Knowing Selves: Expression, Truth and Knowledge

Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 179-212

  Bar On, Dorit ^a   Long, Douglas C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85139276785     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315245997-19     Document Type: Chapter

References (35)

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