Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge

Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-464

  Bar On, Dorit ^a  

^a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

Anti deflationism; Avowals; Epistemology; Expression; Expressivism; Philosophy of language; Philosophy of mind; Realism about mental states; Self knowledge; Theory of action

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922015408     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199276285.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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