An empirical analysis of noncompetition clauses and other restrictive postemployment covenants

Vanderbilt Law Review

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 1-51

  Bishara, Norman D ^a   Martin, Kenneth J ^b   Thomas, Randall S ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921948072     PISSN: 00422533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (190)

1. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23-44 (2004).
2. But see John Core, Wayne Guay & Randall Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1158-60 (2005)
3. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629-31 (1960)
4. citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.);
5. 1 P. Wms. 181
6. See Orly Lobel, Why Noncompetes May Give You the Least Desirable Employees, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2014, 4:30 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/01/22/ orly-lobel-why-non-competes-may-give-you-the-least-desirable-employees/
7. See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO B E FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 7 (2013)
8. See Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001)
9. Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM . & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010)
10. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications for the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 577 (2001)
11. Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 526-27 (1990)
12. See COLO. REV. ST. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2012)
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2012)
14. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2012)
15. See H. 2293, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.com/ uploads/file/Noncompete%20Bill%20-%202011%20As%20Filed%201-20-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C8TN-3XMC
16. proposing amendments to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 1 (2006);
17. see also S.B. 1771, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012)
18. proposing amendments to OKLA. STAT. tit.15 § 219A (2011)
19. H.B. 0016, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011)
20. S.B. 786, 96th Leg. (Mich. 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/127269020/Michigan-Non-Compete-Bill-SB-786, archived at http://perma.cc/P7YA-BU2K
21. amending "Michigan antitrust reform act," MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (1987).
22. See, e.g., Alliant Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Gaddy, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 266-68 (2008)
23. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1215 (2001).
24. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA . L. REV. 379, 384-85 (2006).
25. See also Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 STAN. L. REV. 87, 106 (1993)
26. Wonnell, supra note 10, at 89
27. See Jin-Hyuk Kim, Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to Compete 24 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/ conference/download.cgi?db-name=IIOC2008&paper-id=16,archived at http://perma.cc/ FA2Q-BSKP (discussing instances, in light of noncompetes, in which a firm's behavior in poaching workers from its competitors can be either acceptable competition or a predatory act).
28. See David L. Johnson, The Parameters of "Solicitation" in an Era of Non-Solicitation Covenants, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 99 (2012)
29. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1701 (2009)
30. See e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (N.Y. 1999)
31. Joann S. Lublin, Companies Loosen the Handcuffs on Non-Competes: Companies Are Making It Easier for Senior Managers to Jump Ship, Though It Can Be Costly, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2013 11:12 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579008592336383078
32. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 236-41 (2006).
33. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 20-21 (2012)
34. see also Jennifer Liberto, CEO Pay Is 380 Times Average Worker's-AFL-CIO, CNNMONEY (Apr. 19, 2012 1:12PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/ 04/19/news/economy/ceo-pay/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/W38G-7FU3
35. see generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 61-79.
36. See DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 237 (2011):
37. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 23-24 (2008).
38. Eric A. Posner, Alexander Triantis & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective 2-3 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 137, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=285805, archived at http://perma.cc/ YD5Z-XCGY
39. See also Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 93 (1981)
40. Estlund, supra note 10, at 415-20;
41. see also infra Part II.A
42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981)
43. Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 765 (2010)
44. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 254-57.
45. See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-Competition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 376-79 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009)
47. See, e.g., Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472, 475-81 (2006)
48. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 700 (2011)
49. See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions for Directors' Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, 444-57 (2006)
50. See Andrew Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 461-64 (2009)
51. See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciaries Are There in Corporate Law, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (2010)
52. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2006)
53. Muir & Schipani, supra note 33, at 444-57.
54. Wendi S. Lazar & Gary R. Siniscalco, Confidentiality, Trade Secrets, and Other Duties and Restrictive Covenants in a Global Economy, in RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 19 (Wendi S. Lazar & Gary R. Siniscalco eds., 2010)
55. See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 982-83 (2012)
56. see also Marx, supra note 32, at 697
57. see MACEY, supra note 23, at 22-23,
58. See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee's Post-Employment Mobility, 49 A M. BUS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2012)
59. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762-63 (2002).
60. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 A M. BUS. L.J. 151, 169-71 (1998) .
61. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at ∗7-24, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011)
62. aff'd, 437 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011)
63. See Bob Hepple, The Duty of Employee Loyalty in English Law, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL' Y J. 205, 214 (1999):
64. see Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 25-27.
65. See also Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2002)
66. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1499 (2010)
67. See, e.g., Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL' Y J. 389, 389 (2009)
68. see Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 2-3.
69. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 80.15 (2013)
70. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999)
71. prong in Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 2011).
72. citing Blake, supra note 3, at 651-74;
73. see also Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976)
74. See generally Blake, supra note 3, at 631
75. Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 116 F. App'x 435, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2004)
76. See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 5, at 876.
77. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577 (1999)
78. in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008).
79. California's anti-employee CNC statute is CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2014)
80. see Gilson, supra note 55, at 613-20.
81. See, e.g., Garmaise, supra note 30, at 376
82. Marx, et al., supra note 31, at 879-87
83. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 5, at 49
84. see also Whitmore, supra note 5, at 494 n.67
85. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenant Not to Compete Agreements, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 753, 757 (2011)
86. See, e.g., Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 164 (2008)
87. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1214-15.
88. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 25, at 93
89. Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 294 (2006).
90. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 61, at 164.
91. Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013 (2006).
92. Adam Davidson, C.E.O.'s Don't Need to Earn Less. They Need to Sweat More, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 2, 2013, at 14
93. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 835 (2006).
94. Posner, supra note 66, at 1018.
95. See, e.g., Muir & Schipani, supra note 33, at 444-57
96. Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 849 (2011)
97. see also LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 22, at 78-89
98. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 23-44;
99. see also David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436-37 (2010) (describing the debates around executive pay and the portfolio of possible regulatory proposals).
100. See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1189-1260 (2004)
101. see Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Comparing CEO Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia and the United States, 64 VAND. L. REV. 559, 594 tbl. 2 (2011).
102. The notable exception is Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 254-57.
103. See MACEY, supra note 23, at 51-53, 59-60.
104. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 42, at 762
105. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 66, at 1015-20.
106. see David Armstrong, What Does a Noncompete Pact Truly Bar? Nasty Row Sorts It Out-Iron Mountain Fires an Official, Then Uses Sleuths to See if He's Becoming Its Rival, WALL ST. J., Jun. 14, 2004, at A1
107. See Iron Mountain Inc. v. Carr, NO. 05-10890-RCL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98655, at ∗6-11 (D. Mass. Mar. 13, 2006).
108. Kate Linebaugh & Joann S. Lublin, For Retiring GE Executive, $89,000 a Month Not to Work, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, at B1.
109. See Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 533-34 (E.D. Va. 2012).
110. See e.g., Stone, supra note 5, at 578.
111. See Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing Disfavor of Non-Compete Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting Employers' Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA . J. BUS. L. 1003, 1003-04 (2011)
112. See, for example, M-I LLC v. Stelly, 733 F. Supp. 2d 759, 772-73 (S.D. Tex. 2010),
113. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence Reveals the Economic Harm of Non-Compete Covenants, REGULATION, Winter 2010-2011, at 6, 7-9
114. adapted from Alan Hyde, Intellectual Property Justifications for Restricting Employee Mobility: A Critical Appraisal in Light of the Economic Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 357 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., 2012.
115. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 152-53
116. see also James C. Bruno & David C. Hissong, Enforcement of Non-Disclosure Agreements: Does MCLA 445.1901 and Related Case Law Apply in Other States?, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 58, 58
117. See Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 13.
118. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 156-58.
119. See Bruno & Hissong, supra note 86, at 58
120. See, e.g., Laro Maint. Corp. v. Culkin, 700 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491-92 (App. Div. 1999);
121. Royal Carbo Corp. v. Flameguard, Inc., 645 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (App. Div. 1996)
122. See Maura I. Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements and the Threat of Disqualification, Part II, 90 NEB. L. REV. 141, 182-83 (2011).
123. See, e.g., Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 762-63 (Iowa 1999).
124. See, e.g., Thiesing v. Detsply Int'l, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 932, 951-52.
125. See, e.g., Revere, 595 N.W.2d at 761-63.
126. See, for example, Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 250-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999),
127. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 157
128. See, e.g., Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250-51.
129. See, e.g., Atl. Bread Co. Int'l v. Lupton-Smith, 663 S.E.2d 743, 748 (2008)
130. aff'd, 679 S.E.2d 722 (2009)
131. See, e.g., Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250:
132. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 179-86
133. See Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 364-66 (2010)
134. Randall Thomas, Erin O'Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 977 (2010).
135. See, e.g., Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 95, 101-08 (1998)
136. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at ∗4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011)
137. , aff'd, 437 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011)
138. Garmaise, supra note 30, at 379
139. See Posner, Triantis & Triantis, supra note 25, at 3.
140. See, e.g., Visentin, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15342, at ∗4 (nothing that over 1, 700 IBM employees were asked to sign some form of restrictive covenant).
141. Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 158-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
142. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at ∗5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011),
143. aff'd, 437 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011)
144. In one reported example, a large international firm asks all of its employees-even when the employee is based in California-to sign a restrictive covenant. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
145. WILLIAM MENDENHALL & JAMES E. REINMUTH, STATISTICS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 471-85 (2d ed. 1974).
146. See, e.g., Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 246-48.
147. See Generally Bishara, supra note 60,at 756-57
148. See Generally Bishara, supra note 60,at 756-57
149. See AM. BAR ASS'n SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (brian M. Malsberger et al. eds., 9th ed. 2013)
150. see Bishara, supra note 60, at 772-79.
151. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999)
152. See, e.g., MCS Servs., Inc. v. Jones, No. WMN-10-1042, 2010 WL 3895380, at ∗5 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2010).
153. See also Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 764-66 (Iowa 1999)
154. See Kim, supra note 13, at 2.
155. See, e.g., Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 2, 8.
156. See generally Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W.L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent Work, Knowledge Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680, 691-95 (1998).
157. see Bessemer Trust Co. v. Branin, 949 N.E.2d 462, 469-71 (2011).
158. See Johnson, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
159. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204 (2014);
160. See, for example, EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
161. see statutes in Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2012) (stating that two years from termination is reasonable, while any addditional time exceeding the two years is voidable and unenforceable), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-12(2012)
162. See e.g., USI ins. Servs., LLC v. Miner, 801 F. Supp. 2d 175, 190-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
163. See, e. g., EarthWeb, inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313
164. See, e.g., Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
165. See Susanna K. Gibbons, Non-Compete Covenant Held Enforceable Despite Broad Geographic Scope, NAT'L L. REV. (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/non-compete-covenant-held-enforceable-despite-broad-geographic-scop, archived at http://perma.cc/8GX8-D42U
166. See Court Upholds Covenant Not to Compete, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/business-operations/court-upholds-covenant-not-to-compete.html, archived at http://perma.cc/577Y-XXNX
167. See, e.g., Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313
168. see also Wayne S. Moskowitz, Enforceable Covenants Not to Compete, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/business-operations/enforceable-covenants-not-to-compete.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HL8J-TVWA
169. See, e.g. Chris Montville. Note. Reforming the Law of Proprietary information. 56 DUKE L.J. 1159.1180-83(2007)
170. See, e.g. Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing the elements of a protectable trade secret).
171. See Courtroom Scis., Inc. v. Andrews, No. 3:09-CV-251-0, 2009 WL 1313274,at ∗10 (N.D. Tex May 11. 2009)
172. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 43 at 155.
173. see e. g. Shlack, 71 f. Supp. 2d at 313
174. See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2010)
175. Noncompete enforcement subsequent to a not-for-use termination is controversial among scholars. See generall Staidl, supra note 110
176. See generally Thomas, O'Hara & Martin, supra note 104
177. see Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503-04 (2012)
178. see Hyde v. KLS Prof'l Advisors Grp., LLC, 500 Fed. App'x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2012).
179. See, e.g., Synergy Advanced Pharms., Inc. v. Capebio, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 1736(SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53252, at ∗18 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2010)
180. See, e.g., Quaker Chem. Corp. v. Varga, 509 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478-79 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
181. See generally Bishara, supra note 60, at 780.
182. See Lester, supra note 5, at 49;
183. Moffat, supra note 5, at 876;
184. Stone, supra note 5, at 577;
185. Whitmore, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1
187. see also Lublin, supra note 18
188. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 25, at 99.
189. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2012).
190. th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at http:// www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.com/uploads/file/Noncompete%20Bill%20-%202011%20As%2 0Filed%201-20-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C8TN-3XMC