Conversation and Responsibility

Conversation and Responsibility

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-272

  McKenna, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent meaning; Conversation; Moral responsibility; P.F. strawson; Reactive attitudes

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922322298     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740031.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (148)

1. Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1985. "Involuntary Sins." Philosophical Review 94: 3-31.
2. Aristotle. 1985. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terrence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
3. Arpaly, Nomy. 2006. Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
4. Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Avramides, A. 1989. Meaning and Mind: An Examination of the Gricean Account of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. Bennett, Christopher. 2002. "The Varieties of Retributive Experience." Philosophical Quarterly 52(207): 145-163.
7. Bennett, Jonathan. 2008. "Accountability (II)." In McKenna and Russell: 47-68.
8. Bennett, Jonathan. 1980. "Accountability." In van Straaten.
9. Berofsky, Bernard. 1995. Liberation from Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Berofsky, Bernard. ed. 1966. Free Will and Determinism. New York: Harper & Row.
11. Bishop, John. 1989. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
12. Bok, Hilary. 1998. Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
13. Brand, Myles. 1984. Intending and Acting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
14. Buss, Sarah, and Lee Overton. 2002. Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
15. Calhoun, Cheshire, and Robert Solomon, eds., 1984. What Is an Emotion? New York:Oxford University Press.
16. Campbell, Joseph. 1997. "A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities." Philosophical Studies 88: 319-330.
17. Chisholm, Roderick. 1963. "Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics." Ratio 5: 1-14.
18. Clarke, Randolph. 2005. "On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 13-24.
19. Cole, P., and J. Morgan, eds. 1975. Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. New York: Academic Press.
20. Copp, David. 1997. "Defending the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility." Nous 31: 441-456.
21. Damasio, Antonio. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
22. Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
23. Davidson, Donald. 1987. "Problems in the Explanation of Action." In P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman, eds., Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honor of J. J. C. Smart. Oxford:Blackwell.
24. Davidson, Donald. 1963. "Actions, Reasons and Causes." Journal of Philosophy 60: 685-700.
25. Defoe, Daniel. 1719. Robinson Crusoe. London: W. Taylor.
26. Dennett, Daniel. 2003. Freedom Evolves. London: Penguin.
27. Dennett, Daniel. 1984. Elbow Room: Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
28. de Sousa, Ronald. 2010. "Emotion." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..
29. de Sousa, Ronald. 1987. The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
30. Driver, Julia. 1992. "The Suberogatory." Australian Journal of Philosophy 70: 286-295.
31. Edwards, Paul. 1958. "Hard and Soft Determinism." In Hook: 117-125.
32. Feinberg, Joel. 1986. Harm to Others. New York: Oxford University Press.
33. Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
34. Fischer, John Martin. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell.
35. Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. 2007. Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
36. Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37. Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. eds. 1993. Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
38. Forster, E. M. 1910. Howards End. London: E. Arnold.
39. Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68: 5-20.
40. Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66:829-839.
41. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
42. Ginet, Carl. 1990. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43. Glover, Jonathan. 1970. Responsibility. New York: Humanities Press.
44. Green, Mitchell S. 2007. Self-Expression. New York: Oxford University Press.
45. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
46. Grice, H. P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In Cole and Morgan. Reprinted in Grice, 1989:22-40.
47. Grice, H. P. 1969. "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions." Philosophical Review 78: 147-177. Reprinted in Grice, 1989: 86-116.
48. Grice, H. P. 1957. "Meaning." Philosophical Review 66. Reprinted in Grice, 1989: 213-223.
49. Haji, Ishtiyaque. 2003. "The Emotional Depravity of Psychopaths and Culpability." Legal Theory 9: 65-82.
50. Haji, Ishtiyaque. 1998. Moral Appraisability. New York: Oxford University Press.
51. Heironymi, Pamela. 2004. "The Force and Fairness of Blame." Philosophical Perspectives 18(1): 115-148.
52. Heyd, David. 2006. "Supererogation." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..
53. Heyd, David. 1982. Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
54. Honderich, Ted, ed. 1973. Essays on Freedom and Action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
55. Hook, Sidney, ed. 1958. Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. London: Collier.
56. Hume, David. 1978. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Niditch. Oxford: Clarendon.
57. Hume, David. 1772. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P. H. Niditch. Reprinted 1978. Oxford:Clarendon.
58. James, William. 1884. "What Is an Emotion?" Mind 9: 188-209.
59. Kane, Robert. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
60. Kane, Robert. 1985. Free Will and Values. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
61. Kant, Immanuel. 1797. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Part I, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. Ladd. Reprinted 1965. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
62. King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1963. "Letter from Birmingham City Jail.".
63. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
64. Korsgaard, Christine. 1983. "Two Distinctions in Goodness." Philosophical Review 92: 169-195.
65. Lenman, James. 2006. "Compatibilism and Contractualism: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility." Ethics 117: 7-31.
66. Levy, N. 2005. "The Good the Bad and the Blameworthy." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(2): 1-16.
67. Lewis, David. 1986. Philosophical Papers, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.
68. Lewis, David. 1981. "Are We Free to Break the Laws?" Theoria 47: 113-121.
69. Lewis, David. 1976. "Paradoxes of Time Travel." American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 145-152.
70. Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
71. Lucas, R. J. 1993. Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
72. McKenna, Michael. 2009a. "Compatibilism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..
73. McKenna, Michael. 2009b. "Compatibilism and Desert." Philosophical Studies 144(1): 3-13.
74. McKenna, Michael. 2008. "Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 139: 29-37.
75. McKenna, Michael. 2005. "Where Strawson and Frankfurt Meet." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:163-180.
76. McKenna, Michael. 2003. "Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives." In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, ed. Widerker and McKenna.
77. McKenna, Michael. 2000. "Toward a Speaker Meaning Theory of Moral Responsibility." In Ton van den Beld, ed., Responsibility & Ontology. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic:247-258.
78. McKenna, Michael. 1998. "The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism." Journal of Ethics 2: 123-142.
79. McKenna, Michael, and Paul Russell, eds. 2008. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes:Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment." Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
80. McKenna, Michael, and Aron Vadakin. 2008. "George Sher, In Praise of Blame." Ethics 18(4): 751-757.
81. Mele, Alfred. 2006. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press.
82. Mele, Alfred. 1995. Autonomous Agents. New York: Oxford University Press.
83. Mele, Alfred. 1992. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press.
84. Mele, Alfred, and Steven Sverdlik. 1996. "Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 82: 265-287.
85. Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
86. Nagel, Thomas. 1976. "Moral Luck." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50: 137-151.
87. Nagel, Thomas. 1970. "Death." Noûs 4(1): 73-80.
88. Nichols, Shaun. 2007. "After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive Attitudes." Philosophical Perspectives 21: 405-428.
89. O'Connor, Timothy. 2010. "Free Will." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy..
90. O'Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and Causes. New York: Oxford University Press.
91. Oshana, Marina. 2004. "Moral Accountability." Philosophical Topics 32: 255-274.
92. Oshana, Marina. 1997. "Ascriptions of Responsibility." American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 71-83.
93. Pereboom, Derk. 2009. "Free Will, Love and Anger." Ideas y Valores 141: 5-25.
94. Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
95. Pereboom, Derk, J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, and M. Vargas. 2007. Four Views on Free Will. New York: Blackwell.
96. Pettit, Philip. 2001. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.
97. Ravizza, Mark. 1995. "Review of J. R. Lucas Responsibility." Philosophical Review 104(2): 306-308.
98. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
99. Reiman, Jeffrey H. 1985. "Civilization, Justice, and the Death Penalty." Philosophy and Public Affairs 4(2): 115-148.
100. Russell, Paul. 2004. "Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense." Philosophical Topics 32: 287-306.
101. Russell, Paul. 1995. Freedom and Moral Sentiment. New York: Oxford University Press.
102. Russell, Paul. 1992. "Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility." Ethics 102: 287-302.
103. Scanlon, T. M. 2008. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge, MA:Belknap Harvard Press.
104. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
105. Scanlon, T. M. 1988. "The Significance of Choice." In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Ed. S. McMurrin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
106. Scheffler, Samuel. 1992. "Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics." Philosophy and Public Affairs 21: 299-323.
107. Schiffer, S. 1987. Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
108. Schiffer, S. 1972. Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
109. Schlick, Moritz. 1939. "When Is a Man Responsible?" In Problems of Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall: 143-156.
110. Schoeman, Ferdinand, ed. 1987. Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
111. Sher, George. 2006a. In Praise of Blame. New York: Oxford University Press.
112. Sher, George. 2006b. "Out of Control." Ethics 116(2): 258-301.
113. Shoemaker, David. 2007. "Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of Moral Community." Ethics 118: 70-108.
114. Sidgwick, Henry. 1874. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.
115. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988, Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
116. Smart, J. J. C. 2000. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Clarendon.
117. Smart, J. J. C. 1963. "Free Will, Praise, and Blame." Mind 70: 291-306.
118. Smilansky, Saul. 2000. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Clarendon.
119. Smith, Angela. 2008. "Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment." Philosophical Studies 138: 367-392.
120. Smith, Angela. 2007. "On Being and Holding Responsible." Journal of Ethics 11: 465-484.
121. Smith, Angela. 2005. "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life." Ethics 115: 236-271.
122. Smith, Holly. 1983. "Culpable Ignorance." Philosophical Review 85: 449-487.
123. Smith, Michael. 2003. "Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion." In Stroud and Tappolet: 17-38.
124. Sommers, Tamler. 2007. "The Objective Attitude." Philosophical Quarterly 57(28): 321-342.
125. Steinbeck, John. 1937. Of Mice and Men. New York: Covici-Friede.
126. Strawson, Galen. 2002. "The Bounds of Freedom." In Robert Kane, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press: 441-460.
127. Strawson, Galen. 1994. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 75: 5-24.
128. Strawson, Galen. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon.
129. Strawson, P. F. 1985. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. New York: Columbia University Press.
130. Strawson, P. F. 1962. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 187-211.
131. Stroud, Sarah, and Christine Tappolet, eds. 2003. Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
132. Urmson, J. 1958. "Saints and Heroes." In Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. Melden. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
133. van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon.
134. van Straaten, Zak, ed. 1980. Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson. Oxford: Clarendon.
135. Vargas, Manuel. 2005. "The Trouble with Tracing." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:269-291.
136. Vihvelin, Kadri. 2004. "Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account." Philosophical Topics 32: 427-450.
137. Wallace, R. Jay. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
138. Wallace, R. J., R. Kumar, and S. Freeman, eds. (forthcoming). Reasons and Recognition:Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. New York: Oxford University Press.
139. Watson, Gary. Forthcoming. "The Trouble with Psychopaths." In Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman.
140. Watson, Gary. 2004. Agency and Answerability. New York: Oxford University Press.
141. Watson, Gary. 1996. "Two Faces of Responsibility." Philosophical Topics 24(2): 227-248.
142. Watson, Gary. 1987. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme." In Schoeman: 256-286. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza, 1993.
143. Watson, Gary. ed. 2003. Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
144. Widerker, David. 2000. "Frankfurt's Attack on Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look." Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181-201.
145. Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna, eds. 2003. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
146. Wiggins, David. 1973. "Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism." In Honderich, ed., 1973:31-62.
147. Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
148. Zimmerman, Michael J. 1988. An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.