There is no norm of truth: A minimalist reply to Wright

Analysis

Volumn 59, Issue 264, 1999, Pages 291-299

  Dodd, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61249744503     PISSN: 00032638     EISSN: 14678284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8284.00182     Document Type: Note

References (16)

1. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Burgess, J. A. 1997. What is minimalism about truth? Analysis 57: 259-67.
3. Devitt, M. 1991. Minimalist truth: a critical notice of Paul Horwich's Truth. Mind and Language 6: 273-83.
4. Dodd, J. 1999. Farewell to states of affairs. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 146-60.
5. Dummett, M. 1950. Truth.
6. Reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth.
7. Heal, J. 1987-8. The disinterested search for truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 97-108.
8. Horwich, P. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Blackwell.
9. Horwich, P. 1996. Realism minus truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 877-81.
10. Kölbel, M. 1997. Wright's argument from neutrality. Ratio 10: 35-47.
11. Quine, W. V. O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
12. Russell, B. 1904. Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions. Reprinted in his 1973, 21-76.
13. Russell, B. 1973. Essays in Analysis, ed. D. Lackey. New York: Braziller.
14. Stoljar, D. 1997. Deflationary theory of truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/
15. Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
16. Wright, C. 1996. Response to commentators. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 911-41.