No fact of the matter

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 457-480

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746176696     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713659756     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Field, Hartry 2000. Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle, Nous 34: 1-30;
2. also, with a new Postscript, in Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 278-311.
3. Field, Hartry, 2003a. A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes, Journal of Philosophical Logic 32: 139-77.
4. Field, Hartry, 2003b. Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False? forthcoming in Deflationism and Paradox, ed. Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Field, Hartry, 2003c. The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness, forthcoming in Liars and Heaps, ed. JC Beall, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Field, Hartry, 2004. Mathematical Undecidables, Metaphysical Realism, and Equivalent Descriptions, forthcoming in The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, ed. R. Auxier, Chicago: Open Court.
7. Fine, Kit 1975. Vagueness, Truth and Logic, Synthese 30: 265-300.
8. Hajek, Petr, Jeff Paris, and John Sheperdson 2000. The Liar Paradox and Fuzzy Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic 65: 339-46.
9. Priest, Graham 1998. What Is So Bad About Contradictions? Journal of Philosophy 95: 410-26.
10. Reichenbach, Hans 1938. Experience and Prediction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
11. Restall, Greg 1992. Arithmetic and Truth in Lukaciewicz's Infinitely Valued Logic, Logique et Analyse1939-40: 303-12.
12. Shafer, Glen 1976. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
13. Williamson, Timothy 1994. Vagueness, London: Routledge.