Propositional content in signalling systems

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 171, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 493-512

  Birch, Jonathan ^a  

^a CHRIST S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Content; Game theory; Information; Misrepresentation; Signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84912143244     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0280-5     Document Type: Article

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