Moore’s many paradoxes

Philosophical Papers

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 97-109

  Green, Mitchell S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85011227516     PISSN: 05568641     EISSN: 19968523     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/05568649909506594     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. T. Baldwin, G.E. Moore (London: Routledge, 1990).
2. M. Bratman, ‘Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context’, Mind 101 (1992) 1-15.
3. J. Cargile, ‘On Believing You Believe’, Analysis 27 (1967) 177-183.
4. M. Crimmins, ‘Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs’, Mindand Language 7 (1992) 240-263.
5. L. Goldstein, ‘Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions’, Analysis 53 (1993) 93-9.
6. M. Green, ‘On the Autonomy of Linguistic Meaning’, Mind 106 (1997) 217-243.
7. M. Green, ‘Direct Reference and Implicature’, Philosophical Studies, 91 (1998) 61-90.
8. R. Hamish, ‘Searle and the Logic of Moore’s Paradox’, International Logic Review 11 (1980) 72-6.
9. J. Heal, ‘Insincerity and Commands’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1977) 183-202
10. J. Heal, ‘Moore’s Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach’, Mind 103 (1994) 5-24.
11. O. Jones, ‘Moore’s Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge’, Analysis 51 (1991) 183-6.
12. K. Linville, and M. Ring, ‘Moore’s Paradox: Assertion and Implication’, Behaviorism 1 (1973) 87-102.
13. K. Linville, and M. Ring, ‘Moore’s Paradox Revisited’, Synthese 87 (1991) 295-309.
14. D. Rosenthal, ‘Self-knowledge and Moore’s Paradox’, Philosophical Studies 77 (1995) 195-09
15. D. Rosenthal, ‘Thinking That One Thinks’, in A. Burri (ed.) Language and Thought (De Gruyter), 259-287.
16. J. Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of IZlocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 1985).
17. S. Shoemaker, ‘On Knowing One’s Own Mind’, Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology (Ridgeview, 1988) 183-209. Reprinted in Shoemaker, 1996, 25-49.
18. S. Shoemaker, ‘Moore’s Paradox and Self-Knowledge’ Philosophical Studies 77 (1995) 211-28. Reprinted with revisions in Shoemaker 1996, 74-96.
19. S. Shoemaker, The First Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge, 1996).
20. R. Sorensen, Blindspots (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).
21. Stalnaker, R. Inquiry (M.I.T.)
22. Stalnaker, R. ‘On the Representation of Content’, Journal of logic, Language, and Information 7 (1998). Reprinted in R. Stalnaker, Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (Oxford, 1999) 96-113.
23. M. Welboume, ‘More on Moore’, Analysis 52 (1992) 237-41.
24. J.N. Williams, ‘Moore’s Paradox: One Or Two?' 39 (1979) 141-2.
25. J.N. Williams, ‘The Absurdities of Moore’s Paradoxes’, Theoria 48 (1982) 38-46.
26. J.N. Williams, ‘Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional "Structure" of Assertion’, Analysis 54 (1994) 160-6.
27. J.N. Williams, ‘Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996) 135-49.
28. J.N. Williams, ‘Wittgensteinian Accounts of Moorean Absurdity’, Philosophical Studies 92 (1998) 283-306.
29. L. Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, Keynes, and Moore (ed.) G.H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).