Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 156, Issue , 2015, Pages 269-316

  Adlakha, Sachin ^a   Johari, Ramesh ^b   Weintraub, Gabriel Y ^c  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation; Industrial organization; Stationary equilibrium; Stochastic dynamic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921647657     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.002     Document Type: Article

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