How do dual practitioners divide their time? The cases of three African capital cities

Social Science and Medicine

Volumn 122, Issue , 2014, Pages 113-121

  McPake, Barbara ^a,b   Russo, Giuliano ^c   Tseng, Fu Min ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b QUEEN MARGARET UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c INSTITUTO DE HIGIENE E MEDICINA TROPICAL   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Cape Verde; Dual practice time allocation; Guinea Bissau; Mozambique; Physician dual practice; Physicians in Africa; Physicians' allocative decisions; Physicians' economic behaviour

Indexed keywords

HEALTH WORKER; PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC SECTOR; TIME ALLOCATION; WAGE;

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HEALTH PRACTITIONER; HUMAN; MALE; MEDICAL SPECIALIST; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRIVATE PRACTICE; SCORING SYSTEM; SPECIALIZATION; WORK CAPACITY; WORKING TIME; AFRICA; CITY; ECONOMICS; HEALTH PERSONNEL ATTITUDE; MEDICINE; MIDDLE AGED; PHYSICIAN;

CAPE VERDE [MACARONESIA]; GUINEA-BISSAU; MOZAMBIQUE;

ADULT; AFRICA; ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; CITIES; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MEDICINE; MIDDLE AGED; PHYSICIANS; PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC SECTOR;

EID: 84908386487     PISSN: 02779536     EISSN: 18735347     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.10.040     Document Type: Article

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