Virtual bargaining: A theory of social decision-making

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Volumn 369, Issue 1655, 2014, Pages

  Misyak, Jennifer B ^a   Chater, Nick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

coordination; social decision making; strategic interaction; virtual bargaining

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; COMMUNICATION; DATA SET; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; PREDICTION; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

ANIMAL; DECISION MAKING; GAME; HUMAN; MOTIVATION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

ANIMALS; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; GOALS; HUMANS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84907487078     PISSN: 09628436     EISSN: 14712970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2013.0487     Document Type: Article

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