Does political activism and affiliation affect allocation of benefits in the rural employment guarantee program: Evidence from West Bengal, India

World Development

Volumn 67, Issue , 2015, Pages 202-217

  Das, Upasak ^a  

^a INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH   (India)

Author keywords

India; MGNREGA; Political activity; Political clientelism; West Bengal

Indexed keywords

CLIENTELISM; EMPLOYMENT; PARTY POLITICS; RURAL AREA; RURAL POLITICS;

INDIA; WEST BENGAL;

EID: 84910639487     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.10.009     Document Type: Article

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