On oblivious equilibrium in large population stochastic games

Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 3117-3124

  Adlakha, Sachin ^a   Johari, Ramesh ^a   Weintraub, Gabriel Y ^b   Goldsmith, Andrea ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

CURSE OF DIMENSIONALITY; LARGE POPULATION; MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; PAYOFF FUNCTION; STANDARD SOLUTIONS; STOCHASTIC GAME;

STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

EID: 79953127460     PISSN: 07431546     EISSN: 25762370     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CDC.2010.5717048     Document Type: Conference Paper

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