Discrete clock auctions: An experimental study

Experimental Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 309-322

  Cramton, Peter ^a   Filiz Ozbay, Emel ^a   Ozbay, Erkut Y ^a   Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Clock auctions; Experiments; Market design; Pricing rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860127071     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9301-9     Document Type: Article

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