Rational choice and institutional change: An overview of current theories

Widening the European Union: Politics of Institutional Change and Reform

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 21-38

  Dowding, Keith ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905142362     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203166291     Document Type: Chapter

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