Elements of emission market design: An experimental analysis of California's market for greenhouse gas allowances

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 107, Issue PA, 2014, Pages 402-420

  Shobe, William ^a   Holt, Charles ^a   Huetteman, Thaddeus ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b Power and Energy Analytic Resources Inc   (United States)

Author keywords

Cap and trade; Carbon markets; Emission markets; Market liquidity; Price containment reserve; Uniform price auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911932777     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.007     Document Type: Article

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