Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-387

  Watson, Gary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Addiction; Agency; Determinism; Evaluation; Free will; Manipulation; Normative competence; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920671063     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272273.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (269)

1. Abélard, Peter (c.1139/1995), Ethics, in Ethical Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett), 1-58.
2. Adams, Robert (1985), 'Involuntary Sin', Philosophical Review, 94: 3-31.
3. Ainslie, George (1998), 'A Research-Based Theory of Addictive Motivation', Law and Philosophy, 19/1: 77-115.
4. Albritton, R.(1985), 'Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 59: 239-51; repr. in Watson (2003), 408-23.
5. Allison, Henry (1990), Kant's Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press).
6. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1963), Intention, 2nd edn. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
7. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981a), 'Causality and Determinism', in Anscombe (1981b), 133-47.
8. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981b), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. iii (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
9. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1981c), 'Soft Determinism', in Anscombe (1982b), 163-72.
10. Aristotle (1985), Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis:Hackett).
11. Aristotle (1954), Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, The World's Classics (London: Oxford University Press).
12. Aune, B. (1982), 'Hypotheticals and 'Can'', in Watson (1982), 36-41.
13. Austen, Jane (1932-54), The Oxford Illustrated Jane Austen, 3rd edn., ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
14. Ayer, A. J. (1982), 'Freedom and Necessity', in Watson (1982), 15-23.
15. Beardsley, Elizabeth (1960), 'Determinism and Moral Perspectives', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17: 1-20.
16. Bennett, Jonathan (1980), 'Accountability', in Zak van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 14-47.
17. Benson, Paul (1987), 'Freedom and Value', Journal of Philosophy, 84: 465-86.
18. Berlin, Isaiah (1969), Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press).
19. Blackstone, William (1770), Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-7) (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
20. Blum, Kenneth, et al. (1996), 'Reward Deficiency Syndrome', American Scientist, 84: 132-45.
21. Bok, Hilary (1999), Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
22. BonJour, L. (1976), 'Determinism, Libertarianism, and Agent Causation', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 14: 145-56.
23. Boorse, Christopher (1987), 'Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility', in Premenstrual Syndrome: Ethical and Legal Implications in a Biomedical Perspective (New York: Plenum Press), 81-124.
24. Bramhall, Bishop (1962), 'Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance', repr. in Morgenbesser and Walsh (1962), 41-51.
25. Brand, M. and D. Walton (1976) (eds.), Action Theory (Dordrecht: Reidel).
26. Brandt, Richard (1958), 'Blameworthiness and Obligation', in A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 3-39.
27. Bratman, M. (1985), 'Davidson's Theory of Intention', in B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 13-26.
28. Bratman, M. (1986), 'Intention and Evaluation', in P. French et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. x (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 185-9.
29. Bratman, M. (1987), Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press).
30. Bratman, M. (1992), 'Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context', repr. in Bratman (1999), 15-34.
31. Bratman, M. (1996), 'Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason', Philosophical Topics, 185, 185-206.
32. Bratman, M. (1999), Faces of Intention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
33. Broad, C. D. (1962), 'Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertatianism', in Morgenbesser and Walsh (1962), 115-32.
34. Buss, Sarah (1999), 'What Practical Reasoning Must Be if We Act for our own Reasons', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 399-421.
35. Broad, C. D. and Overton, Lee (2002) (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
36. Calhoun, Cheshire (1995), 'Standing for Something', Journal of Philosophy, 92: 235-60.
37. Chisholm, R. (1964), 'Human Freedom and the Self', repr. in Watson (2003), 26-37.
38. Chisholm, R. (1976) 'The Agent as Cause', in Brand and Walton (1976), 199-212.
39. Cleckley, Hervey (1941), The Mask of Sanity (St Louis: C. V. Mosby).
40. Clifford, William Kingdon (1866), 'The Ethics of Belief', repr. in L. Stephen and F. Pollock (eds.), Lectures and Essays by William Kingdon Clifford, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1879), ii. 177-211.
41. Code, Lorraine (1987), Epistemic Responsibility (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England).
42. Cohen, L. Jonathan (1989), 'Belief and Acceptance', Mind, 98: 367-89.
43. Corwin, Miles (1982), 'Icy Killer's Life Steeped in Violence', Los Angeles Times, 16 May.
44. Crucius, Christian (1990), Guide to Rational Living, in J. B. Schneewind (ed.), Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, vol. ii (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 569-85.
45. Cullity, Garrett, and Gaut, Berys (1997) (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
46. Dan-Cohen, Meir (1983), 'Actus Reus', in Sanford Kadish (ed.), Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice (New York: Free Press), 15-22.
47. Davidson, D. (1963), 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', repr. in Davidson (1980), 3-19.
48. Davidson, D. (1970), 'How is Weakness of the Will Possible?', repr. in Davidson (1980), 21-42.
49. Davidson, D. (1973), 'Freedom to Act', repr. in Davidson (1980), 63-81.
50. Davidson, D. (1978), 'Intending', repr. in Davidson (1980), 83-102.
51. Davidson, D. (1980), Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford University Press).
52. Delgado, Richard (1985), ''Rotten Social Background': Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?', Law and Equality, 9.
53. Dennett, D. (1984), Elbow Room (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
54. Descartes, René (1641a/1967), 'Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God and the Distinction between Soul and Body, drawn up in Geometrical Fashion', in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press), ii. 52-9.
55. Descartes, René (1641b/1984), 'Author's Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections', in Descartes (1984), ii. 285-301.
56. Descartes, René (1641c/1984), Meditations on First Philosophy, in Descartes (1984), ii. 1-62.
57. Descartes, René (1649/1984), The Passions of the Soul, in Descartes (1984), i. 325-404.
58. Descartes, René (1984), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
59. Dewey, John (1891/1957), Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics (New York:Hillary House).
60. Double, Richard (1991), The Non-Reality of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
61. Dressler, Joshua (1989), 'Exegesis and the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits', Southern California Law Review, 62/5: 331-89.
62. Duff, Antony (1977), 'Psychopathy and Moral Understanding', American Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 189-200.
63. Dworkin, G. (1970), 'Acting Freely', Nous, 4: 367-83.
64. Dworkin, G. (1976) 'Autonomy and Behavior Control', Hastings Center Report, 6: 23-8.
65. Einstein, Albert (1982), Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown Publishers).
66. Elster, Jon (1999a), 'Rationality and Addiction', unpublished typescript.
67. Elster, Jon (1999b), Ulysses Unbound (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
68. Feinberg, Joel (1970), 'What is so Special about Mental Illness?', in Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 272-92.
69. Fine, G. (1981), 'Aristotle's Determinism', Philosophical Review, 90: 561-79.
70. Fingarette, Herbert (1967), On Responsibility (New York: Basic Books).
71. Fine, G. (1970), 'The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the 'Disease Concept of Alcoholism' ', Harvard Law Review, 83: 793-812.
72. Fine, G. (1988), Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease (Berkeley:University of California Press).
73. Fischer, John Martin (1982), 'Responsibility and Control', Journal of Philosophy, 89: 24-40.
74. Fischer, John Martin (1983), 'Incompatibilism', Philosophical Studies, 43: 127-37.
75. Fischer, John Martin (1986), 'Van Inwagen on Free Will', Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 252-60.
76. Fischer, John Martin (1987), 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility', in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 81-106.
77. Fischer, John Martin (1994), The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell).
78. Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark (1991), 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics, 101:258-78.
79. Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark (1995), 'When the Will is Free', in Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events (New York: Oxford University Press), 239-69.
80. Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark (1997), Responsibility and Control (New York: Cambridge University Press).
81. Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark (1998), Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
82. Foley, R. (1979), 'Compatibilism and Control over the Past', Analysis, 39: 70-4.
83. Foot, Philippa (1978), Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press).
84. Frankfurt, H. (1969), 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', Journal of Philosophy, 89; repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 1-10.
85. Frankfurt, H. (1971), 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy, 11, 25-.
86. Frankfurt, H. (1973), 'Coercion and Moral Responsibility', repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 24-46.
87. Frankfurt, H. (1975), 'Three Concepts of Free Action', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol.; repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 47-57.
88. Frankfurt, H. (1976), 'Identification and Externality', repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 58-68.
89. Frankfurt, H. (1978), 'The Problem of Action', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15; repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 69-79.
90. Frankfurt, H. (1987), 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', repr. in Frankfurt (1988), 159-76.
91. Frankfurt, H. (1988), The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).
92. Frankfurt, H. (1992), 'The Faintest Passion', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 95, 107-.
93. Frankfurt, H. (1999a), 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love', in Necessity, Volition, and Love (New York: Cambridge University Press), 129-41.
94. Frankfurt, H. (1999b), 'On Caring', in Necessity, Volition, and Love (New York:Cambridge University Press), 155-80.
95. Frankfurt, H. (1999c), 'On the Necessity of Ideals', in Necessity, Volition, and Love (New York: Cambridge University Press), 108-16.
96. Gardner, Eliot L. (1997), 'Brain Reward Mechanisms', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 51-85.
97. Gardner, Eliot L. and Lowinson, Joyce H. (1993), 'Drug Craving and Positive/Negative Hedonic Brain Substrates Activated by Addicting Drugs', The Neurosciences, 5: 359-68.
98. Gert, B., and Duggan, T. (1979), 'Free Will as Ability to Will', Nous, 13: 197-217.
99. Ginet, C. (1966), 'Might We Have No Choice?', in Lehrer (1966), 87-104.
100. Ginet, C. (1980), 'The Conditional Analysis of Freedom', in van Inwagen (1980), 171-86.
101. Ginet, C. (1983), 'A Defense of Incompatibilism', Philosophical Studies, 44: 391-400.
102. Glover, J. (1970), Responsibility (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
103. Gold, Mark S., and Miller, Norman S. (1997), 'Cocaine (and Crack):Neurobiology', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 167-80.
104. Gold, Mark S., and Goodman, Ariel (1997), 'Sexual Addiction', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 340-54.
105. Gold, Mark S., Johnson, C., and Stennie, K. (1997), 'Eating Disorders', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 319-30.
106. Goldman, A. (1970), A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall).
107. Gold, Mark S., (1978), 'Chisholm's Theory of Action', Philosophia, 8: 583-96.
108. Greenspan, P. S. (1978), 'Behavior Control and Freedom of Action', Philosophical Review, 191, 204-.
109. Grinspoon, Lester, and Bakular, James (1976), Cocaine: A Drug and its Social Evolution (New York: Basic Books).
110. Haksar, Vinit (1965), 'The Responsibility of Psychopaths', Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 135-45.
111. Halikas, James, et al. (1997), 'Craving', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 85-90.
112. Halikas, James, et al. (1991), 'The Measurement of Craving in Cocaine Patients using the Minnesota Cocaine Craving Scale', Comprehensive Psychiatry, 32/1: 22-7.
113. Hamill, Pete (1994), A Drinking Life (Boston: Little, Brown).
114. Hamilton, Edith, and Cairns, Huntington (1989) (eds.), Plato: The Collected Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
115. Hampshire, S. (1959), Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press).
116. Hampshire, S. (1965), Freedom of the Individual (New York: Harper and Row).
117. Hampshire, S. (1983a), Morality and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
118. Hampshire, S. (1983b), 'Two Kinds of Explanation', in Hampshire (1983a), 69-81.
119. Hampshire, S. (1983c), 'Two Kinds of Morality', in Hampshire (1983a), 10-68.
120. Harman, Gilbert (1978), 'Morality and Politics', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. iii (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 109-21.
121. Hart, H. L. A. (1968), Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
122. Heil, John (1983), 'Doxastic Agency', Philosophical Studies, 43: 355-64.
123. Herman, Barbara (2002), 'Bootstrapping', in Buss and Overton (2002), 253-74.
124. Hobart, R. E. (1966), 'Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without it', in Bernard Berofsky (ed.), Free Will and Determinism (New York:Harper and Row), 63-95.
125. Hobbes, T. (1648/1969), 'Of Liberty and Necessity', in D. D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists, 1650-1800, vol. i (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 61-70.
126. Hoffman, Paul (1995), 'Freedom and Strength of Will: Descartes and Albritton', Philosophical Studies, 77: 241-60.
127. Holstrom, N. (1977), 'Firming Up Soft Determinism', The Personalist.
128. Holton, Richard (1999), 'Intention and Weakness of Will', Journal of Philosophy, 96: 241-62.
129. Holton, Richard (2003), 'How is strength of Will Possible?', in Strand and Taggolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
130. Honderich, T. (1973) (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
131. Hornsby, J. (1980), Actions (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
132. Hurley, Susan (1989), Natural Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press).
133. Irwin, Terence H. (1992), 'Who Discovered the Will?', Philosophical Perspectives, 6: 453-73.
134. James, William (1896), 'The Will to Believe', repr. in F. H. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, and I. K. Skrupskelis (eds.), The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 13-33.
135. James, William (1950), The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Dover).
136. Jeffrey, Richard C. (1974), 'Preferences among Preferences', Journal of Philosophy, 71/13: 377-91.
137. Kadish, Sanford H. (1987), 'Excusing Crime', in California Law Review, 75:257-89.
138. Kadish, Sanford H. and Schulhofer, Stephen J. (1989), Criminal Law and its Processes, 5th edn. (Boston: Little, Brown).
139. Kahan, Dan, and Nussbaum, Martha (1996), 'Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law', Columbia Law Review, 96/2: 269-374.
140. Kahn, Charles (1985), 'Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine', in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The Question of 'Eclecticism' (Berkeley:University of California Press), 234-59.
141. Kane, Robert (1985), Free Will and Values (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
142. Kane, Robert (1996), The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press).
143. Kant, I. (1788/1956), Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press).
144. Kant, I. (1797/1991), The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press).
145. Katz, Leo (1987), Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press).
146. Kenny, A. (1976), Freedom, Will and Power (Oxford: Blackwell).
147. Kolnai, A. (1966-7), 'Freedom and Choice', in The Human Self, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, I.
148. Korsgaard, Christine (1996b), The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).
149. Korsgaard, Christine (1997), 'The Normativity of Instrumental Reason', in Cullity and Gaut (1997), 215-54.
150. Kreek, Jeanne, and Reisinger, Marc (1997), 'The Addict as Patient', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 997-1011.
151. Kuehule, John, and Spitzer, Robert (1992), 'DSM III Classification of Substance Use Disorders', in Joyce H. Lowinson and Pedro Ruiz (eds.), Substance Abuse:A Comprehensive Textbook (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1992; 2nd edn. 1997), 22-3.
152. Lamb, J. (1977), 'On a Proof of Incompatibilism', Philosophical Review, 86:20-35.
153. Lehrer, K. (1966a), 'An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?', in Lehrer (1966b), 175-202.
154. Lehrer, K. (1966b), (ed.), Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House).
155. Lehrer, K. (1980), 'Preferences, Conditionals, and Freedom', in van Inwagen (1980), 76-96.
156. Lehrer, K. (1982), 'Cans without Ifs', in Watson (1982), 41-5.
157. Lewis, D. (1981), 'Are We Free to Break the Laws?', Theoria; repr. in Watson (2003), 122-9.
158. Locke, Don (1975), 'Three Concepts of Free Action I', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 49: 95-112; repr. in John Martin Fischer, Moral Responsibility (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 97-112.
159. Locke, J. (1690/1975), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
160. Loewenstein, George (1996), 'Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behaviour', Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65/3:272-92.
161. Loewenstein, George (1999), 'The Visceral Account of Addiction', in Jon Elster and Ole-Jorgen Skog (eds.), Getting Hooked: Rationality and the Addictions (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 235-64.
162. Lowinson, Joyce H., Marion, I. J., Joseph, H., and Dole V. P. (1997a), 'Methadone Maintenance', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 550-61.
163. Loewenstein, George, Ruiz, Pedro, Millman, Robert B., and Langrod, John G. (1997b), Substance Abuse: A Comprehensive Textbook, 2nd edn. (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins).
164. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981), After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press).
165. Magill, Kevin (1997), Freedom and Experience (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
166. Marks, Isaac (1969), Fears and Phobias (New York: Academic Press).
167. Marks, Isaac (1987), Fears, Phobias, and Rituals (New York: Oxford University Press).
168. McCann, Hugh (1974), 'Volition and Basic Action', repr. in McCann (1998), 75-93.
169. McCann, Hugh (1986), 'Intrinsic Intentionality', repr. in McCann (1998), 127-46.
170. McCann, Hugh (1998), The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
171. Melden, A. I. (1961), Free Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
172. Mele, Alfred R. (1996), 'Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios', Philosophical Topics, 24/2: 123-41.
173. Mele, Alfred R. (2000), 'Deciding to Act', Philosophical Studies, 100: 81-108.
174. Melville, Joy (1977), Phobias and Obsessions (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.).
175. Milo, Ronald (1984), Immorality (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
176. Montaigne, Michel de (1971), Essays (London: Penguin).
177. Moore, Michael (1984), Law and Psychiatry (Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press).
178. Moran, Richard (2000), Authority and Estrangement (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
179. Morgenbesser, S., and J. Walsh (1962) (eds.), Free Will (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall).
180. Morse, Stephen J. (1994), 'Culpability and Control', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 142: 1587-1660.
181. Morse, Stephen J. (2000), 'Hooked on Hype', Law and Philosophy, 19/1: 33-49.
182. Murphy, Jeffrie (1972), 'Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy', Ethics, 82: 284-98.
183. Nagel, T. (1970), The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
184. Murphy, Jeffrie (1986), The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press).
185. Nash, J. Madeleine (1997), 'Addicts', Time, 149/18 (May 5): 69-77.
186. Neely, W. (1974), 'Freedom and Desire', Philosophical Review, 83/1: 32-54.
187. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1955), Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Gateway Editions).
188. Normore, Calvin (1998), 'Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice', Vivarium, 36: 23-39.
189. Nozick, Robert (1981), Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press).
190. O'Shaughnessy, B. (1980), The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
191. Owens, David (2000), Reason without Freedom (London: Routledge).
192. Peele, Stanton (1985), The Meaning of Addiction (New York: Heath).
193. Peele, Stanton (1989), The Diseasing of America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books).
194. Penner, Terry (1971), 'Thought and Desire in Plato', in Vlastos (1971), ii: 96-118.
195. Perry, R. B. (1950), General Theory of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
196. Pettit, Philip, and Smith, Michael (1996), 'Freedom in Belief and Desire', Journal of Philosophy, 93: 429-49.
197. Pink, Thomas (1996), The Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
198. Piper, A. (1985), 'Two Conceptions of the Self', Philosophical Studies.
199. Plato,Phaedrus Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth, in Hamilton and Cairns (1989), 475-525.
200. Plato,Phaedrus The Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns (1989), 575-844.
201. Portenoy, Russell K., and Payne, Richard (1997), 'Acute and Chronic Pain', in Lowinson et al. (1997b), 563-89.
202. Pritchard, M. S. (1991), On Becoming Responsible (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas).
203. Radden, Jennifer (1985), Madness and Reason (London: George Allen and Unwin).
204. Ravizza, Mark (1994), 'Semi-compatibilism and the Transfer of Nonresponsibility', Philosophical Studies, 75: 61-93.
205. Raz, Joseph (1999), 'When we are Ourselves: The Active and the Passive', in Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (New York: Oxford University Press), 5-21.
206. Reid, T. (1788/1969), Essays on the Active Powers, ed. Baruch Brody (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
207. Roberts, Robert (1984), 'Will-Power and the Virtues', Philosophical Review, 93: 227-47.
208. Robinson, Paul (1984), Criminal Law Defenses, vol. ii (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing).
209. Santas, G. (1966), 'Plato's Protagoras, and Explanations of Weakness', Philosophical Review, 75: 3-33.
210. Scanlon, T. M. (1988), 'The Significance of Choice', Lecture 1 in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. viii (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press); repr. in Watson (2003), 352-71.
211. Scanlon, T. M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
212. Scanlon, T. M. (2002), 'Reasons and Passions', in Buss and Overton (2002), 165-83.
213. Scheffler, Samuel (1982), The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford:Clarendon Press).
214. Schopp, Robert (1991), Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).
215. Seeburger, F. (1993), Responsibility and Addiction (New York: Crossroads).
216. Shatz, D. (1986), 'Free Will and the Structure of Motivation', in P. French et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. x (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
217. Slote, M. (1980), 'Understanding Free Will', Journal of Philosophy, 77: 136-51.
218. Slote, M. (1982), 'Selective Necessity and Free Will', Journal of Philosophy, 79: 5-24.
219. Slote, M. (1990), 'Ethics without Free Will', Social Theory and Practice, 16: 369-83.
220. Solomon, Andrew (1998), 'Anatomy of Melancholy', New Yorker, Jan. 12: 46-58.
221. Sorabji, R. (1983), Necessity, Cause, and Blame (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
222. Stern, Lawrence (1974), 'Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community', Journal of Philosophy, 71: 72-84.
223. Strawson, Galen (1986), Freedom and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
224. Strawson, Peter (1962), 'Freedom and Resentment', Proceedings of the British Academy; repr. in Watson (2003), 72-93.
225. Stroud, Sarah, and Tappolet, Christine (2003) (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
226. Taylor, C. (1985), Human Agency and Language, vol. i (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).
227. Taylor, C. (1989), Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
228. Taylor, R. (1960), Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
229. Thalberg, I. (1976), 'How Does Agent Causation Work?', in Brand and Walton (1976), 213-38.
230. Thalberg, I. (1978), 'Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8: 211-26.
231. van Inwagen, P. (1978a), 'Ability and Responsibility', Philosophical Review, 87: 201-24.
232. Thalberg, I. (1978b), 'A Definition of Chisholm's Notion of Immanent Causation', Philosophia, 8: 567-80.
233. Thalberg, I. (1980), (ed.), Time and Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel).
234. Thalberg, I.1 (1982), 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism', repr. in Watson (1982), 46-58.
235. Thalberg, I. (1983), An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
236. Thalberg, I. (1995), 'When is the Will Free?', repr. in Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events (New York: Oxford University Press), 219-36.
237. Velleman, J. David (1992), 'The Guise of the Good', repr. in Velleman (2000), 99-122.
238. Velleman, J. David (1996), 'The Possibility of Practical Reason', repr. in Velleman (2000), 170-99.
239. Velleman, J. David (2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
240. Vlastos, Gregory (1971) (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. ii (Garden City, NJ: Anchor).
241. Vuoso, George (1987), 'Background, Responsibility, and Excuse', Yale Law Journal, 96: 1680-1.
242. Walker, Nigel (1968), Crime and Insanity in England (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
243. Wallace, James (1978), Virtues and Vices (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
244. Wallace, R. Jay (1994), Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
245. Wallace, R. Jay (1999), 'Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections', Law and Philosophy, 18: 621-54.
246. Wallace, R. Jay (2001), 'Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason', Philosophers' Imprint, www.philosophersimprint.org., 1/3.
247. Warnock, G. (1963), 'Actions and Events', in D. Pears (ed.), Freedom and the Will (London: Macmillan and Co.), 69-79.
248. Watson, G. (1982) (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
249. Watson, G. (1995), 'Freedom and Strength of Will in Hoffman and Albritton', Philosophical Studies, 77: 261-71.
250. Watson, G. (1998), 'Some Worries about Semi-Compatibilism', Journal of Social Philosophy.29: 135-43.
251. Watson, G. (2003) (ed.), Free Will, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
252. Waugh, Evelyn (1945/67), Brideshead Revisited (New York: Dell).
253. Wertheimer, Alan (1987), Coercion (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
254. Wiggins, D. (1973), 'Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism', emended version in Watson (2003), 94-121.
255. Williams, B. (1978), Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry (London: Penguin).
256. Williams, B. (1981), 'Internal and External Reasons', in Moral Luck (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 101-13.
257. Williams, B. (1985), 'How Free Does the Will Need to Be?', Lindley Lecture, The University of Kansas.
258. Williams, B. (1995), 'Moral Incapacity', in Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 46-55.
259. Wolf, Susan (1987), 'Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility', in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), 46-62.
260. Wolf, Susan (1990), Freedom within Reason (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).
261. Wright, Larry (1995), 'Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding', Journal of Philosophy, 92: 565-85.
262. Yaffe, Gideon (2000), Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
263. Young, Robert (1979), 'Compatibilism and Conditioning', Nous, 1979: 361-78.
264. Young, Robert (1980), 'Autonomy and the 'Inner Self'', American Philosophical Quarterly: 35-43.
265. Youpa, Andrew (2002), 'Descartes and Spinoza on Freedom and Virtue' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine).
266. Zagzebski, Linda (1996), Virtues of the Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press).
267. Zagzebski, Linda (2001), 'Must Knowers be Agents?', in A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Value and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press), 142-57.
268. Zimmerman, D. (1981), 'Hierarchical Motivation and Freedom of the Will', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 354-68.
269. Zimmerman, M. (1984), An Essay on Human Action (New York: Peter Lang).