An identity theory of truth

An Identity Theory of Truth

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-200

  Dodd, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85014663970     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230584266     Document Type: Book

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