambridge Law Journal 144 (1985).
92. William Edmundson. 'Legitimate Authority without Political Obligation', 17 Law and Philosophy 43 (1998);
93. A. John. Simmons, 'Voluntarism and Political Associations', 67 Virginia Law Review 19, 24-4 (1981).
94. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 223-33.
95. Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 3-9;
96. Charles Silver, 'Elmer's Case: A Legal Positivist Replies to Dworkin', 6 Law and Philosophy 381, 386-7 (1987);
97. John Stick, 'Literary Imperialism:Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in Law's Empire';, 34
98. Deryek Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference BetweenNatural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2 n, 1 (1985)
99. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George(ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 198
100. Matthew Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1999), ch. 10.
101. Matthew Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1999), ch. 10.
102. N. E. H. Hull, Roscoe Pound & Karl Llewellyn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 244-5-was therefore particularly reprehensible.
103. Matthew H. Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), ch. 7 .
104. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 342(emphasis added).
105. W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
106. Gerald Postema, 'Implicit Law', 13 Law and Philosophy 361, 369-79 (1994).
107. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 272-4, 353;
108. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 222;
109. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 220-2.
110. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) (rev. edn.), 148, 151.
111. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)186-7.
112. D. N. MacCormick, 'Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy', in A. W. B. Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973)
113. Matthew H. Kramer, Hobbes and the Paradoxes of Political Origins (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 14-18.
114. Michael Bayles, 'Hart vs. Dworkin'. 10 Law and Philosophy 349, 353-61 (1991);
115. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 12-27;
116. Gerald Postema, ' "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices', 6 Law and Philosophy 283, 300, 301, 315-16 (1987).
117. Joseph. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 95-6.
118. Tom Campbell, 'Obligation: Societal, Political, and Legal', in Paul Harris (ed.), On Political Obligation (London; Routledge, 1990), 120, 140-4;
119. David Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 75-8;
120. Philip Mullock, 'The Inner Morality of Law', 84 Ethics 327, 329, 331 (1974);
121. Peter Nicholson, 'The Internal Morality of Law; Fuller and His Critics', 84 Ethics 307, 316, 324-5 (1974);
122. Theodore Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 98;
123. Kent Greenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George, The Autonomy of Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1, 12-13;
124. John Ladd, 'Law and Morality:Internalism vs. Externalism', in Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 61, 69-71;
125. Paul LeBel, 'Blame This Messenger; Summers on Fuller', 83 Michigan Law Review 717, 723-4 (1985);
126. Neil MaeCormiek, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 122-4;
127. R. George Wright, 'Does Positivism Matter?', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 57, 60.
128. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 12;
129. Ronald Dworkin, 'A Reply', in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984), 247, 252;
130. Jules Coleman, 'Authority and Reason', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 287, 316 n. 5.
131. Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 102-3.
132. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 192-4.
133. Stuart Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977), 16-17.
134. William Boardman, 'Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 97 Ethics 546 (1987);
135. Neil MacCormick, 'Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy', in A. W. B. Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 100, 128-9;
136. Neil MacCormiek, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 117.
137. Monroe Beardsley, 'Equality and Obedience to Law', in Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 35, 41-2.
138. J. W, Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1997), eh. 16;
139. Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Ch. 2.
140. Chaim Cans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
141. Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988);
142. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chs. 4-9;
143. John Motion, Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992);
144. Heidi Hurd, 'Challenging Authority', 100 Yale law Journal 1611 (1991);
145. George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992);
146. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979);
147. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), chs. 14-15;
148. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979);
149. Philip Soper, A. Theory of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984);
150. Philip Soper, 'The Obligation to Obey the Law', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 127.
151. Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York; New York University Press, 1964)
152. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 225-6.
153. Hart, Jurisprudence, 11-12.
154. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], 13-16, 234-7;
155. John Finnis, 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison ed.], Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy [Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1987], 62, 67-9.)
156. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], 284-4, 295.)
157. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], ch. 2.)
158. Robert Alexy, 'On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality', 2 Ratio Juris 167, 176-7 (1989);
159. E. Philip Soper, 'Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute', in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London; Duckworth, 1984), 3, 22;
160. Philip Soper, A Theory of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 55-6, 117-25
161. Trevor Allan, 'Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent', 55 Cambridge Law Journal 89, 96-7 (1996);
162. Michael Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 56-60, 158-9;
163. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 18-20.
164. Tony Honore´, 'Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation', 67 Virginia Law Review 39, 48 (1981).
165. Richard Brandt, 'Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law', in Hook, Law, above, n. 7 , at 43, 46;
166. David Lyons, 'Need, Necessity, and Political Obligation', 67 Virginia Law Review 63, 66-8 (1981).
167. H. L. A. Hart, 'Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law', in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983], 343, 359).
168. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 187-95
169. Frederick Schauer, 'Fuller's Internal Point of View', 13 Law and Philosophy 285, 291-2 n. 15 (1994).
170. E. Philip Soper, 'Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute', in Cohen, Dworkin, at 3, 16-19.
171. Kent Greenawalt, 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison, Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 156, 165
172. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory [Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1992], 188, 192).
173. Neil MacCormick, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)['Natural Law'], 105, 114;
174. Gerald Postema, 'Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law', 11 Journal of Legal Studies 165, 197-200 (1982);
175. Philip Soper, 'Law's Normative Claims', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)['Normative Claims'], 215, 218-20.
176. Jules Coleman, 'On the Relationship Between Law and Morality', 2 Ratio Juris 66, 71-2 [1989].
177. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) (ed Richard Tuck.), 110.
178. William Boardraan, 'Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 97 Ethics 546, 552-3 (1987).
179. C. D. Broad, 'On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics', 26 International Journal of Ethics 377, 387-92 (1916).
180. H. L. A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', 64 Philosophical Review 175, 185 (1955);
181. John Rawls, 'Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play', in Hook. Law. above, n. 7 , at 3.
182. A. M. Honore´, 'Real Laws', in P. M. S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977), 99, 117-18.
183. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 90-5.
184. W. J. Waiuchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), chs VI and VII.
185. Eleni Mitrophanous, 'Soft Positivism', 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 621 (1997).
186. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 235.
187. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), ch. 2 .
188. Brian Leiter, 'Peterminacy, Objectivity, and Authority', in Andrei Mamior (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 203, 241-78.
189. Chaim Gans. 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 180, 185-9;
190. Paul Harris, 'The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', in Harris, Political Obligation, above, n. 7 , at 151, 158-9, 174-5.
191. George Christie, 'On the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 1990 Duke Law Journal 1311. 1328-33 (1990).
192. Philip Soper, 'Legal Systems, Normative Systems, and the Paradoxes of Positivism', 8 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 363, 375 (1995)
193. MacCormick, 'Natural Law', 110-18;
194. Postema, 'Normativity', 92-3.
195. Rolf Sartorius, 'Positivism and the Foundations of Legal Authority', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 43, 55-6;
196. M. B. E. Smith, 'Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?', 82 Yale Law Journal 950, 975-6 (1973).
197. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 83;
198. Charles Covell, The Defence of Natural Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 53;
199. J. W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1980), 132-4;
200. Neil MacCormick, above, n. 6 , at 122-4;
201. Peter Nicholson, above, n. 6 , at 312, 322-3;
202. Nigel Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986)
203. Anthony Lisska, Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21-4;
204. David Lyons, above, n. 6 , at 77-8;
205. Margaret Jane Radin, 'Reconsidering the Rule of Law', 69 Boston University Law Review 781, 784-7 (1989);
206. Robert Summers, 'Professor Fuller on Morality and Law', 18 Journal of Legal Education 1, 14, 26 (1965).
207. Jeremy Waldron, 'Why Law-Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?', 13 Law and Philosophy 259, 261-2 (1994).
208. John Dunn, 'Political Obligation', in David Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 23, 34;
209. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986), 194;
210. J. Roland Pennock, 'The Obligation to Obey the Law and the Ends of the State', in Hook, Law, above, n. 7 , at 77, 80-1;
211. Ronald Dworkin, 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It', 25 Philosophy & Public Again 87, 116 (1996)
212. Ronald Dworkin, 'Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim', 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 668, 683-6 (1965)
213. R. A. Duff, 'Legal Obligation and the Moral Nature of Law', 25 (n.s.) Juridical Review 61, 74 (1980)
214. James Boyle, 'Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance', 78 Cornell Law Review 371, 372, 375-8, 396-7(1993).
215. H. L. A. Hart, 'Introduction', in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 1, 14-15;
216. Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 275-92;
217. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 175-7;
218. Meir DanCohen, 'Interpreting Official Speech', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 433
219. Trevor Allan, 'Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent', 55 Cambridge Law Journal 89, 94-5 (1996);
220. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 29 (1985);
221. Daniel Brudney, 'Two Links of Law and Morality', 103 Ethics 280, 284 (1993);
222. Peter Nicholson, above, n. 6 , at 314, 323-4;
223. Gerald Postema, above, n. 5 , at 367-87;
224. Noel Reynolds, 'Grounding the Rule of Law', 2 Ratio Juris 1, 14-15 (1989);
225. Simmonds, Issues, 124-5;
226. Rex Martin, 'The Character of Political Allegiance in a System of Rights', in Harris, Political Obligation, above, n. 7 , at 184, 211-12;
227. Donald Regan, 'Law's Halo', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1987), 15, 25-6.
228. Larry Alexander, 'Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law', 6 Law and Philosophy 419, 427-31 (1987);
229. Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, 'Against Legal Principles', in Andrei. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 279, 284-5, 287-8;
230. Trevor Allan, 'Justice and Fairness in Law's Empire', 52 Cambridge Law Journal 64, 68, 75-4, 84-5 (1993);
231. David Lyons, 'Moral Aspects of Legal Theory', in Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 64, 94-5;
232. Nigel Simmonds, 'imperial Visions and Mundane Practices', 46 Cambridge Law Journal 465, 477-80 (1987).
233. Kenneth Winston, 'Introduction', in Lon Fuller, The Principles of Social Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981), 11, 37-40;
234. Trevor Allan, 'Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect', 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 497. 504-5 (1998);
235. Philip Soper, 'Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford:Blackwell, 1987), 31, 47;
236. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 219-21.
237. Philip Soper, 'Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 31.
238. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1985).
239. Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 230.
240. Matthew H. Kramer, 'Rights Without Trimmings', in Matthew H. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds. and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 7
241. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3.
242. Jeremy Waldron, 'The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory', 2 Ratio Juris 79, 93 1989);
243. George Anastaplo, 'Natural Right and the American Lawyer: An Appreciation of Professor Fuller', 1965 Wisconsin Law Review 322, 331-2 (1965);
244. Matthew H. Kramer, 'The Rule of Misrecognition in the Hart of Jurisprudence', 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 401, 426-7 n. 100 (1988);
245. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Self-Destructton of Legal Positivism', 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449, 458 (1990).
246. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 72;
247. Kent Gieenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George (ed), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1, 10.
248. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) (rev. edn.), 122.
249. Deryek Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference BetweenNatural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2 n, 1 (1985)
250. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George(ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 198
251. Matthew Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1999), ch. 10.
252. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3, 12;
253. Ronald Dworkin, 'A Reply', in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1984), 247, 252;
254. Jules Coleman, 'Authority and Reason', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 287, 316 n. 5.
255. David Lyons, 'On Formal Justice', 58 Cornell Law Review 833 (1973)
256. David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
257. Neil MacCormick, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 122-4;
258. Kent Greenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), J, 28 n. 28. Neither MacCormick nor Greenawalt takes account of Lyons's criticisms at all.
259. David Lyons, 'Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent', 38 Vanderbilt Law Review 495 (1985)
260. David Lyons, 'Derivabtlity, Defensibility, and the Justification of Judicial Decisions', 68 Monist 325 (1985)
261. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961} [Concept], 155-7;
262. H. L. A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', 71 Harvard Law Review 593, 623-4 (1958)
263. Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 102-3.
264. William Edmundson. 'Legitimate Authority without Political Obligation', 17 Law and Philosophy 43 (1998);
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266. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Richard Tuck.ed), 95-4, 98, 150-1.
267. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) ['Law'], 188.
268. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) [Concept], 186-7.
269. John Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government', in Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
270. William Boardman, 'Coordination and the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 97 Ethics 546 (1987);
271. Neil MacCormick, 'Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy', in A. W. B. Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 100, 128-9;
272. Neil MacCormiek, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 117.
273. Monroe Beardsley, 'Equality and Obedience to Law', in Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 35, 41-2.
274. J. W, Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1997), eh. 16;
275. Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Ch. 2.
276. Chaim Cans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
277. Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988);
278. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chs. 4-9;
279. John Motion, Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992);
280. Heidi Hurd, 'Challenging Authority', 100 Yale law Journal 1611 (1991);
281. George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992);
282. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) [Authority], chs. 12-13;
283. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), chs. 14-15;
284. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979);
285. Philip Soper, A. Theory of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984);
286. Philip Soper, 'The Obligation to Obey the Law', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 127.
287. Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York; New York University Press, 1964)
288. Stephen Perry, 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
289. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 225-6.
290. Tony Honore´, 'Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground of Obligation', 67 Virginia Law Review 39, 48 (1981).
291. Richard Brandt, 'Utility and the Obligation to Obey the Law', in Hook, Law, above, n. 7 , at 43, 46;
292. David Lyons, 'Need, Necessity, and Political Obligation', 67 Virginia Law Review 63, 66-8 (1981).
293. Kent Greenawalt, 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison, Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 156, 165
294. C. D. Broad, 'On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics', 26 International Journal of Ethics 377, 387-92 (1916).
295. H. L. A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', 64 Philosophical Review 175, 185 (1955);
296. John Rawls, 'Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play', in Hook. Law. above, n. 7 , at 3.
297. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 90-5.
298. Chaim Gans. 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 180, 185-9;
299. Paul Harris, 'The Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', in Harris, Political Obligation, above, n. 7 , at 151, 158-9, 174-5.
300. George Christie, 'On the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law', 1990 Duke Law Journal 1311. 1328-33 (1990).
301. John Dunn, 'Political Obligation', in David Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 23, 34;
302. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986), 194;
303. J. Roland Pennock, 'The Obligation to Obey the Law and the Ends of the State', in Hook, Law, above, n. 7 , at 77, 80-1;
304. Rex Martin, 'The Character of Political Allegiance in a System of Rights', in Harris, Political Obligation, above, n. 7 , at 184, 211-12;
305. Donald Regan, 'Law's Halo', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1987), 15, 25-6.
306. The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) [AL], 153-7;
307. Steven Burton, 'Law as Practical Reason', 62 Southern California Law Review 747, 769-71 (1989);
308. William Edmundson, 'Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation', 17 Law and Philosophy 43, 44, 56-8, 60 (1998);
309. J. D. Goldsworthy, 'Dermoid's "The Unity of Law and Morality" ', 12 Monash University Law Review 8, 17-18 (1986);
310. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism', 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449, 453-60, 461-2 (1990)
311. Leslie Green, 'Law, Legitimacy, and Consent', 62 Southern California Law Review 795, 797-800 (1989);
312. Andrei Marmoer, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 45-7;
313. Michael Moore, 'Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons', 62 Southern California Law Review 827, 837-8, 840 (1989);
314. Stephen Perry, 'Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory', in Andrei Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 97, 115-16, 126-8;
315. Gerald Postema, 'The Normativity of Law', in edRuth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
316. Gerald Postema, 'Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reason', Robert George, (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)['Autonomy'], 79, 84.
317. J, W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1997) (n2nd edn.), 124-7.
318. Matthew Kramer, In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy (Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1999), ch. 10.
319. D. N. MacCormick, 'Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy', in A. W. B. Simpson (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973)
320. Stuart Hampshire, Two Theories of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1977), 16-17.
321. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980], 13-16, 234-7;
322. John Finnis, 'Comment', in Ruth Gavison ed.], Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy [Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1987], 62, 67-9.)
323. Robert Alexy, 'On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality', 2 Ratio Juris 167, 176-7 (1989);
324. E. Philip Soper, 'Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute', in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London; Duckworth, 1984), 3, 22;
325. Philip Soper, A Theory of Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 55-6, 117-25
326. Trevor Allan, 'Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent', 55 Cambridge Law Journal 89, 96-7 (1996);
327. Michael Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 56-60, 158-9;
328. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 18-20.
329. Neil MacCormick, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)['Natural Law'], 105, 114;
330. Gerald Postema, 'Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law', 11 Journal of Legal Studies 165, 197-200 (1982);
331. Philip Soper, 'Law's Normative Claims', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)['Normative Claims'], 215, 218-20.
332. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), ch. 2 .
333. Philip Soper, 'Legal Systems, Normative Systems, and the Paradoxes of Positivism', 8 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 363, 375 (1995)
334. Rolf Sartorius, 'Positivism and the Foundations of Legal Authority', in Ruth Gavison (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 43, 55-6;
335. M. B. E. Smith, 'Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?', 82 Yale Law Journal 950, 975-6 (1973).
336. Ronald Dworkin, 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It', 25 Philosophy & Public Again 87, 116 (1996)
337. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) (rev. edn.)
338. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 223-33.
339. Robert Summers, Lon L. Fuller (London: Edward Arnold, 1984), 11:
340. Gerald Postema, 'Implicit Law', 13 Law and Philosophy 361, 369-79 (1994).
341. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 272-4, 353;
342. Michael Moore, 'Law as a Functional Kind', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 188, 222;
343. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 220-2.
344. Tom Campbell, 'Obligation: Societal, Political, and Legal', in Paul Harris (ed.), On Political Obligation (London; Routledge, 1990), 120, 140-4;
345. David Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 75-8;
346. Philip Mullock, 'The Inner Morality of Law', 84 Ethics 327, 329, 331 (1974);
347. Peter Nicholson, 'The Internal Morality of Law; Fuller and His Critics', 84 Ethics 307, 316, 324-5 (1974);
348. Theodore Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 98;
349. Kent Greenawalt, 'Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing Features of Legal Positivism', in Robert George, The Autonomy of Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1, 12-13;
350. John Ladd, 'Law and Morality:Internalism vs. Externalism', in Sidney Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 61, 69-71;
351. Paul LeBel, 'Blame This Messenger; Summers on Fuller', 83 Michigan Law Review 717, 723-4 (1985);
352. Neil MaeCormiek, 'Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals', in Robert George (ed.), Natural Law Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 105, 122-4;
353. R. George Wright, 'Does Positivism Matter?', in Robert George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 57, 60.
354. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 187-95
355. Frederick Schauer, 'Fuller's Internal Point of View', 13 Law and Philosophy 285, 291-2 n. 15 (1994).
356. A. M. Honore´, 'Real Laws', in P. M. S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977), 99, 117-18.
357. Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence [London and Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1989], 138.)
358. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 235.
359. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 83;
360. Charles Covell, The Defence of Natural Law (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 53;
361. J. W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (London: Butterworths, 1980), 132-4;
362. Neil MacCormick, above, n. 6 , at 122-4;
363. Peter Nicholson, above, n. 6 , at 312, 322-3;
364. Nigel Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986)
365. Anthony Lisska, Aquinas's Theory of Natural Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21-4;
366. David Lyons, above, n. 6 , at 77-8;
367. Margaret Jane Radin, 'Reconsidering the Rule of Law', 69 Boston University Law Review 781, 784-7 (1989);
368. Robert Summers, 'Professor Fuller on Morality and Law', 18 Journal of Legal Education 1, 14, 26 (1965).
369. Jeremy Waldron, 'Why Law-Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?', 13 Law and Philosophy 259, 261-2 (1994).
370. Ronald Dworkin, 'Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim', 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 668, 683-6 (1965)
371. R. A. Duff, 'Legal Obligation and the Moral Nature of Law', 25 (n.s.) Juridical Review 61, 74 (1980)
372. James Boyle, 'Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance', 78 Cornell Law Review 371, 372, 375-8, 396-7(1993).
373. Trevor Allan, 'Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent', 55 Cambridge Law Journal 89, 94-5 (1996);
374. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, 'The Practical Difference Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism', 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 29 (1985);
375. Daniel Brudney, 'Two Links of Law and Morality', 103 Ethics 280, 284 (1993);
376. Roger Cotterreli, above, n. 13 , at 140, 148-9;
377. Charles Covell, above, n. 16 , at 50-2;
378. J. W. Harris, above, n. 16 , at 133-4;
379. Peter Nicholson, above, n. 6 , at 314, 323-4;
380. Gerald Postema, above, n. 5 , at 367-87;
381. Noel Reynolds, 'Grounding the Rule of Law', 2 Ratio Juris 1, 14-15 (1989);
382. Simmonds, Issues, 124-5;
383. Jeremy Waldron, above, n. 16 , at 277-82.
384. John Finnis, above, n. 5 , at 272-3.
385. George Breekenridge, above, n. 7 , at 958;
386. Duff, 'Obligation', 75-85;
387. Gerald Posteraa, above, n. 5 , at 369-70;
388. Simmonds, Issues, 120-4;
389. Kenneth Winston, 'Introduction', in Lon Fuller, The Principles of Social Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981), 11, 37-40;
390. Trevor Allan, 'Procedural Fairness and the Duty of Respect', 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 497. 504-5 (1998);
391. Daniel Brudney, above, n. 19 , at 284-5;
392. Philip Soper, 'Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds', in Jules Coleman and Ellen Frankel Paul (eds), Philosophy and Law (Oxford:Blackwell, 1987), 31, 47;
393. Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 230.
394. Jules Coleman, 'Negative and Positive Positivism', in Markets, Morals, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3.
395. George Anastaplo, 'Natural Right and the American Lawyer: An Appreciation of Professor Fuller', 1965 Wisconsin Law Review 322, 331-2 (1965);
396. Matthew H. Kramer, 'The Rule of Misrecognition in the Hart of Jurisprudence', 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 401, 426-7 n. 100 (1988);
397. Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 291 n. 54.
398. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 'The Self-Destructton of Legal Positivism', 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449, 458 (1990).
399. Michael Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism (London: Routiedge & Regan Paul, 1984)
400. T. R. S. Allan, 'Book Review', 49 Cambridge Law Journal 135 (1990).
401. Brian Bix, 'Recent Publication', 22 Harvard Journal on Legislation 620. 621 (1985);
402. J. D. Goldsworthy, 'Detmold's "The Unity of Law and Morality" ', 12 Monash University Law Review 9, 23-4 (1986)
403. John Robinson, 'Book Reviewed', 31 American Journal of Jurisprudence 173 (1986);
404. N. E. Simmonds, 'Book Review', 4 Legal Studies 343, 345-6 (1984);
405. Richard Susskind, 'Detmold's Refutation of Positivism and the Computer Judge', 49 Modem Law Review 125, 126-7 (1986);
406. David Wood, 'Review', 63 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 562 (1985).
407. Zenon Bankowski, 'Review', 49 Modern Law Review 138 (1986);
408. Andrew Tettenbom, 'Book Review', 44 Cambridge Law Journal 144 (1985).
409. W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
410. Matthew H. Kramer, Hobbes and the Paradoxes of Political Origins (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 14-18.