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1
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33750040480
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note
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Taking that broadly so as to include thinkers such as Gabriel Marcel, who did not think of himself specifically as a Phenomenologist, and Paul Ricoeur, who has developed Phenomenology in a distinctively hermeneutical direction.
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-
-
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2
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0010091701
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-
Oxford: Oxford University Press
-
This is the sub-title of Olson's book, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). In fact it would be more accurate to say that Olson offers a theory of our identity which isn't really about personal identity at all.
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(1997)
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology
-
-
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3
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0003393508
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-
See e.g. S. Shoemaker's contributions to, (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
-
See e.g. S. Shoemaker's contributions to S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984);
-
(1984)
Personal Identity
-
-
Shoemaker, S.1
Swinburne, R.2
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4
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33750080387
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-
Oxford: Oxford University Press
-
D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Pt 3;
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(1984)
Reasons and Persons
, Issue.PART 3
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Parfit, D.1
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6
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33750066561
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See e.g., (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press)
-
See e.g. R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981), Part 1;
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(1981)
Philosophical Explanations
, Issue.PART 1
-
-
Nozick, R.1
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9
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0004246901
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-
also, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed), Ch 9
-
also Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1997), Ch 9.
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(1997)
The Evolution of the Soul
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-
Swinburne1
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10
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33750081021
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note
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So although it is the first-person perspective that is crucial, I can be concerned (taking a second-person approach) about the persistence of your first-person perspective.
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11
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84953716310
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Personal identity and the idea of a human being
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D. Cockburn (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at p. 127
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G. Madell, "Personal identity and the idea of a human being", in Human Beings, D. Cockburn (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 127-142, at p. 127. Things don't seem to have improved very much since he wrote that.
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(1991)
Human Beings
, pp. 127-142
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Madell, G.1
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12
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24044457737
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See, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press)
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See Madell, The Identity of the Self (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).
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(1981)
The Identity of the Self
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Madell1
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13
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0003393508
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-
See also Swinburne's contributions to, (op cit)
-
See also Swinburne's contributions to Shoemaker and Swinburne, Personal Identity (op cit).
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Personal Identity
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Shoemaker1
Swinburne2
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17
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61949256240
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Of personal identity
-
See D. Parry (ed.) Berkeley: University of California Press
-
See J. Butler, "Of personal identity", in Personal Identity, D. Parry (ed.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 99-105.
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(1976)
Personal Identity
, pp. 99-105
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Butler, J.1
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18
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0003740191
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see e.g.
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The standard neo-Lockean reply, relying on the notion of q-memories (see e.g. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 219-23)
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Reasons and Persons
, pp. 219-223
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Parfit1
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19
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33750086265
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Reductionism and the third person
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see his J. McDowell, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), at pp. 370-77
-
is effectively criticized by McDowell; see his "Reductionism and the third person" in J. McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 359-382, at pp. 370-77.
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(1998)
Mind, Value and Reality
, pp. 359-382
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-
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20
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0004221441
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Though see, C. Smith (trans.) London: Routledge, Part 2, Ch 3
-
Though see M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, C. Smith (trans.) London: Routledge, 1962, Part 2, Ch 3, for a fascinating discussion of substance which takes something like the expressive understanding of the Self which I shall be developing here as a model for thinking about substance in general.
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(1962)
Phenomenology of Perception
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Merleau-Ponty, M.1
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23
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0004258937
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London: Methuen
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P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 101.
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(1959)
Individuals
, pp. 101
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Strawson, P.F.1
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24
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0002296027
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person
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See, 68.1
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See H. Frankfurt, "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person", in Journal of Philosophy, 68.1, 1971, pp. 5-20.
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(1971)
Journal of Philosophy
, pp. 5-20
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Frankfurt, H.1
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25
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0004164657
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K. Blamey (trans), Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press
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"The person therefore remains on the side of the things about which we speak rather than on the side of the speakers themselves, who designate themselves in speaking....By placing its main emphasis not on the who of the one speaking, but on the what of the particulars about which one speaks, including persons, the entire analysis of the person as a basic particular is placed on the public level of locating things in relation to the spatiotemporal schema that contains it." P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, K. Blamey (trans), Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 32.
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(1992)
Oneself As Another
, pp. 32
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Ricoeur, P.1
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26
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33750070877
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note
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I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for raising this criticism.
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28
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84969471493
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See
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See Individuals, pp. 95-103.
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Individuals
, pp. 95-103
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30
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33750085231
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Incarnate being
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See, his, R. Rosthal (trans), New York: Farrar, Straus and Co
-
See G. Marcel, "Incarnate being" in his Creative Fidelity, R. Rosthal (trans), New York: Farrar, Straus and Co, 1964, pp. 11-37,
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(1964)
Creative Fidelity
, pp. 11-37
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Marcel, G.1
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31
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33750039580
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G.S. Fraser (trans) Lanham MD: University Press of America, esp Chs. 5 and 6
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and The Mystery of Being, Vol 1, G.S. Fraser (trans) Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1978, esp Chs. 5 and 6;
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(1978)
The Mystery of Being
, vol.1
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-
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34
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33750078907
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see the, Bk. II, Ch 27, sec 9
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The phrase is Locke's - see the Essay, Bk. II, Ch 27, sec 9 - and suggests a better insight than his "official" doctrine was able to articulate.
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Essay
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35
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33750092175
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note
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By putting it this way, I don't mean to suggest that Baker arrived at her own position by explicitly starting from, and attempting to remedy, the weaknesses of Strawson's.
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38
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33750052201
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Materialism with a human face
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K. Corcoran (ed) (Ithica, NY and London: Cornell University Press), at p. 166
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also her "Materialism with a human face", in K. Corcoran (ed) Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons (Ithica, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 159-180, at p. 166. But she does not directly engage with the issues raised in the Phenomenological literature on the lived body that I have alluded to here.
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(2001)
Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons
, pp. 159-180
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41
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33750081362
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See also p. 131
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See also p. 131.
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42
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4243830452
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"The idea of a self is much richer than the idea of a first-person perspective." (Baker, Persons and Bodies, p. 87) I haven't so far tried to distinguish between the notions of "self" and "person", as the terms are not used with consistently different senses in most of the literature. In the remainder of the paper, though, I will follow Baker's usage, in order to make the important distinction that she introduces here.
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Persons and Bodies
, pp. 87
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Baker1
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44
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33750072851
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note
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I am not, incidentally, suggesting that Baker thinks this.
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46
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0004257429
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New York: Basic Books
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The case Baker refers to is that written up by A.R. Luria in his The Man With a Shattered World (New York: Basic Books, 1972).
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(1972)
The Man with a Shattered World
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Luria, A.R.1
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47
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26844530908
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Wittgenstein and Heidegger (Op cit) Part Two
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I can only do so very briefly here. For a detailed discussion of other mind scepticism and Wittgenstein's expressive response to it, see A. Rudd, Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein and Heidegger (Op cit) Part Two.
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Expressing the World: Skepticism
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Rudd, A.1
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48
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33750066901
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G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell
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L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell, 1958, II, p. 179.
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(1958)
Philosophical Investigations
, vol.2
, pp. 179
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Wittgenstein, L.1
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49
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0003790891
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G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell, #220
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L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, #220.
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(1981)
Zettel
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Wittgenstein, L.1
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50
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0031287838
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The self
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For this suggestion, see, 4.5-6
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For this suggestion, see G. Strawson, "The self", in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4.5-6, 1997, pp. 405-28.
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(1997)
Journal of Consciousness Studies
, pp. 405-428
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Strawson, G.1
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51
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0037521525
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see, (Oxford: Clarendon)
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For an interesting account which distinguishes emotions from dispositions on the one hand and "emotional episodes" on the other, see P. Goldie, The Emotions: a Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), pp. 12-16.
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(2000)
The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration
, pp. 12-16
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Goldie, P.1
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52
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26844530908
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see Rudd, Wittgenstein and Heidegger (op cit)
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A fuller account would make more detailed distinctions than are needed for present purposes; see Rudd, Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein and Heidegger (op cit), pp. 131-37.
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Expressing the World: Skepticism
, pp. 131-137
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54
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0003851654
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N. Kemp Smith (trans.) London: Macmillan
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"It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me." (Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith (trans.) London: Macmillan, 1933, B 131-2.
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(1933)
Critique of Pure Reason
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56
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0004123406
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See, (London: Duckworth), esp. Ch 15
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See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981) esp. Ch 15;
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(1981)
After Virtue
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MacIntyre, A.1
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57
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0004243950
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Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
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R. Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984);
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(1984)
The Thread of Life
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Wollheim, R.1
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58
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0004199157
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-
(Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press), esp. Ch 5
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M. Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), esp. Ch 5.
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(1996)
The Constitution of Selves
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Schechtman, M.1
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59
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0004199157
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See esp. Chs 1 and 4
-
See Schechtman (op cit) esp. Chs 1 and 4. The problem according to Schechtman is that analytic philosophers have not made this distinction and have therefore expected that an answer to the Reidentification question will solve problems that only really arise when we are concerned with the Characterization question.
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The Constitution of Selves
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Schechtman1
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60
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0003740191
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See, e.g. (op cit)
-
One point to note is that both narrative and Lockean accounts are concerned with psychological continuity and thus both give a crucial role to memory. The difference is that, on the narrative model, to remember my past is to posses the ability to tell my own story. It is not to bring out some atomistic - and ultimately impersonal - mental snapshots that I have filed away, as it is for Parfit (See, e.g. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (op cit) pp. 220-21, which makes quite clear his understanding of memories as impersonal psychological atoms, which we can coherently imagine simply being transferred between different consciousnesses. And this impersonal understanding is of course required of neo-Lockean theorists if they are to escape Butler's charge of circularity.)
-
Reasons and Persons
, pp. 220-221
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Parfit, D.1
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61
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33750083542
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note
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For more detail see the works mentioned in note #43, above.
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62
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0003656652
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See, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Part One
-
See C. Talyor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Part One.
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(1989)
Sources of the Self
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Talyor, C.1
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63
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33750038794
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note
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Or in some cases, stories that make them seem more degraded, wretched, unsuccessful than they really are.
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65
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0004123406
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See
-
See MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 194-6, where he argues that "intelligible action" is a more fundamental concept that "action;" a "mere" action is a failed candidate for the status of intelligible action. And intelligibility is provided precisely by narrative.
-
After Virtue
, pp. 194-196
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-
MacIntyre1
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66
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33750043699
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note
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This is true at least in the human sphere, and I suspect it is also true of events involving inanimate objects. However, that claim would raise issues that are not strictly relevant to my argument here.
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67
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0004109730
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See, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)
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See J. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).
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(1994)
Mind and World
-
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McDowell, J.1
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68
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0003751558
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see his (Harmondsworth: Penguin), Ch 13
-
As is suggested by some of the more outre forms of post-modernism; also, in a different idiom (though not in all respects as different as one might have supposed) by Dennett; see his Consciousness Explained (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), Ch 13.
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(1991)
Consciousness Explained
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Dennett1
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70
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33750083815
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note
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Earlier drafts of this paper have been given to colloquia at the University of Hertfordshire (UK) in October 2003 and at St. Olaf College, Minnesota in October 2004. I am grateful to all the participants in these discussions for their very helpful comments, and for subsequent valuable discussions with or comments from, Dan Hutto, John Lippitt, Brendan Lavour, Kim Atkins, Jeanine Grenberg, Charles Talliaferro, Fred Stoutland and Lynne Baker.
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