Mechanism design for crowdsourcing: An optimal 1-1/e competitive budget-feasible mechanism for large markets

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 266-275

  Anari, Nima ^a   Goel, Gagan ^b   Nikzad, Afshin ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b GOOGLE INC   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget feasibility; Crowdsourcing; Large Markets; Truthful Mechanisms

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; COMMERCE; COSTS; CROWDSOURCING; MACHINE DESIGN;

AMAZON'S MECHANICAL TURKS; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; BUDGET-FEASIBILITY; PRIVATE INFORMATION; PROPORTIONAL-SHARE MECHANISMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

MECHANISMS;

EID: 84920026456     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2014.36     Document Type: Conference Paper

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