Crystallisations of the global western state in the era of climate change

International Journal of Human Rights

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 320-335

  Kent, Gregory ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROEHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

climate change; global state; globality; governance; human rights; the West

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903270079     PISSN: 13642987     EISSN: 1744053X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2014.914704     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. The emergent Global State of Shaws theory, is built on this Western conglomerate or network of state-based power, which it is argued, is increasingly global in its reach. A more complete elaboration of this idea and key underpinning terms and concepts will evolve below.
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8. Given existing particular preoccupations of leaders and publics, underpinned by strong national, religious and ethnic identities which consistently hamper the relatively minimal efforts of the UN system to ensure cooperation on policy areas critical to humanity, such as R2P, Security Council reform or even climate change itself, the notion of a legitimate, democratic top-down government on a global level does indeed seem some way off.
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10. Readers will note that a significant limitation to Shaws theory is the emphasis on the political at the expense of the economic. The interconnection between global economic forces in the form of transnational corporations and the elites that direct them on the one hand and the political leaders of state and supra-state organisations on the other is not explored. Clearly, this is important to any discussion of climate change, driven as it has been, and continues to be, by the forces of global liberalisation of trade and markets that comprise the economic globalisation emphasised by traditional globalisation theory. There is not space to consider this aspect of development in this article.
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17. The Fifth Assessment Report will be published in 2014.
18. The impact of developed states is relatively minor and is, for reasons of space, not considered here. Various criticisms have been levelled at the work of working group two of the AR4 on climate change impacts. Most notable was Professor J. Graham Cogley, supported by Michael Zemp from the World Glacier Monitoring Service, who raised the highly damaging issue of the melting of the Himalayan glaciers, suggesting that the IPCC got the date (2035) wrong by 300 years. While the IPCC authors denied the claims, it has subsequently distanced itself from the claim.
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27. There was very high confidence about this. It was also noted that coastal located industries would be vulnerable.
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31. Authors go further, arguing that there is now little to no chance of maintaining the rise in global mean surface temperature at below 28C, despite repeated high-level statements to the contrary. Impacts associated with 28C have been revised such that it more appropriately represents the threshold between dangerous and extremely dangerous climate change.
32. Munich Re, for example, the largest reinsurer in the world, has publicly stated its expectation for the near future of an exponential increase in natural disaster-related costs.
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35. Which the author has analysed the scientific literature on climate change. Oreskes has analysed 928 abstracts of papers from refereed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003, concluding that there is a scientific consensus on the existence of anthropogenic climate change. Seventy-five percent of the abstracts either explicitly or implicitly accepted the consensus view; the remaining 25% dealt with methods or paleoclimate, thus taking no position on current anthropogenic climate change. None of the abstracts disagreed with the consensus position. There are a few dissenting voices on climate change. Richard Lindzen of MIT and Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Study question the accuracy of IPCC projections. Others, including Tim Patterson of Carleton University and David Douglass of the University of Rochester, argue that climate change has been caused by natural processes. Robert C. Balling of Arizona State University and Judith Curry of Georgia Institute of Technology argue the cause is not yet established. A limited number of other dissenters, including Craig Idso and Patrick Michaels of Arizona State and the University of Virginia respectively, argue effects are more limited than the IPCC proposes.
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39. There are four main ways in which these events are revolutionary: they are fundamental challenges to structures of authoritarian states; they are rooted in widespread popular agency; they are connected to changes in national structures and international relations; and these changes show every sign of durable impact on the forms and character of power. They are not primarily socio-economic revolutions, but represent historic political transformations. Global-democratic revolution is not simply about the form of government within any nation-state, but rather the shape of world order.
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78. The case of Syria appeared to be replicating this development of British and French initiative ahead of US involvement. However, at the time of writing, the British parliaments rejection of military action, followed by President Obamas focus on the elimination of Syrias chemical weapons capability - a not to be dismissed achievement however - has threatened arguably to undermine any crystallisation of Western power in an important case of asystematic human rights violation by a state on a massive scale.
79. This assumption - of the continued existence and development of the global state - is based on the historical argument that war and massive human rights violation are the key impetus for the cooperation that underpins the development of the global state. Although war can be said to be in decline, it is far from eradicated. Massive human rights violation is far from a purely historical phenomenon. Climate change is another factor that ensures cooperation into the future.
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86. Permanent displacement of 70 million Bangladeshis is a commonly used figure.