The emotional depravity of psychopaths and culpability

Legal Theory

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 63-82

  Haji, Ishtiyaque ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47249100086     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S135232520300003X     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. See Ishtiyaque Haji, On Psychopaths and Culpability, 17 LAW & PHIL. 117-40 (1998).
2. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 79-80 (New York, 1998).
3. Walter Glannon, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 14 J. APPLIED PHIL. 263-75 (1997).
4. Paul Russell, Responsibility, Moral Sense and Symmetry, (unpublished manuscript).
5. Aristotle, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross, trans., Oxford, 1987), esp. III.
6. See Ishtiyaque Haji, MORAL APPRAISABILITY: PUZZLES, PROPOSALS, AND PERPLEXITIES (New York, 1998), chs. 6, 7. Fischer and Ravizza propose and defend an account of authenticity; NICOMACHEAN ETHICS note 3, ch. 8. A probing discussion on authenticity and autonomy can be found in Alfred Mele, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS (New York, 1995) ch. 9.
7. See Haji, MORAL APPRAISABILITY: PUZZLES, PROPOSALS, AND PERPLEXITIES note 7.
8. Other proponents of reasons responsiveness accounts include Fischer and Ravizza, MORAL APPRAISABILITY: PUZZLES, PROPOSALS, AND PERPLEXITIES note 3; Gary Watson, Free Action and Free Will, 96 MIND 145-72 (1987); and Jay Wallace, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (Cambridge, MA, 1994).
9. For a desire in one scenario to be the same desire as a desire in another scenario, the two should have the same relative strength-they must have the same strength relative to competing desires. For further elaboration on the notion of volitional control, see Haji, Free Action and Free Will note 7, ch. 20.
10. Carl Elliott, THE RULES OF INSANITY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THEMENTALLY ILLOFFENDER 75-6 (Albany, NY, 1996).
11. There is an note at the end of this passage in the original citing Hervey Cleckley, THE MASK OF SANITY 209 (St. Louis, MO, 1976).
12. Carl Elliott, Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath, 17 J MED & PHIL. 199-214 (1992) at 208.
13. Glannon, Diagnosing Blame: Responsibility and the Psychopath note 4, at 267.
14. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, in ETHICS AND PERSONALITY 207-221 (John Deigh, ed., Chicago, 1992) at p. 209.
15. See Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9.
16. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 12.
17. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 91.
18. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 2, 8.
19. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 63.
20. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 129-31.
21. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 131.
22. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 132.
23. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 135.
24. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 155-66.
25. Wallace, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 9, at 1. See also 86-7, 156-61.
26. Paul Russell, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy note 5, argues that as Wallace is committed to the Kantian strand of responsible agency, he cannot endorse the Humean condition that the capacity to feel or experience moral sentiments is required for being responsible, without compromising his own Kantian position on this issue.
27. See Ishtiyaque Haji, DEONTIC MORALITY AND CONTROL (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
28. See Ishtiyaque Haji, Determinism and Its Threat to the Moral Sentiments, MONIST (forthcoming, 2003).
29. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, eds., PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 18 (Ithaca, NY, 1993).
30. Wallace, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 9, at 77.
31. Wallace, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 9, at 77.
32. Wallace, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 9, at 78.
33. Wallace, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 9, at 78-9, n. 41.
34. Russell, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 5.
35. Glannon, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 4, at 268.
36. Glannon, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 4, at 265.
37. Glannon, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 4, at 268, emphasis added.
38. For discussion and defense of this precept, see Mele, PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY note 7, at 150.
39. Fischer & Ravizza, For discussion and defense of this precept note 3, at 76-80.
40. Fischer & Ravizza, For discussion and defense of this precept note 3, at 74.
41. See, for example, Michael McKenna, book review of RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL in 98 J PHIL. 93-100 (2001) Russell, For discussion and defense of this precept note 5; and Gary Watson, Reasons and Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 374-94 (2001).
42. For more on varieties of normative responsibility, see Haji, Reasons and Responsibility note 7, ch. 11.
43. Michael S. Moore, PLACINGBLAME:ATHEORYOFCRIMINALLAW 524 (note omitted) (Oxford, 1997).
44. For further illuminating discussion of this second strand, see Joel Feinberg, HARM TO SELF. 3 THE MORAL LIMITTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 189-268 (New York, 1986).
45. See Michael J. Zimmerman, AN ESSAY ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 106 (Totowa, NJ, 1988).