THE ETHICS OF CARE AND EMPATHY

The Ethics Of Care And Empathy

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-133

  Slote, Michael ^a,b  

^a Department of Biology   (United States)

^b Royal Irish Academy   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911188590     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203945735     Document Type: Book

References (166)

1. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
2. Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.
3. This latter point came out more clearly in a talk Noddings gave to the Society for Women in Philosophy in 1988, published as ‘A Response’, Hypatia 5, 1990, pp. 120–26.
4. Carol Gilligan, ‘Letter to Readers, 1993’ in later printings of In a Different Voice, pp. xxvi–xxvii (from which the epigram at the beginning of the present book is taken); and Nel Noddings, Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002. My own recent work has consistently defended the notion that an ethics of care can cover all of (individual and political) morality
5. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; but the project was pursued in earlier papers as well
6. Virginia Held, ‘The Ethics of Care’ in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 548f.
7. Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, Chapter 5; and Annette Baier, ‘The Need for More than Justice’ in Virginia Held, ed., Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, esp. p. 57.
8. Gilligan cites (subsequent) studies that favor her ‘different voices’ hypothesis in ‘Reply by Carol Gilligan’, Signs 11, 1986, pp. 324–33. Among the many later studies that call her view at least partially into question are
9. Mary Brabeck, ‘Moral Judgment: Theory and Research on Differences between Males and Females’, Developmental Review 3, 1983, pp. 274–9
10. Lawrence Walker, ‘Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning’, Child Development 55, 1986, pp. 511–21. (However, Gilligan cites articles that question Walker’s conclusions in ‘Reply’.) These papers are just the tip of the iceberg (of relevant publications).
11. Patricia Hill Collins, ‘The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought’ in Nancy Tuana and Rosemarie Tong, eds, Feminism and Philosophy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 526–47.)
12. Hume’s most significant defense of moral sentimentalism occurs in A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. For an important work that antedates the (official) emergence of care ethics, but that shows the strong influence of moral sentimentalism
13. Lawrence Blum’s Friendship, Altruism and Morality, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
14. Virginia Held, ‘The Ethics of Care’, op. cit., p. 551; and Nel Noddings, ‘Caring as Relation and Virtue in Teaching’ in Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds, Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 41–60. My own argument against the priority of caring relationships can be found in Michael Slote, Morals from Motives, op. cit., Ch. 1, and in an earlier paper cited therein.
15. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
16. Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.
17. Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 223; and Michael Slote, ‘Agent- Based Virtue Ethics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20, 1995, pp. 97, 101.
18. Nel Noddings, Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, esp. pp. 21–24.
19. Virginia Held takes something like this view of the building/sustaining of relationships in ‘The Ethics of Care’ in David Copp., ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 540. My own discussion is greatly indebted to hers.
20. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
21. Martin L. Hoffman, ibid., pp. 49–62. I should mention that Noddings has recently made it very clear she is aware that the literature of psychology describes and discusses a kind of empathy that closely resembles what she calls engrossment
22. Nel Noddings, Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education, New York: Teachers College Press, 2002, p. 151. For relevant discussion of different kinds of empathy
23. Justin D’Arms, ‘Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry’, Chicago Kent Law Review 74, 2000, pp. 1489ff.
24. C. D. Batson, The Altruism Question: Toward a Social–Psychological Answer, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991.
25. Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., pp. 276ff.; passim. Similar ideas are to be found in John Deigh, ‘Empathy and Universalizability’ in L. May, M. Friedman and A. Clark, eds, Mind and Morals, Cambridge, MA: Bradford (MIT), 1996, pp. 213f. Deigh borrows from Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, Hamden, CT: Shoestring Press, 1970, pp. 8–36.
26. Mark Davis, Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach, Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark, 1994, pp. 70ff.; and Nancy Eisenberg, The Caring Child, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
27. Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, 1991, pp. 223–46.
28. Nel Noddings, Starting at Home, op. cit., pp. 235–37.
29. John Noonan, ‘Responding to Persons: Methods of Moral Argument in Debate over Abortion’, Theology Digest, 1973, pp. 291–307. I am indebted to Allen Stairs for bringing this article to my attention.
30. Published originally as Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 1972, pp. 229–43.
31. Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
32. Frances Kamm, ‘Famine Ethics’ in Dale Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 162–208.
33. Martin L. Hoffman: Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 209ff.
34. Martin L. Hoffman, ‘Empathy, its Limitations, and its Role in a Comprehensive Moral Theory’ in W. Kurtines and J. Gewirtz, eds, Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984, p. 298
35. Martin L. Hoffman, ‘Toward a Comprehensive Empathy-Based Theory of Prosocial Moral Development’ in D. Stipek and A. Bohart, eds, Constructive and Destructive Behavior, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000/01, concluding section. For Hume’s discussion of the same basic idea L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958, p. 370 (also pp. 316ff.).
36. Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die, op. cit., esp. p. 36.
37. Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 207–27, esp. p. 226.
38. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 100f.
39. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., pp. 49ff.
40. Martin L. Hoffman: ‘Empathy, its Limitations, and its Role in a Comprehensive Moral Theory’, op. cit.; Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., Ch. 8; and the final section of ‘Toward a Comprehensive Empathy-Based Theory of Prosocial Moral Development’, op. cit. Also, Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1985, pp. 185f.)
41. Elizabeth Ashford, ‘Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality’, Journal of Philosophy XCVII, 2000, pp. 421–29.
42. Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 233.
43. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., esp. pp. 370, 386, 389.
44. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., pp. 481f., 602.
45. Martin L. Hoffman, ‘The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment’ in N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer, Empathy and its Development, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, esp. p. 69
46. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., p. 297.
47. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul, eds, The Communitarian Challenge to Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 27–58
48. The Ethics of Care’ (in D. Copp. ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 550)
49. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., p. 298.
50. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., pp. 198ff.
51. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., pp. 216, 297f.
52. Martin L. Hoffman, ‘The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment’, op. cit., pp. 76, 78n.
53. Dale Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 308) says that partialists have failed to provide adequate foundations for their approach(es), and I take it that this is what a partialist ethic of empathic caring must attempt to do.
54. Bernard Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’ in J. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: for and against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
55. R. Koestner, C. Franz and J. Weinberger, ‘The Family Origins of Empathic Concern: A 26-Year Longitudinal Study’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, 1990, pp. 709–17.
56. Nancy Eisenberg, The Caring Child, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, Chs 7 and 8.
57. Eisenberg, N., Guthrie, I. K., Murphy, B. C., Shepard, S. A., Cumberland, A. and Carlo, G., ‘Consistency and Development of Prosocial Dispositions: A Longitudinal Study’, Child Development 70, 1999, pp. 1360–72.
58. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., p. 207.
59. Lawrence Blum, ‘Moral Development and Conceptions of Morality’, in his Moral Perception and Particularity, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 194; but also Mark A. Barnett, ‘Empathy and Related Responses in Children’ in Eisenberg and Strayer, Empathy and its Development, op. cit., pp. 154ff
60. M. Radke-Yarow, C. Zahn-Waxler and M. Chapman, ‘Children’s Prosocial Dispositions and Behavior’ in P. H. Mussen, ed., Handbook of Child Psychology, New York: Wiley, 1983, esp. p. 514; Nancy Eisenberg, The Caring Child, op. cit., p. 138 (and works in footnotes).
61. Jorge Garcia, ‘The Heart of Racism’, Journal of Social Philosophy 27, 1996, pp. 5–45
62. Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, op. cit., p. 208. See also Nancy Eisenberg, The Caring Child, op. cit., pp. 39f., 139 (and works in footnotes).
63. Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982
64. Shelly Kagan, ‘Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13, 1984, pp. 239–54;
65. Michael Koenigs et al., ‘Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements’, Nature, online version, 21 March 2007. But more studies of the effect of causal factors are needed to complement the many that have already been carried out to show how perception and contemporaneity affect empathy and action.
66. John Kleinig, ‘Good Samaritanism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, 1975–76, pp. 382–407
67. Eric Mack, ‘Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, 1979–80, pp. 230–59
68. Eric Mack, ‘Causing and Failing to Prevent’, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7, 1976, pp. 83–90. A completely systematic deontology based on a criterion of empathy would have to sort out such cases.
69. N. MacCormick, ‘Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 46, 1972, pp. 59–78
70. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, Ch. 7.
71. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, op. cit., pp. 302f.). But Scanlon’s treatment of the case differs somewhat from what the present approach would say.
72. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 1978, pp. 180–83, 272–78.
73. Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’ (Yale Journal for Law and Feminism 1, 1989, pp. 7–36)
74. L. Blum, M. Homiak, J. Housman and N. Scheman, ‘Altruism and Women’s Oppression’ in C. Gould and M. Wartofsky, eds, Women and Philosophy, New York: Putnam, 1976, esp. p. 238. And for helpful relevant discussion, also see Clement, ibid.
75. Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg–Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory’ in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, eds, Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, esp. pp. 89–82
76. J. L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 28.
77. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 154–68.
78. Albert Bandura, ‘Reflexive Empathy: On Predicting More Than One Has Ever Observed’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, 2002, pp. 24f. Stoljar’s ‘Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition’ in C. MacKenzie and N. Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, esp. p. 95.
79. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, Ch. 3
80. Carol Gilligan, ‘Hearing the Difference: Theorizing Connection’ in Anuario de Psicologia 34, 2003, pp. 155–61.
81. Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 74ff.
82. Gilligan offers her own kind of answer to this criticism in ‘Hearing the difference in ‘Reply by Carol Gilligan’, Signs 11, 1986, pp.324–33; and, originally, in In a Different Voice, ibid., Ch. 3.
83. Annette Baier, ‘Cartesian Persons’ in her Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985, pp. 84ff.
84. Brad Hooker’s ‘Is Moral Virtue a Benefit to the Agent?’ (in R. Crisp, ed., How Should One Live?, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, esp. p. 145); and Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, Ch. 8
85. Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’, op. cit.; Marina Oshana, ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’, Journal of Social Philosophy 29, 1998, pp. 81–102.
86. Susan Brison, ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, Ethics 108, 1998, pp. 312–39,
87. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975, esp. p. 395
88. Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, esp. pp. 82f., 105f
89. Catharine MacKinnon, Women’s Lives – Men’s Laws, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, esp. p. 64.; and several of the essays collected in L. Lederer and R. Delgado, eds, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography, New York: Hill and Wang, 1995.
90. Thomas Scanlon, ‘Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 40, 1979, pp. 511–50. Catharine MacKinnon (ibid.) opposes hate speech with specific reference to Skokie.
91. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978.
92. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, op. cit., pp. 87ff., 217ff. I am simplifying matters here by not speaking of the distinction between sex and gender, and by not considering the kinds of voices homosexuals, lesbians, transsexuals, and others might have.
93. Carol Gilligan, ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development’ in E. Kittay and D. Meyers, eds, Women and Moral Theory, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987, pp. 19–33.
94. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987, p.45
95. Claudia Card, ‘Gender and Moral Luck’in V. Held, ed., Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 79–98
96. For two examples, see the work of Martha Nussbaum (note 31) and Diana Meyers’s ‘Rights in Collision: A Non-punitive Compensatory Remedy for Abusive Speech’, Law and Philosophy 14, 1995, pp. 203–43
97. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, op. cit., passim; also Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 7–8.
98. Tania Singer et al., ‘Empathic Neural Responses are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of Others’, Nature 439, 2006, pp. 466–69
99. Tania Singer et al., ‘Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain’, Science 303, 2004, pp. 1157–62
100. E. J. Hermans et al., ‘Testosterone Administration Reduces Empathetic Behavior: A Facial Mimicry Study’, Psychoneuroendocrinology 31, 2006, pp. 859–66
101. S. Baron-Cohen, ‘The Extreme Male Brain Theory of Autism’, Trends in Cognitive Science 6, 2002, pp. 248–54
102. S. Baron-Cohen, The Essential Difference: The Male and Female Brain, and the Riddle of Autism, London: Penguin, 2003
103. R. Knickmeyer, S. Baron-Cohen, P. Raggatt, K. Taylor and G. Hackett, ‘Fetal Testosterone and Empathy’, Hormones and Behavior 49, 2006, pp. 282–92
104. J. A. Harris, J. P. Rushton, E. Hampson and D.N. Jackson, ‘Salivary Testosterone and Self-Report Aggressive and Pro-Social Personality Characteristics in Men and Women’, Aggressive Behavior 22, 1996, pp. 321–31; and, for a book that summarizes and popularizes recent findings, Louann Brizendine, The Female Brain, New York: Morgan Road Books, 2006.
105. Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, ‘The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships’, in Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb, eds, The Emergence of Morality in Young Children, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987, esp. p. 279.
106. Lawrence Blum, ‘Care’ in L. Becker and C. Becker, eds, Encyclopedia of Ethics, Volume I, New York: Garland Publishing, 1992, p. 126.
107. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1960, pp. 76–81.
108. Randy Lemon and Nancy Eisenberg’s ‘Gender and Age Differences in Empathy and Sympathy’ and C. Daniel Batson, Jim Fultz and Patricia A. Schoenrade’s ‘Adults’ Emotional Reactions to the Distress of Others’, both in N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer, eds, Empathy and its Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
109. C. P. McCue and J. D. Gopoian, ‘Dispositional Empathy and the Political Gender Gap’, Women and Politics 21, 2000, pp. 1–20.
110. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, sections 5, 6, 30.
111. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., pp. 560–63. However, in subsequent work (e.g. Political Liberalism), Rawls denies having, or ever having had, a genuinely metaphysical theory of the nature of selves. Rather, he regards what he says about selves in A Theory of Justice as an expository device for representing the reasoning that occurs behind the veil of ignorance.
112. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, esp. Ch. 1 and Conclusion.
113. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
114. Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’ in Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
115. Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 74ff.
116. Martha Nussbaum, ibid., p. 79. As far as I am able to tell, Nel Noddings’s Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984
117. Susan Mendus, ‘Some Mistakes about Impartiality’, Political Studies XLIV, 1996, p. 323.
118. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, esp. pp. 20ff.
119. Joel Feinberg usefully introduces the term ‘Skokie-type cases’ in Offense to Others, Volume 2 of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 86–96
120. Martha Nussbaum’s ‘Poets and Judges’ in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995, pp. 79–121
121. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self, Volume 3 of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986.
122. Virginia Held, ‘The Ethics of Care’ in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 551
123. Nel Noddings, ‘Caring as Relation and Virtue in Teaching’ in Rebecca L. Walker and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds, Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 41–60.
124. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001
125. Michael Slote, Morals from Motives, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003
126. Recently available evidence shows that this problem may have existed more in the past than it does today, at least in the USA. S. Bianchi, J. Robinson, and M. Milkie (Changing Rhythms of American Family Life, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006)
127. G. A. Cohen, ‘Incentives, Inequality, and Community’, reprinted in S. Darwall, ed., Equal Freedom, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp. 331–97
128. JohnRawls, ATheory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
129. Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Ch. 11
130. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, Ch. 9
131. Derek Parfit’s Lindley Lecture ‘Equality or Priority’, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991
132. Roger Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority, and Compassion’, Ethics 113, 2003, pp.745–63.
133. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr, and Jeffrey Paul, eds, The Communitarian Challenge to Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 27–58.
134. Jane Mansbridge, ‘Feminism and Democratic Community’ in John Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds, Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV, New York: New York University Press, 1993, pp. 347–61
135. Diana Meyers, ‘Social Exclusion, Moral Reflection, and Rights’, Law and Philosophy 12, 1993, pp. 125f.
136. Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995, pp. 79–121.
137. Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984, esp. p. 79.
138. Nel Noddings (Caring, op. cit., pp. 25, 61f.) clearly doesn’t regard caring as any sort of rational requirement.
139. J. H. Bernard, ed., The Works of Joseph Butler, London: Macmillan, 1900.
140. Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640–1740, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 283.
141. Stephen Darwall (The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, op. cit., pp. 247–72) is one among many who understand normativity in this way.
142. David Wiggins, ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty’, Monist 74, 1991, pp. 83–106, esp. pp. 91f. Wiggins offers an interesting account of why critics may have thought that Hume and the other sentimentalists were incapable of allowing for categorical imperatives.
143. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, reprinted in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton, eds, Moral Discourse and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 313–22
144. H. A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ in his Moral Obligation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.
145. Hume’s Treatise (L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958, esp. pp. 416, 458
146. Peter Railton, ‘Humean Theory of Practical Rationality’ in D. Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 265–81.
147. R. Jay Wallace, ‘Normativity, Commitment and Instrumental Reason’, Philosopher’s Imprint 1, 2001: www.philosophersimprint.org/001003
148. Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’ (in his Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 and elsewhere
149. Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986, pp. 5–25
150. Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction’ in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds, Moral Discourse and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 309
151. Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 107
152. R. Jay Wallace, ‘Normativity, Commitment and Instrumental Reason’, op. cit., p. 26; Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, Chs 2 and 3, esp. p. 100.)
153. Both Donald Davidson (‘How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?’ in Joel Feinberg, ed., Moral Concepts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 93–113
154. David Pears (Motivated Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) seem to hold that weakness of will or akrasia is always irrational. But I don’t believe either counts as an ethical rationalist overall.
155. Martin Hoffman (Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) describes a number of different ways in which ‘normal’ self-interest or self-concern sets limits on how much empathy for others we can develop or display.
156. Michael Slote, Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
157. Grace Clement, Care, Autonomy, and Justice, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, Ch. 2.
158. Carol Gilligan (‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development’ in E. Kittay and D. Meyers, eds, Women and Moral Theory, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987, p. 20) says that the distinction between the justice perspective and the care perspective cuts across the distinction between thinking and feeling.
159. Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 11.
160. Martha Nussbaum (Sex and Social Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 74ff.
161. Richard Holton and Rae Langton, ‘Empathy and Animal Ethics’ in Dale Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, esp. pp. 222ff.
162. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978; John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’ in R. Crisp and M. Slote, eds, Oxford Readings in Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
163. Jeanette Kennett, ‘Autism, Empathy, and Moral Agency’, Philosophical Quarterly 52, 2002, pp. 340–57.
164. As Nel Noddings (Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984
165. David Wiggins, ‘A Sensible Subjectivism’ (in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton, eds, Moral Discourse and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 237–42
166. Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640–1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, esp. pp. 214f.). Anyone who regards Hume as an ideal observer theorist also presumably regards sentimentalism as not entailing non-cognitivism.