Prove it! The Burden of Proof Game in Science vs. Pseudoscience Disputes

Philosophia (United States)

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 487-502

  Pigliucci, Massimo ^a   Boudry, Maarten ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian theory; Burden of proof; Logical fallacies; Pseudoscience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901813907     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-013-9500-z     Document Type: Article

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