The United States, the United Nations and Iraq: 'Multilateralism of a kind'

International Affairs

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2003, Pages

  Dunne, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84917291860     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00307     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. All these future states and disputed lands were in the front rank as Class A mandates, as distinct from the Class B and C mandates in Africa and the Pacific.
2. The contemporaneous American assumption of the very recent British hegemony in Turkey was the other regional aspect of the 1947 Truman Doctrine.
3. CENTO was wound up in early 1979 following first the defection of revolutionary Iran and then Pakistan; SEATO had been dissolved two years earlier in 1977.
4. PL [US Public Law] 85-7 of 9 March 1957.
5. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from revolution to dictatorship (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 1-45 for the period to 1958; Charles Tripp, A history of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chs 1-4.
6. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from revolution to dictatorship (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 1-45 for the period to 1958; Charles Tripp, A history of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chs 1-4.
7. A series of Iranian-Iraqi treaties had seen the left (eastern) bank remaining in Iraqi hands.
8. The Kurds sought UN mediation in the late 1960s to end the chronic war with the Iraqi government; but an internally agreed ceasefire in 1970 was, typically, soon replaced by the normal condition of civil war.
9. Takrit, 100 miles north of Baghdad on the Tigris, remains a personal stronghold of Saddam and is an early target for any US invasion: 'War plans target Hussein power base', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2002; George C. Wilson, 'Toppling Saddam with quick strikes', National Journal, 21 Dec. 2002, p. 3742. Takrit is the birthplace not only of Saddam but also of Salah al-din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, the twelfth-century warrior, scholar and political leader known to the non-Arab world as Saladin.
10. Takrit, 100 miles north of Baghdad on the Tigris, remains a personal stronghold of Saddam and is an early target for any US invasion: 'War plans target Hussein power base', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2002; George C. Wilson, 'Toppling Saddam with quick strikes', National Journal, 21 Dec. 2002, p. 3742. Takrit is the birthplace not only of Saddam but also of Salah al-din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, the twelfth-century warrior, scholar and political leader known to the non-Arab world as Saladin.
11. Iran supported the Iraqi Kurds (15 per cent of the population) with arms and a place of refuge; Iraq likewise supported secessionist movements of Iran's Baluchi, Arab and Kurdish minorities. The Kurds straddle Turkey, Iran and Iraq and were promised a homeland in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, then denied one in the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Shatt al-Arab boundary was moved by the 1975 treaty from the left bank to the thalweg (mid-point) of the navigable waters.
12. One constant in post-Second World War Middle East politics is the basic rivalry, even hostility, between Syria and Iraq.
13. Iran's population of some 75 million exceeds the combined totals of all the seven Arab Gulf states, among which Saudi Arabia and Iraq have approximately 22-23 million each.
14. While the Shi'ites (Arabic: 'sectarians') have been influenced by early Persian thinking, the most sacred Shi'ites sites are in Iraq at Karbala and Najaf. Absolute demographic figures for Iraq are disputed: the proportion of Shi'ites ro Sunnis is roughly 2 : 1, while within the Iraqi Sunni population half are Kurds.
15. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at war (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); Dilip Hiro, The longest war: the Iran-Iraq military conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991).
16. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at war (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); Dilip Hiro, The longest war: the Iran-Iraq military conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991).
17. Iran, in return, was to put pressure on Hizbollah to release American hostages in Beirut - Israel acting as the conduit between Washington and Tehran.
18. In the early 1970s Paris and Moscow (cf. the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty) were seen as the true non-Arab, non-Muslim friends of Iraq.
19. For US policy during the decade, see Bruce W. Jentleson, With friends like these: Riagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994); for a brief critical comment, see Adlai E. Stevenson III, 'Different man, different moment', New York Times, 7 Feb. 2003.
20. For US policy during the decade, see Bruce W. Jentleson, With friends like these: Riagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994); for a brief critical comment, see Adlai E. Stevenson III, 'Different man, different moment', New York Times, 7 Feb. 2003.
21. The US Senate had wanted to impose sanctions on Iraq for its use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) against the Kurds.
22. Kuwait, 25 times smaller than Iraq, has a per capita wealth some eleven times bigger, according to CIA figures-seven times, according to The Statesman's Yearbook.
23. F. Gregory Gause III, 'Iraq's decisions to go to war, 1980 and 1990', Middle East Journal 56 (Winter 2002), pp. 47-70, esp. pp. 56-7; Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of triumph: an Arab view of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992), esp. pp. 232-42.
24. F. Gregory Gause III, 'Iraq's decisions to go to war, 1980 and 1990', Middle East Journal 56 (Winter 2002), pp. 47-70, esp. pp. 56-7; Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of triumph: an Arab view of the Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992), esp. pp. 232-42.
25. After the US, the UK supplied the greatest number of ground troops from outside the region (430,000 and 35,000 respectively). A number of coalition states contributed funds (to a total war chest of $55 billion) rather than forces, Germany and Japan being the most conspicuous examples.
26. The percentages given are approximations, rounded to the nearest whole number, and provide an average of contemporary and current estimates, which have not changed significantly in absolute terms or proportionately in relative terms during the last twelve years. The figures here are derived from estimates published by the US Department of Energy, the Oil and Gas Journal and World Oil The same sources also show that while the US imports two-thirds more oil than it did 25 years ago, the same ratio (one-quarter) still comes from the Gulf.
27. The current Vice-President, Richard Cheney, and Secretary of State Colin Powell held high office under Bush Senior, of course, as Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff respectively.
28. According to governmental and unofficial reports, Iraqi chemical weapons include the phosphorous compound sarin, mustard (ethylene and sulphur chloride) gas and a deadly nerve agent VX; biological agents include anthrax, botulinum and the smallpox virus.
29. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the war of sanctions: conventional threats and weapons of mass destruction and beyond (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999).
30. See esp. UNSCR 986 of 14 April 1995, 1153 of 20 Feb. 1998, and 1210 of 24 Nov. 1998, At the start of the sanctions regime Iraq was particularly vulnerable, depending almost entirely upon oil exports for foreign earnings and importing almost three-quarters of its food supplies.
31. Richard Butler, The greatest threat: Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and the crisis of global security (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2001); James Kirfield, 'Disclosure, defectors key to inspections', National Journal 16 Nov. 2002, pp. 3416-17. In fact, Pentagon sources gave a favourable report on what UNSCOM had achieved from 1991 to 1998 in terms of WMD destroyed: George C. Wilson, 'On Iraq, moderates want hard proof, National Journal, 14 Dec. 2002, pp. 3670-1.
32. Richard Butler, The greatest threat: Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and the crisis of global security (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2001); James Kirfield, 'Disclosure, defectors key to inspections', National Journal 16 Nov. 2002, pp. 3416-17. In fact, Pentagon sources gave a favourable report on what UNSCOM had achieved from 1991 to 1998 in terms of WMD destroyed: George C. Wilson, 'On Iraq, moderates want hard proof, National Journal, 14 Dec. 2002, pp. 3670-1.
33. Richard Butler, The greatest threat: Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and the crisis of global security (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2001); James Kirfield, 'Disclosure, defectors key to inspections', National Journal 16 Nov. 2002, pp. 3416-17. In fact, Pentagon sources gave a favourable report on what UNSCOM had achieved from 1991 to 1998 in terms of WMD destroyed: George C. Wilson, 'On Iraq, moderates want hard proof, National Journal, 14 Dec. 2002, pp. 3670-1.
34. This was another example of Saddam's divide-and-rule technique: the Iraqi attack allied the government forces with the Kurdistan Democratic Party against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-Kurdistan being an aspiration deprecated by Ankara.
35. Current concern to gain a so-called second UNSC resolution (i.e. after UNSCR 1441) derives partly from Saudi Arabia's declaration that it would be necessary in order to use Saudi military facilities: see the pre-UNSCR 1441 report, 'Arab countries bending to US influence on Iraq', Washington Post, 23 Sept. 2002. In future bombing raids American B-2s and B-52s will be deployed out of the British Indian Ocean Territory, the five atolls popularly known by the name of the largest as Diego Garcia (depopulated for such US military purposes).
36. In August 1998 Congress had described Iraq's WMD programme as threatening US vital interests and constituting a 'material and unacceptable breach of [Iraq's] international obligations': PL 105-235.
37. 'D'un mandat à l'autre', Le Monde Diplomatique, Jan. 2002, p. 13.
38. PL 105-338 (3: Oct. 1098), authorizing inter alia almost $100 million in FY 1999 for aid to 'Iraqi democratic opposition organizations'. In December 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell unveiled the 'US-Middle East Partnership Initiative' to promote democracy generally in the region: Corine Hegland, 'A Cheney pushes openness. Huh?', National Journal, 21 Dec. 2002, pp. 3740-1. (The Cheney in question is the VP's daughter in her role as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.)
39. For the text of Zinni's speech to the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, 31 Oct. 2002, see www.cdi.org/terrorism/zinni.
40. The Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain) was formed in 1981 mainly for mutual defence against revolutionary Iran; but following the election of Mohammad Khatemi to the Iranian presidency in 1997. Iran's foreign relations with its Arab neighbours have improved noticeably. Once again oil provides much of the explanation: both Iran and Saudi Arabia led the OPEC campaign to raise oil prices after a fall of over 50 per cent in the mid-1990s.
41. UNMOVIC (established by UNSCR 1284) is a UN-funded body, some 300 strong, of whom 100 have been recruited from UNSCOM, which was funded by individual UN member states and seen as too close to their respective official intelligence services.
42. Rosemary Hollis, 'Getting out of the Iraq trap', International Affairs 79: 1, Jan. 2003, pp. 23-35, esp. PP. 27-9, offers a different 'context' for US policy towards Iraq.
43. Pentagon planners envisage a very different politico-military strategy (to 'decapitate the [Saddam) regime [and] liberate' Iraq) from that used in Afghanistan, not least because there is no credible local armed opposition comparable to the Northern Alliance; but the use of overwhelming air power would repeat the basic pattern of the Second Gulf War: see e.g. 'US plan for Iraq said to include attack on three sides', New York Times, 5 July 2002; 'Bush has received Pentagon options on attacking Iraq', New York Times, 21 Sept. 2002; 'War plans target Hussein power base', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2002.
44. Pentagon planners envisage a very different politico-military strategy (to 'decapitate the [Saddam) regime [and] liberate' Iraq) from that used in Afghanistan, not least because there is no credible local armed opposition comparable to the Northern Alliance; but the use of overwhelming air power would repeat the basic pattern of the Second Gulf War: see e.g. 'US plan for Iraq said to include attack on three sides', New York Times, 5 July 2002; 'Bush has received Pentagon options on attacking Iraq', New York Times, 21 Sept. 2002; 'War plans target Hussein power base', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2002.
45. Pentagon planners envisage a very different politico-military strategy (to 'decapitate the [Saddam) regime [and] liberate' Iraq) from that used in Afghanistan, not least because there is no credible local armed opposition comparable to the Northern Alliance; but the use of overwhelming air power would repeat the basic pattern of the Second Gulf War: see e.g. 'US plan for Iraq said to include attack on three sides', New York Times, 5 July 2002; 'Bush has received Pentagon options on attacking Iraq', New York Times, 21 Sept. 2002; 'War plans target Hussein power base', Washington Post, 22 Sept. 2002.
46. Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, 'US says Hussein intensifies quest for A-bomb parts', New York Times, 8 Sept. 2002; cf. the published findings of the [London] International Institute for Strategic Studies, half's weapons of mass destruction: a net assessment (London: IISS, 2002). The IISS, like the British government and the CIA, estimate the Iraqis are five to seven years from producing a nuclear capability; while the missiles being sought are reportedly designed to exceed the very limited range of their SCUDS.
47. Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller, 'US says Hussein intensifies quest for A-bomb parts', New York Times, 8 Sept. 2002; cf. the published findings of the [London] International Institute for Strategic Studies, half's weapons of mass destruction: a net assessment (London: IISS, 2002). The IISS, like the British government and the CIA, estimate the Iraqis are five to seven years from producing a nuclear capability; while the missiles being sought are reportedly designed to exceed the very limited range of their SCUDS.
48. PL 107-243 ('Authorization for use of military force against Iraq'), passed by the House and Senate on 10 Oct. 2002. begins and ends its many paragraphs of preamble with Iraq indicted for its role as adversary in rhe 'war on terrorism'.
49. Vice President Dick Cheney had put the argument more vigorously earlier in a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 26 August: 'In Cheney's words: the administration's case for removing Saddam Hussein', New York Times, 27 Aug. 2002: published text at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
50. 'Bush seeks power to use "all means" to oust Hussein', New York Times, 20 Sept. 2002.
51. Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant, 'Executive diplomacy: multilateralism, unilateralism and managing American power', International Affairs 79: 1, Jan. 2003, pp. 37-51, offer an interesting understanding of these traditional terms. For the practical necessity of military multilateralism, see Michael W. Isherwood, 'US strategic options for Iraq: easier said than done', Washington Quarterly 25: 2, Spring 2002, pp. 145-59: Henry R. Nau. 'Alliance at risk', World Today, May 2002, pp. 17-18.
52. Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant, 'Executive diplomacy: multilateralism, unilateralism and managing American power', International Affairs 79: 1, Jan. 2003, pp. 37-51, offer an interesting understanding of these traditional terms. For the practical necessity of military multilateralism, see Michael W. Isherwood, 'US strategic options for Iraq: easier said than done', Washington Quarterly 25: 2, Spring 2002, pp. 145-59: Henry R. Nau. 'Alliance at risk', World Today, May 2002, pp. 17-18.
53. Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant, 'Executive diplomacy: multilateralism, unilateralism and managing American power', International Affairs 79: 1, Jan. 2003, pp. 37-51, offer an interesting understanding of these traditional terms. For the practical necessity of military multilateralism, see Michael W. Isherwood, 'US strategic options for Iraq: easier said than done', Washington Quarterly 25: 2, Spring 2002, pp. 145-59: Henry R. Nau. 'Alliance at risk', World Today, May 2002, pp. 17-18.
54. Nationalist China was also represented - minimally - at Dumbarton Oaks.
55. The second, juridical example (concerning US policy in Central America) is set in the twentieth-century context in Michael Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1933; (New York: St Martin's. 1998), esp. ch. 9. For the selectivity of the US on UN resolutions dealing with Israel, see Marc Lynch, 'Using and abusing the UN, redux', Middle East Report 225 (Winter 2002), pp. 8-13.
56. The second, juridical example (concerning US policy in Central America) is set in the twentieth-century context in Michael Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1933; (New York: St Martin's. 1998), esp. ch. 9. For the selectivity of the US on UN resolutions dealing with Israel, see Marc Lynch, 'Using and abusing the UN, redux', Middle East Report 225 (Winter 2002), pp. 8-13.
57. A decade of deception and defiance: Saddam Hussein's defiance of the United Nations, a 'background paper' published by the White House, 12 Sept. 2002 (to coincide with Bush's address to the General Assembly): available on the White House website. This briefing paper, even by its own measures, undercounts the possible maximum number; nor could it, of course, have specified UNSCR 1441.
58. Malise Ruthven, 'The eleventh of September and the Sudanese mahdiya in the context of Ibn Khaldun's theory of Islamic history', International Affairs 78: 2, April 2002, pp. 339-51, esp. p. 340.
59. For the language and further references, see Michael Dunne, 'US foreign relations in the twentieth century: from world power to global hegemony', International Affairs 76: 1, Jan. 2000, pp. 25-40, esp. p. 26.
60. Fareed Mohamedi and Raad Alkadiri, 'Washington makes its case for war', Middle East Report 224 (Fall 2002), pp. 2-5.
61. See the preface to the compendium of speeches by George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published by the White House, Sept. 2002. Shocking to some, apparently unprecedented to others, Bush's doctrine of pre-emption was expressed in the Cold War classic of 1950: NSC Memorandum 68.
62. See the preface to the compendium of speeches by George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published by the White House, Sept. 2002. Shocking to some, apparently unprecedented to others, Bush's doctrine of pre-emption was expressed in the Cold War classic of 1950: NSC Memorandum 68.
63. The following analysis is based upon, inter alia, the survey of American defence and diplomatic experts in David Masci, 'Confronting Iraq: should the US depose Saddam Hussein?, CQ Reporter 12: 34 (4 Oct. 2002), pp. 793-816. Nothing has happened since autumn 2002 seriously to challenge the various opinions cited there from members of such diverse private and public bodies as the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Hoover Institution, Institute for Policy Studies, Lexington Institute, Middle East Institute, National Defense University, Navy War College and Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
64. 'The day after', New York Times, 24 Sept. 2002.
65. Sandra Mackey, The reckoning: Iraq and the legacy of Saddam Hussein (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
66. 'Israel tells US it will retaliate if Iraq attacks', New York Times, 22 Sept. 2002.
67. See e.g. the February 2002 issue of Le Monde Diplomatique for a series of articles on this theme.
68. For a Washington insider's considered judgement, see Kenneth M Pollack, The threatening storm: the case for invading Iraq (New York; Random House, 2002).
69. Julie Kosterlitz, 'Empire strikes back', National Journal, 14 Dec. 2002, pp. 3640-5.
70. For an earlier effort to frame an answer, see Michael Dunne, The Treaty of Gent: the British perspective', Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunte te Cent 44 (1990), pp. 35-46.