The sense of justice: Empathy in law and punishment

The Sense of Justice: Empathy in Law and Punishment

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-205

  Dubber, Markus ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

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EID: 84900220551     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
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References (496)

1. Rick Bragg, Former Klansman Is Found Guilty of 1966 Killing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2003
2. Matt Volz, Trial Opens in Slaying Linked to MLK Plot, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2003.
3. Johan Arne Vetlesen, Perception, Empathy, and Judgment 85-152 (1994). On Eichmann, see Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963).
4. Martha Grace Duncan, Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons: The Unconscious Meanings of Crime and Punishment (1996).
5. This is not to say that they couldn't have identified with both. To the contrary, a proper judgment from the standpoint of justice would have required identification with both defendant and victim. Empathy does not imply sympathy. See infra pp. 71-72.
6. See Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime, 206-07; see generally Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996)
7. Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 19 (1993). On the use of narrative to induce victim empathy in Supreme Court opinions upholding death sentences, see Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 161 (1990).
8. Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 143, 166 (1999) (citing Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d 1074, 1085-86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997))
9. see also Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity through Modern Punishment. 51 Hastings L.J. 829 (2000)
10. Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1165 (1995).
11. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
12. J. E. B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender).
13. Justices Side with Death Row Inmate on Jury Bias, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2003.
14. Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
15. Howard Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Am. J. Sociology 420, 421 (1956).
16. E.g., Mackubin v. Whetcroft, 4 H. & McH. 135 (Md. Gen. 1798) (Chase, J.) ("every man's sense of justice").
17. E.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 43 (1881) (deterrence theory of punishment "said to conflict with the sense of justice").
18. E.g., Erwin Riezler, Das Rechtsgefühl: Rechtspsychologische Betrachtungen (1923) (sense of justice as psychological phenomenon); Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1963) (1930) (Freud-inspired account of judicial hunches).
19. For a recent attempt, see Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal. Educ. 518 (1986).
20. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987).
21. Cf. Edward F. McClennen, Justice and the Problem of Stability, 14 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 3, 9 (1985). I'm not interested here in the extent to which Rawls himself has followed his critics in shifting his attention away from the sense of justice to other components of his theory, nor am I interested in the connection between the sense of justice and stability.
22. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ch. 8 (1971)
23. see also John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 Phil. Rev. 281 (1963).
24. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
25. Edmond Cahn, The Sense of Injustice (1949).
26. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994) ("sense of justice is clearly involved in many criminal cases"). For a nice summary of various tort theories, see Jules Coleman, Theories of Tort Law, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/. notes to chapter 1
27. See, e.g., A Moment of Grace, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2005, at A18, col. 1
28. Bob Herbert, An Empty Apology, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2005, at A19, col. 5.
29. See, e.g., John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, & Guyora Binder, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 524, 530 (3d ed. 1996) (inquiring into the felonymurder rule's accordance with "our sense of justice" and "your sense of justice," respectively; under the felony-murder rule, even accidental deaths caused in the commission of certain felonies are punished as murders).
30. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.).
31. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
32. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
33. See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521 (1978)
34. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
35. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
36. Powell v. Bowen, 279 Mo. 280 (1919) (dissent) ("nauseating to a sense of right doing, and shocking to a keen sense of justice").
37. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
38. Breithaupt v. Adams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)
39. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
40. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)
43. Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984)
44. Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
45. United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
46. Hoefker v. United States, 86-1 U.S.T.C. P 9360 (E.D. Ky 1985).
47. Energy Resources Group, Inc. v. Energy Resources Corp., 297 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ("impinges upon [the] court's sense of justice as well as its sense of practicality").
48. Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934) ("shocking to our sense of justice and equity")
49. see generally Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 707 (2000).
50. Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 97 (1952) ("It is repugnant to every sense of justice and fair dealing that a principal shall avail himself of the benefits of an agent's act, and at the same time repudiate his authority.").
51. Lesh v. Ill. Steel Co., 163 Wisc. 124 (1916).
52. Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987).
53. Cianci v. Burwell, 299 Pa. Super. 387 (1982).
54. People v. Flowers, 51 Ill. 2d 25 (1972) (offending the "right sense of justice").
55. McKeigue v. Chicago & N.W. RR Co., 130 Wisc. 543 (1907) (shocking "every natural sense of justice").
56. People v. Rosaro, 43 App. Div. 2d 916, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 11 (1974).
57. M. v. M., 313 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. App. 1958).
58. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 55 Ohio Ops 465 (1954).
59. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 205, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
60. Territory v. Lynch, 18 N.M. 15, 133 P. 405 (1913) ("violat[ing] our American sense of justice").
61. Madison v. San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 2d 253, 236 P.2d 141 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting) (shocking "the intelligence, as well as the sense of justice, of those who believe in the American way of life").
62. Berry v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 783, 792 (1989) (quoting People v. Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d 98, 168 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1980)).
63. Morrow v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 218 (Cal. App. 1995) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
64. Home Steam Laundry Co. v. Smith, 8 Ohio NP NS 402, 19 Ohio Dec. 460 (1909).
65. People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172 (1952).
66. Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506 (1947).
67. Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wisc. 161 (1899) ("based upon the sense of justice of the business community").
68. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wisc. 2d 1 (1962) ("on a layman's sense of justice or on natural justice").
69. Terrell v. Washington, 158 N.C. 281 (1912).
70. Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237 (1880).
71. People v. Miller, 42 Misc. 2d 794, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1964).
72. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
73. Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Arnold, J.).
74. Seawell v. MacWhitney, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (1949).
75. State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979)
76. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430 (1969).
77. Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 434 Pa. 293 (1969) (Roberts, J., concurring).
78. Woodson v. Foster, 182 Kan. 315 (1958)
79. see generally 42 A.L.R. 3d 1116.
80. Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 180 A.2d 632 (1962).
81. Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N.Y. 389 (1873).
82. See, e.g., Redewill v. Gillen, 12 P. 872 (N.M. 1887).
83. Henthorne v. Hopwood, 218 Ore. 336 (1959) (O'Connell, J., concurring)
84. White v. Tiffen, 1 Ga. App. 569, 57 S.E. 1038 (1907).
85. United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
86. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 432 (1960).
87. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921)
88. see also DPP v. Camplin, [1978] AC 705 (Lord Glaisdale) (precedent's "implications constitute affronts to common sense and any sense of justice").
89. Flood v. Kuhn 407 U.S. 258, 293, n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View, 10 Hastings L.J. 394, 397 (1959))
90. see also Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349 (1951).
91. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). For a critical analyis of that sense of justice,see Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights (2002).
92. Sam Sparks, Tribute to the Honorable Homer Thornberry, 74 Texas L. Rev. 949, 949-50 (1996) ("a strong sense of what was 'right' and what was 'wrong.' ")
93. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Frank Minis Johnson, Jr., as a Colleague, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1414, 1415 (2000) ("A sense of justice-inborn in Judge Johnson- permeated everything he did.")
94. J. Michael Luttig, Tribute to Warren Burger, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1995) ("a man with a fierce sense of justice")
95. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5 (1994) ("join[ing] the legions who applaud Harry A. Blackmun for 'his integrity, his high sense of justice' "); Richard W. Benka, Remembrances of William O. Douglas on the 50th Anniversary of His Appointment to the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Historical Society 1990 Yearbook ("decisions were profoundly governed by his sense of justice and human need"), http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_library/subs_volumes/04_c12_o.html
96. Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 143 (1990), at 127 ("The second most important factor in Cardozo's eminence may well be his judicial program. of bringing law closer to the (informed) non-lawyer's sense of justice.")
97. see also Kathryn Abrams & Ronald Wright, Judge Frank Johnson in the Long Run, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1381 (2000) (Judge Johnson's "situation sense"). On the situation sense, see infra pp. 28-31.
98. National Press Club Interview, Nat'l Public Radio, Jul. 23, 2000
99. cf. Letter from Frank E. Todaro, President, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 3, 2002) (appointee to 6th Circuit "lacks a proper judicial temperament and a meaningful sense of justice").
100. Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (collateral estoppel; reliance on district court's "sense of justice and equity" to determine if prior chance to litigate issue).
101. State v. Accardo, 129 La. 666, 56 So. 631 (1911) (refusal to testify on issue of guilt).
102. Hays v. McFarlan, 32 Ga. 699, 79 Am. Dec. 317 (1861) (validity of promise to support illegitimate child made under threat of legal action).
103. Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235 (1905) (mentally incompetent sister lacked "an ordinary sense of justice").
104. Cramer v. Burlington, 42 Iowa 315 (1875).
105. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994).
106. On those underpinnings, see Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code 6-22 (2002)
107. Markus D. Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and Comments ch. 3 (2005).
108. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 327-28 (emphasis added).
109. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 54 (2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
110. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 545 (1988).
111. Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice 222 (1962) ("Jurisprudence").
112. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 59-61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960)
113. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America § 56, at 78-80 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).
114. See James Q. Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156, 168 (1987).
115. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? 40 Yale L.J. 704, 729 n.54 (1931)
116. See Karl Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 224, 250-65 (1942)
117. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, 59-61
118. see generally William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 186-88, 441 n.68 (1973).
119. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75 (1928).
120. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
121. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1963) (1930). Though frequently derided as a piece of simple-minded, pseudo-psychoanalysis, Frank's book was republished over thirty years later, long after Legal Realism had faded away.
122. Hermann Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism, 43 Yale L.J. 1240 (1934).
123. Hermann Isay, Rechtsnorm und Entscheidung (1929).
124. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive; Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 111-12, 156.
125. P. J. A. Feuerbach, Kritik des natürlichen Rechts 83 (1796). He was also the father of Ludwig Feuerbach.
126. Heinrich von Kleist, Michael Kohlhaas, in The Marquise of O-and Other Stories 114, 114 (David Luke & Nigel Reeves trans. 1978).
127. James C. Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law (1884).
128. Joachim Heinrich Campe, Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1810), preface, at xvi.
129. Hans-Martin Gauger & Wulf Oesterreicher, Sprachgefühl und Sprachsinn, in Sprachgefühl: Vier Antworten auf eine Preisfrage 9, 13 (Deutsche Akademie ed., 1980).
130. For a recent reappraisal of Carter's work, see Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 Law & Hist. Rev. 577 (2002).
131. James C. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, Annual Address, Report of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, Saratoga Springs, New York, Aug. 20-22, 1890, at 217, 223 (1890).
132. Cf. Munroe Smith, Jurisprudence, a Lecture Delivered at Columbia University in the Series on Science, Philosophy and Art, February 19, 1908, at 21 (1909) ("lawfinding experts" seek to "give to the social sense of justice articulate expression in rules and in principles") (emphasis added; quoted in Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 23 (1921)).
133. Eugen Ehrlich, Die richterliche Rechtsfindung, 212.
134. Edmond N. Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 838 (1951).
135. See, e.g., Robert Cover, Justice Accused (1975)
136. David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy 151 (1991)
137. Edwin Cameron, Legal Chauvinism, Executive-Mindedness and Justice-L. C. Steyn's Impact on South African Law, 99 S. Afr. L.J. 39, 59-60 (1982)
138. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 545 (1996).
139. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1807 (1993) (role of positivism in Nazi Germany).
140. Cf. Bruce S. Ledewitz, Edmond Cahn's Sense of Injustice: A Contemporary Reintroduction, 3 J.L. & Rel. 277 (1985).
141. Edmond N. Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 838, 844 (1951).
142. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights pt. 1 (2002)
143. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005).
144. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (1993).
145. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding sodomy statute)
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down sodomy statute).
147. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558
148. see also Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91 (1980)
149. Powell v. State, 270 Ga. 327 (1998)
150. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 Hastings L.J. 509 (2004).
151. See Wilson, The Moral Sense.
152. See Bruce S. Ledewitz, Edmond Cahn's Sense of Injustice: A Contemporary Reintroduction, 3 J.L. & Rel. 277 (1985).
153. See already John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 147 (1690) (executive and federative prerogative).
154. Constitutional Law, 16A Am. Jur. 2d § 317
155. see generally Dubber, The Police Power.
156. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983).
157. In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the INS may not indefinitely detain illegal immigrants. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The implementation of that decision, however, has been slow and spotty. Cf. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2003) (indefinite detention of "excludable aliens" after Zadvydas).
158. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001)
159. see generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (2003).
160. Edmond Cahn, The Sense of Injustice 22 (1949).
161. See Helmut Coing, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie (1st ed. 1950)
162. Helmut Coing, Die obersten Grundsätze des Rechts: Ein Versuch zur Neugründung des Naturrechts (1947).
163. See Rawls's discussion of intuitionism in chapter 1 of A Theory of Justice (1971).
164. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, 12.
165. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, 12.
166. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
167. As a form of empathy, the sense of justice thus always retains a reflexive aspect, namely, the emotion triggered by the recognition of identity. Cf. Martin L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development, in The Development of Affect 227, 236 (Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum eds., 1978), who distinguishes between two components of "empathic arousal": a "relatively involuntary component, based mainly on conditioning and possibly mimicry" and a "more reflective" one, "based mainly on the tendency to imagine oneself in the other's place."
168. For such an account, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 462-79 (1971).
169. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, 24.
170. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ch. 8.
171. See 3 G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften §§ 399-412 (1830)
172. see also G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right § 4A (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
173. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (1998).
174. Cahn, The Sense of Injustice, 12, 13.
175. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (2001).
176. See Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime, pt. I
177. see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 689 (1995).
178. Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9, 13 (1848)
179. See Dubber, The Police Power, 115-19.
180. 2 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law in England 81 (1883).
181. Emile Durkheim, Crime and Punishment, in Durkheim and the Law 59, 60 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1984) (translation of Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social (1893)) ("The interest for revenge is. merely a heightened instinct of self-preservation in the face of danger.").
182. Stephen came close to doing just that, though he described the relevant instinct as "the feeling of hatred which the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily constituted minds," including presumably his own. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 152 (1967) (emphasis added).
183. See, e.g., George H. Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 28 Am. J. Sociology 577 (1918).
184. On the War on Crime as a war-and as a police action- see Markus D. Dubber, The New Police Science and the Police Power Model of the Criminal Process, in in The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., forthcoming 2006).
185. Moore distances himself from Stephen's own attempt to justify punishment as desire gratification. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions 179, 180 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
186. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn § 202 (quoted in Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 73 n.2 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1967)).
187. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, 209.
188. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 462-79.
189. For an argument even contempt can qualify as a moral sentiment under certain conditions. See Michelle Mason, Contempt as a Moral Attitude, 113 Ethics 234 (2003).
190. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 95 (1970).
191. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, 201.
192. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Freedom and Resentment 1, 17 (1974).
193. For an interesting discussion of the moral and legal significance of disgust, compare Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in The Passions of Law (Susan Bandes ed., 1999), at 63
194. with Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law
195. See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Joan Riviere & James Strachey trans., James Strachey ed., 1963) (1930).
196. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (legislators', prosecutors', and juries' behavior as evidence of communal sense of justice regarding capital punishment).
197. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 70 (1933).
198. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 55.
199. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 570, 645 A.2d 1165, 1182 (1994) ("[A]nd law in the last analysis must reflect the general community sense of justice." ) (quoting Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 70).
200. Georg Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht (1843).
201. For a discussion of the relation between the notion of gesundes Volksempfinden and the Volksgeist concept of the historical school, see Joachim Rückert, Das "gesunde Volksempfinden"-eine Erbschaft Savignys? 103 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Germanistische Abteilung) 199, 236 (1986).
202. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 227 (1995).
203. John Dickinson, The Law behind Law, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 113, 116 (1929)
204. John Dickinson, The Law behind Law: II, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 285, 318 (1929).
205. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 284, 289 (1963) (1930) (discussing Dickinson)
206. John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 87-90, 283 (1916) (discussing Savigny).
207. See James Q. Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L.J. 156, 156 (1987).
208. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 565-70, 645 A.2d 1165, 1179 (1994)
209. 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, at 140 (2d ed., 1898; reissued 1968)
210. see also Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law and Knowledge (1994).
211. Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. (1985).
212. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 48 (1881) ("It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.")
213. People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987);.
214. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 592 (1997)
215. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment, in The Trial on Trial 85 (R. A. Duff et al. eds., 2004).
216. See Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime, pt. 2.
217. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 Hastings L.J. 509 (2004).
218. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12 (1986) (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.03, cmt. at 261 n.17 (1985)).
219. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 155-56 n.1 (1893).
220. Hermann Weinkauff, Der Naturrechtsgedanke in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes, 1960 NJW 1689, 1690.
221. see also Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in Rechtspositivismus und Wertbezug des Rechts 33, 43-44 (Ralf Dreier ed., 1990)
222. Michael Bihler, Rechtsgefühl, System und Wertung: Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Rechtsgewinnung (1979) (commenting on authoritarian potential of phenomenological approach to sense of justice as developed by Hermann Isay and, later, Heinrich Hubmann).
223. As jurors were said to possess an unspoiled sense of justice, so women were said to possess an unspoiled sense of language. Jacob Grimm, Vorwort, in 1 Jacob & Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch (1991) (1854).
224. See, e.g., Ludwig Frey, Das Geschwornengericht aus historischen, straf- und staatsrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet 39-40 (1835) (quoted in Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk, 161)
225. cf. Georg Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht 258, 261, 267 (1843).
226. See generally Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk.
227. Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 906 (1994) (citing Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic 115 (1971)).
228. Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 89 (1990).
229. Cf. Thomas Jefferson's comments on the innate sense of justice of "aborigines": "Their only controuls are their manners, and that moral sense of right and wrong, which, like the sense of tasting and feeling, in every man makes a part of his nature." Thomas Jefferson, Query XI, in Notes on the State of Virginia (1787).
230. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On Education 222 (Allan Bloom trans., 1979).
231. See Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 6.
232. Franz Alexander & Hugo Staub, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public 13 (1956) (German original 1929).
233. For an excellent discussion of empathy as "imaginative experiencing of the situation of another" and its role in Supreme Court jurisprudence and legal discourse more generally, to which I am deeply indebted, see Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 (1987).
234. Toni Massaro critically assesses what she considers the polemical invocation of a vague concept of empathy by "critical legal studies, feminist, and 'law and literature' writers." Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1989)
235. see also Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 929 (1994).
236. In this book empathy is not employed as an ill-defined label used to express one's frustration with others' fetishistic infatuation with legal rules as rules. On the contrary, it seeks to work out an account of the sense of justice that has enough content to do real analytical and normative work. This book also doesn't concern itself with the relevance of an offender's emotions for assessing her criminal liability. For recent treatments of this subject, see Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997) (provocation)
237. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996) (criminal law generally).
238. On the development of this capacity in young children, see, e.g., Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development, 239.
239. See, e.g., Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in Explaining Emotions 507, 510 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
240. Claire Armon-Jones, The Thesis of Constructionism, in The Social Construction of Emotions 32, 35 (Rom Harré ed., 1986).
241. See Dubber, The Police Power, ch. 1.
242. Markus Dirk Dubber, Polizei-Recht-Strafrecht, in Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen zum 70. Geburtstag 179 (Cornelius Prittwitz et al. eds., 2002).
243. Aristotle, Politics bk. I.
244. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 170 (1690).
245. Edmond Cahn, The Sense of Injustice 24 (1949).
246. Martha C. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life 66 (1995)
247. see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions pt. II (2001).
248. For an excellent recent overview of Smith's theory of empathy, see Stephen Darwall, Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith, 28 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 139 (1999).
249. See, e.g., 1 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 308 (1759) ("Our sensibility to the feelings of others is the very principle upon which that manhood is founded.").
250. See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 85 (1993).
251. 1 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 296.
252. For an interesting recent exploration of the role of the imagination in the process of "stepp[ing] beyond our egocentric perspectives" through empathetic role taking, see Nancy Sherman, Empathy and Imagination, 22 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 82 (1998).
253. Cf. Martin L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development, in The Development of Affect 227, 242 (Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum eds., 1978) (distinction retained).
254. See, e.g., Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in Explaining Emotions 507, 509 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (identity confusion).
255. Annette Baier, Master Passions, in Explaining Emotions 403, 420-21 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
256. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature bk. ii, pt. i, § xi, at 318 (1739).
257. Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, 65
258. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 316 (discussing compassion).
259. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On Education 224 (Allan Bloom trans., 1979).
260. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 319.
261. Rousseau, Emile, 222.
262. See Blum, Compassion, 512 (contrasting pity with compassion).
263. John Sabini & Maury Silver, Emotions, Responsibility, and Character, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions 165, 170 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
264. Jürgen Habermas, Morality and the Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics? in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 195, 199-200 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans. 1990).
265. See his critiques of F. H. Jacobi and Schleiermacher. See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1577, 1593-97 (1994).
266. Immanel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 59 (Ak. 460)
267. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 46, 86-95 (Ak. 38, 73-81)
268. Metaphysik der Sitten (Tugendlehre) 530-31 (A35-37) (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 8th ed. 1989).
269. Every moral being possesses this Moralgefühl, which should be cultivated and strengthened. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, 530-31 (A36)
270. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 46 (Ak. 38).
271. See generally A. M. MacBeath, Kant on Moral Feeling, 64 Kant-Studien 283 (1973)
272. Henri Lauener, Hume und Kant: Systematische Gegenüberstellung einiger Hauptpunkte ihrer Lehren 152-59, 196-205 (1969).
273. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 46 & n.30, 59 (Ak. 442 & n.30, 460)
274. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 45-46 (Ak. 38)
275. Metaphysik der Sitten, 530-31 (A36-37).
276. This also applies to Hegel's comments on emotion and morality in the Philosophy of Right. See Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 1596. On Hutcheson, see Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728)
277. see also W. L. Taylor, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith (1965).
278. 2 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 293-305 (1759).
279. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy 502 (1998).
280. Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime 58 (John T. Goldthwait trans., 1991)
281. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 502
282. see also David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature bk. iii, pt. i, § ii, at 481-83 (1739).
283. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. iii, pt. i, § ii, at 491.
284. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 489.
285. On the connection between a sense of honor and a sense of justice, see Johann Michael Franz Birnbaum, Ueber das Erfordeniß einer Rechtsverletzung zum Begriffe des Verbrechens, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den Begriff der Ehrenkränkung, Archiv des Criminalrechts (Neue Folge) 149, 189 (1834).
286. 3 G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften §§ 399-412 (1830)
287. see also G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right § 4A (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
288. 3 Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 402 (1830) (Rechts- or Selbstgefühl, instead of Recht- or Selbstempfindung).
289. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 36.
290. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse Z35 (1986)
291. Rousseau, Emile, 222.
292. Blum, Compassion, 511.
293. What's more, Rawls himself appears to have abandoned it. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996)
294. Edward F. McClennen, Justice and the Problem of Stability, 14 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 3, 9 (1985).
295. Raymond Saleilles, The Individualization of Punishment 3 (Rachel Szold Jastrow trans., 1913) (L'individualisation de la peine; étude de criminalité sociale 2d ed. 1909) (1st ed. 1898).
296. Emile Durkheim, Crime and Punishment, in Durkheim and the Law 59, 69 (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1984) (translation of Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social (1893)).
297. George H. Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 28 Am. J. Sociology 577, 580-81 (1918).
298. cf. George Herbert Mead, Probation and Politics, 27 Survey 2003 (1912), http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Mead/pubs/Mead_1912e.html.
299. Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 580-81.
300. See Gabriel Tarde, Les lois de l'imitation (1890).
301. Gabriel Tarde, Penal Philosophy 88 (Rapelje Howell trans., 1912) (4th ed. 1903; 1st ed. 1890).
302. see also Saleilles, The Individualization of Punishment, 3.
303. Tarde, Penal Philosophy, 88.
304. See Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (James Strachey trans., 1922) (1921).
305. See Michael Bihler, Rechtsgefühl, System und Wertung: Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Rechtsgewinnung (1979).
306. See Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (Joan Riviere & James Strachey trans., James Strachey ed., 1963) (1930).
307. Saleilles, The Individualization of Punishment, 3.
308. Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in Communication and the Evolution of Society 178, 188 (1979).
309. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 504 (1971).
310. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Development and Ego Identity, in Communication and the Evolution of Society 69, 86-87 (1979).
311. Jürgen Habermas, What Is Universal Pragmatics? in Communication and the Evolution of Society 1, 29 (1979).
312. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 505.
313. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 565-70, 645 A.2d 1165, 1179-82 (1994) (quoting Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 70 (1933)).
314. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 46.
315. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 Hastings L.J. 509 (2004).
316. As Carole Pateman points out, Rawls faces a much larger problem to the extent he adopts Kohlberg's views on moral psychology, which follow a long tradition in denying women the capacity to develop a sense of justice. Carole Pateman, "The Disorder of Women": Women, Love, and the Sense of Justice, in The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory 17 (1989).
317. For Carol Gilligan's celebrated response to Kohlberg, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982) (contrasting a feminine ethic of care with a masculine ethic of justice)
318. cf. Lawrence A. Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, 98 Ethics 472 (1988).
319. On the difficulties of basing moral development on intrafamilial relationships, see Susan Moller Okin, The Gendered Family and the Development of a Sense of Justice, in Values and Knowledge 61 (Edward S. Reed, Elliot Turiel, & Terrance Brown eds., 1996)
320. see also Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, 99 Ethics 229 (1989).
321. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 463-64. Rawls of course isn't trying to describe actual child-rearing practices. He is laying out the process of acquiring a sense of justice in a well-ordered society, where parents are well-intentioned and children well-behaved by definition.
322. See John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 Phil. Rev. 281, 302 (1963) (emphasis added).
323. See generally Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment
324. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
325. Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights (2002).
326. Federal Election Commission, State Voter Registration Requirements, http://www.fec.gov/votregis/state_voter_reg_requirements02.htm. On felon disenfranchisement, see Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote: An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (2000) (3.9 million Americans, or one in fifty adults, disenfranchised because of a felony convictions).
327. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 44 (1881).
328. Osborne set up the first Mutual Welfare League at Auburn Prison in 1914. See Thomas Mott Osborne, Society and Prisons (1916, repr. 1972)
329. see also Frank Tannenbaum, Osborne of Sing Sing 66, 71-87 (1933).
330. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment, in The Trial on Trial 85 (R. A. Duff et al. eds., 2004).
331. What victim participation means in a criminal case is difficult to say; everything depends on who-or what-is thought of as the victim of crime. If the victim of crime is the state (or "The People," or "The United States of America"), then the prosecutor (or state's attorney, district attorney, U.S. attorney, and so on) represents the communal or institutional victim. To the extent that the victim is a person, however, there is no reason why, everything else being equal, that person should not be permitted to participate in the criminal proceeding against the person charged with having committed a crime against her. The problem is, of course, that everything is not equal insofar as victim participation may interfere with the defendant's rights to a fair trial by improperly influencing the fact finder. See Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime; Dubber, The Criminal Trial. On the institution of victim's counsel in German criminal law, see William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 37 (1996).
332. See, e.g., 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, at 410 (2d ed. 1898; reissued 1968) (judgment of peers, rather than king, in treason cases "based on the maxim that no one should be judge in his own cause").
333. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547 (1997).
334. That would make us saints. Regarding nothing but our self-interest would make us moral lepers, to stick with Michael Moore's contrast. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions 179, 185 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987)
335. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 19.
336. Thomas McCarthy, Introduction, in Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action vii, viii (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990).
337. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 18 (1971).
338. Habermas, What Is Universal Pragmatics? 2.
339. Habermas, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, 188.
340. Habermas, What Is Universal Pragmatics? 19.
341. Habermas, Moral Development and Ego Identity, 91.
342. Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 302 ("It is plausible to suppose that any being capable of language is capable of the intellectual performances to have a sense of justice.").
343. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 46.
344. On the debate, see Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky (Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini ed., 1980).
345. This feature of Rawls's work, and the connections between moral theory and linguistics in general, recently have begun to attract attention after initially having been largely ignored. See, for example, Gilbert Harman, Moral Philosophy and Linguistics, in Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (2000)
346. Gilbert Harman, Three Trends in Moral and Political Philoso- phy, 37 Value Inquiry 415 (2003)
347. John Mikhail, Rawls' Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the "Generative Grammar" Model of Moral Theory (Cornell University Ph.D. diss. 2000)
348. John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1057 (2002)
349. Susan Dwyer, Moral Competence, in Philosophy and Linguistics 1 (K. Murasugi & R. Stainton eds., 1999).
350. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax § 4 (1965)
351. see also Hans-Martin Gauger & Wulf Oesterreicher, Sprachgefühl und Sprachsinn, in Sprachgefühl: Vier Antworten auf eine Preisfrage 9, 29 (Deutsche Akademie ed., 1980).
352. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47 (citing Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 3-9).
353. Habermas, What Is Universal Pragmatics? 14.
354. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 50.
355. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 3.
356. Habermas, What Is Universal Pragmatics? 32.
357. Emmon Bach, An Introduction to Transformational Grammar 3-4 (1964) ("What we must account for [in linguistics] includes what is known as the native speaker's 'intuition' about what he says and hears [what the Germans call Sprachgefühl].").
358. 16 Grimmsches Wörterbuch 2758 (entry "Sprachgrenze") (quoting Jacob Grimm).
359. Joachim Heinrich Campe, Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1810), preface, at xvi.
360. E.g., 3 Moriz Heyne, Deutsches Wörterbuch (1906) (entry "Sprachgefühl").
361. See Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and Its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species (Michael Losonsky ed., Peter Heath trans., 1999) (1836).
362. Gauger & Oesterreicher, Sprachgefühl und Sprachsinn, 13.
363. See, e.g., Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 4.
364. T. C. Williams, Kant's Philosophy of Language: Chomskyan Linguistics and Its Kantian Roots 12 (1993) (quoting Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics 70-71 (1966)).
365. Jean Piaget, Moral Judgment: Children Invent the Social Contract (1932), in The Essential Piaget 159, 190 (Howard E. Gruber & J. Jacques Vonèche eds., 1977).
366. Habermas, Moral Development and Ego Identity, 91.
367. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
368. Immanual Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
369. For an extended discussion of the interrelation among these three aspects of penal law in the modern regime of punishment, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 545 (1996).
370. Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights pt. I (2002)
371. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (2001).
372. On telishment, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955).
373. In this sense the offender can even be said to have a "right to be punished." See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 Law & Hist. Rev. 113 (1998).
374. See generally Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime.
375. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988).
376. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 85, 142-43 (1993).
377. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (Rationale of Punishment), in 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 401 (J. Bowring ed., 1843).
378. See Richard A. Posner, Emotions versus Emotionalism in Law, in The Passions of Law 309, 321-25 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
379. See Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, 398. Grotius's theory of punishment had already stressed the identity of humans in contrast to omniscient and omnipotent God. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. 2, chap. 20, sect. 4 (1625).
380. See also Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, bk. 8, chap. 3, sect. 8 (1672)
381. Christian Thomasius, Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae, 7th ed. (1730; 1687), bk. 3, chap. 7, sect. 36
382. Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (1978), 55-56 (discussing John Howard).
383. At least since Hobbes, intracommunal punishment was distinguished from extracommunal war. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 28 (1651); John Locke, Of Civil Government, chap. 2, sect. 9, and chap. 7, sect. 88 (1689).
384. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre §§ 20, 254 (Fritz Medicus ed., 1967; 1796).
385. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten AB 70-71 (A ed. 1785; B ed. 1786)
386. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts §§ 36 (persons), 100 (1821)
387. see generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1601 (1994).
388. See generally Immanuel Kant, What Is Enlightenment? (1784).
389. William Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania 5 (1793).
390. William Roscoe, Observations on Penal Jurisprudence and the Reformation of Criminals 8-9 (1819).
391. On Roscoe, a remarkably versatile historian and writer, see Henry Roscoe, The Life of William Roscoe, 2 vols. (1933).
392. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2-3 (1769).
393. On Blackstone's influence in the United States
394. see, e.g., Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture 11 (1984) (Commentaries "rank second only to the Bible as a literary and intellectual influence on the history of American institutions").
395. On treatmentism (which encompasses both rehabilitative and incapacitative treatment), see Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 53 (2000);
396. see also Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code (2002) (detailed exploration of a treatmentist system of criminal law, the Model Penal Code).
397. Karl David August Röder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten als Rechtsforderung: Eine Berufung auf den gesunden Sinn des deutschen Volks 13-14 (1864). See generally Dubber, The Right to Be Punished.
398. Röder, Besserungsstrafe, 14.
399. See Franz von Liszt, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, 3 ZStW 1, 45 (1883) (so-called "Marburger Programm");
400. Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 453, 461, 462, 469 (1928);
401. Albert J. Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 550, 555, 562 (1937) (comparing the criminal to "a man with a contagious disease" and criminality to "matters of sanitation and health").
402. On the conflation of punishment as a legal sanction and as a quasi-patriarchal police action, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005).25. Solitary confinement, for example, was recommended as the proper treatment for offenders because "isolation is the best means of acting on the moral nature of children."
403. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 294 (Alan Sheridan trans. 1978). The reaction to rehabilitationism since the mid-1970s has reversed the inspirational flow, while retaining the analogy between juvenile and adult punishment.
404. See Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose 8 (1981).
405. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 467.
406. See David Garland, Punishment and Welfare 40-41 (1985).
407. See Dubber, The Police Power.
408. Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830-1914, at 229 (1990).
409. On phrenology in the United States, see W. David Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora 236-37 (1965);
410. David Brion Davis, Homicide in American Fiction, 1798-1860, at 25-26 (1957);
411. see generally Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose 41 (1981).
412. Liszt, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, 45.
413. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pt. I), 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 758 (1937).
414. Alfred L. Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code (pt. I), 11 Wisc. L. Rev. 364, 374, 382 (1936);
415. see also Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 461, 478.
416. See Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code, § 1.
417. As recently as 1995, a conference in Maryland was devoted to the genetic origins of crime. Sam Fulwood, Scholars Gather to Debate Genetics-Crime Research, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 1995, A14;
418. see also James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (1985); The Causes of Crime:New Biological Approaches (Sarnoff A. Mednick, Terrie E. Moffitt, & Susan A. Stack eds., 1987).
419. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in German Criminal Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 679 (2006).
420. On the distinction between character- and act-based varieties of retributivism, see generally Markus D. Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes and Comments 22-24 (2005).
421. See generally Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 6.
422. Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12 (1986) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.03, Comment at 262 (1985)).
423. See generally Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 5.
424. People v. Haney, 30 N.Y.2d 328 (1972) (citing Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 9 (May 8, 1959), at 53); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 417 (1958).
425. See Dubber, The Police Power.
426. See generally Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code.
427. For an exploration of this question, see Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 7.B.5 (2005).
428. On the central role of the household, and quasi-household, in conceptions of criminal law, see Dubber, The Police Power.
429. On the distinction between incapacity and inability excuses, see Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code, 267.
430. Criminality here simply means a match between the conduct and the definition of some offense; unlawfulness means the absence of a justification. Responsibility means the absence of an excuse. On the tripartite analysis of criminal liability, see Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code, ch. 1; Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 3.
431. See Shaun Nichols, How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism, or Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? 85 The Monist 285 (2002);
432. John Deigh, Empathy and Universalizability, in The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory 160 (1996);
433. Jeffrie Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, 82 Ethics 284 (1972).
434. Autism presents another difficult case. There appears to be considerable evidence, however, that autism also involves a cognitive deficiency, specifically the incapacity for empathic role taking. See Shaun Nichols, Mindreading and the Cognitive Architecture underlying Altruistic Motivation, 16 Mind & Language 425 (2001);
435. see also Jeanette Kennett, Autism, Empathy, and Moral Agency, 52 Phil. Q. 340 (2002).
436. See Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart.
437. But see E. P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals (1987) (1906).
438. This oversimplifies the current state of affairs and its historical origins. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 2.
439. See Richard J. Bonnie, Peter W. Low, & John C. Jeffries, Case Study in the Insanity Defense:The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. (2d ed. 2000).
440. Anything else would violate the principle of prospectivity (also known as the prohibition of ex post facto criminal lawmaking). See Dubber & Kelman, American Criminal Law, ch. 2.
441. Henry Schwarzschild, Homicide by Injection, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1982, at A15 (quoting then-Governor Reagan's 1973 comments in support of lethal injection);
442. see generally Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 563-73.
443. On the difficulty of empathic identification at the capital sentencing hearing after the defendant has been convicted of capital murder, see Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305;
444. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart.
445. Today, upward of 90 percent of criminal cases are resolved without a jury trial. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547 (1997).
446. On antisympathy instructions, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 85 (1993);
447. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart.
448. Dubber, The Pain of Punishment.
449. Cf. Thomas A. Green, Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability in Mediaeval England, 47 Speculum 669, 688 (1972) ("from the outset of the common law period, trial juries reflected a sense of justice fundamentally at odds with the letter of the law").
450. For a spirited defense of jury nullification in certain cases, see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995).
451. FIJA Home Page Fully Informed Jury Association, http://nowscape.com/ fija/fija_us.htm.
452. South Dakota Rejects Jury Nullification, in Minnesota Planning, Minnesota IssueWatch, Dec. 2002, http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/issues/scan.htm? Id=3198.
453. Bob Egello, Judge Keeps Tight Rein on Pot Trial: References to Med- ical Uses Quickly Squelched in Federal Court, S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/01/31/BA213606.DTL
454. Josh Richman, Jurors Tell Ed Rosenthal They're Sorry, Oakland Trib., Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.oaklandtribune.com/Stories/0,1413,82%257E1865%257E1159355,00.html#.
455. On the question of representativeness in nonjury proceedings, see Dubber, American Plea Bargains.
456. Caleb Lownes, An Account of the Alteration and Present State of the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania, in William Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania 73, 76 (1793).
457. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Treatise II: An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good 165 (1725);
458. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 2 Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times 420 (1737-1738);
459. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 316-20, 369-71, 470-76 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888; 1749);
460. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (9th ed., 1801; 1759);
461. Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education (Allan Bloom trans. 1979; 1762);
462. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 146 (1777; 1751);
463. see also Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, 221, 233, 236;
464. David Marshall, The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (1986);
465. John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (1988);
466. Karen Halttunen, Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American History, 100 Am. Hist. Rev.(1995);
467. Norman S. Fiering, Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism, 37 J. Hist. Ideas 195 (1976).
468. Lownes, An Account of the Alteration and Present State of the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania, 83.
469. Lownes, An Account of the Alteration and Present State of the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania, 76-77. Ironically, the gangs of wheelbarrow men were the first offspring of the punishment reform effort in late-eighteenth-century Philadelphia. From 1786 until 1790, four years before the opening of the "Penitentiary House," offenders convicted of noncapital felonies cleaned the streets of Philadelphia with "an iron collar around their necks and waist to which a long chain is fastened and at the end a heavy ball."
470. Michael Meranze, The Penitential Ideal in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia, 108 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 431, 432 (1984). Their heads shaved, the wheelbarrow men wore conspicuous clothes ("an infamous habit") that indicated the nature of their crime. Lownes, 76.
471. 1 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1-5; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 319, 371, 385. For an example of a similar contemporary account of empathic judgment
472. see Martin L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development, in The Development of Affect (Michael Lewis & Leonard Rosenblum eds., 1987);see also Empathy and Its Development (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987).
473. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 316-20, 359, 604;
474. see also Randall McGowen, Punishing Violence, Sentencing Crime, in The Violence of Representation:Literature and the History of Violence 144, 146 (Nancy Armstrong & Leonard Tennenhouse eds., 1989) (role of empathy and identification in the criminal law reform movement in early-nineteenth-century England);
475. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, 260 (discussing Burke's theory of rhetoric as producing identifications).
476. Lownes, An Account of the Alteration and Present State of the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania, 82-83 (emphasis in original).
477. See Joanna Innes, The King's Bench in the Later Eighteenth Century:Law, Authority and Order in a London Debtors' Prison, in An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 251, 257 (John Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980).
478. Meranze, The Penitential Ideal, 442 (quoting Pennsylvania Gazette, 26 September 1787).
479. Cf. Michael Meranze, Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia, 1760-1835, at 60, 156, 176 (1996) (class distinctions in late-eighteenth-century Philadelphia).
480. A similar distinction among offenders appears in Jefferson's proportionate punishment bill for the State of Virginia, which sough to "reform" offenders "committing an inferior injury," but to "exterminate" anyone "whose existence is become inconsistent with the safety of their fellow citizens," albeit only as "the last melancholy resource." Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital of 1779; see generally Markus Dirk Dubber, "An Extraordinarily Beautiful Document":Jefferson's Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments and the Challenge of Republican Punishment, in Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (Markus Dirk Dubber & Lindsay Farmer eds., forthcoming 2006).
481. Gunter Haber has pointed out that much of the zeal with which the rising German bourgeoisie pursued the introduction of public jury trials during the first half of the nineteenth century can be attributed to the identification with the bourgeois victims of the political prosecutions of the period. Gunter Haber, Probleme der Strafprozeßgeschichte im Vormärz: Ein Beitrag zum Rechtsdenken des aufsteigenden Bürgertums, 91 ZStW 590 (1979). In late-eighteenth-century England, the plight of political prisoners likewise did much to mobilize political resistance against the expansion of solitary cell penitentiaries.
482. Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850, at 120-33 (1978).
483. See generally Christopher Adamson, Wrath and Redemption: Protestant Theology and Penal Practice in the Early American Republic, 13 Crim. Just. Hist. 75 (1996).
484. Constitution of the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons (May 8, 1787), in Reform of Criminal Law in Pennsylvania:Selected Enquiries 1787-1819, at 105 (1972); see also Roscoe, Observations on Penal Jurisprudence, 176-77 (reform "is founded on Christian principles, and applies the precepts of our religion to the conduct of our lives [and] considers a criminal as an unfortunate fellow-creature, led on to guilt through a great variety of causes, but capable by kindness, patience, and proper discipline, of being reformed and restored to society").
485. See generally Dubber, The Right to Be Punished.
486. See Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote: An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (2000); Extending Democracy to Ex-Offenders, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2005, at A18, col. 1 (five million citizens barred from voting in the 2004 presidential election).
487. See, e.g., Correctional Services Act 1998 (S. Africa); StVollzG (German Code of Punishment Execution); see generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice:Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (2003).
488. For an argument that punishment execution in the United States has remained a species of police rather than of law, see Dubber, The Police Power, 33-34, 51-52.
489. See generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L.J. 437 (2006).
490. See Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime, pt. I.
491. See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 227 (1995).
492. See, e.g., Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 70 (1933).
493. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 312 (1971).
494. See Edmond N. Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 838 (1951);
495. see also Edmond Cahn, The Moral Decision: Right and Wrong in the Light of American Law (1955).
496. For a detailed discussion of the American legal system as a system for the vindication of victims' rights through victim compensation and, as a last resort (ultima ratio), punishment, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims' Rights (2002).