Three trends in moral and political philosophy

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 415-425

  Harman, Gilbert ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043170525     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:INQU.0000013350.42507.c6     Document Type: Review

References (50)

1. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 18.
2. See Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
3. See Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1965); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); M. Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (New York: Viking Penguin: 1997).
4. See Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1965); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); M. Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (New York: Viking Penguin: 1997).
5. See Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1965); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); M. Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (New York: Viking Penguin: 1997).
6. See Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1965); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); M. Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (New York: Viking Penguin: 1997).
7. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-68; Rawls, op. cit., pp. 18, 40-45.
8. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 65-68; Rawls, op. cit., pp. 18, 40-45.
9. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 158-168.
10. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1993).
11. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), and Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1993).
12. John McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," in R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
13. Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 201.
14. On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 165.
15. Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
16. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978);
17. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
18. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
19. See Foot, op. cit.
20. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," in W. Parent, ed., Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
21. Foot, op. cit.
22. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p. 41.
23. See Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
24. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974), p. 41.
25. Ronald Dworkin, "A Reply by Ronald Dworkin: Posner," in M. Cohen, ed., Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983).
26. Warren Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), essays 7-8.
27. See Noam Chomsky, The Minimalist Program (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); Howard Lasnik, Minimalist Analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999).
28. See Noam Chomsky, The Minimalist Program (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995); Howard Lasnik, Minimalist Analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999).
29. Gilbert Harman, "Intrinsic Value," in Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
30. G.E.M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in Collected Philosophical Papers, III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
31. See Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett, The Person and the Situation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
32. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1998-99) and "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999-2000); also see John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
33. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1998-99) and "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999-2000); also see John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
34. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1998-99) and "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1999-2000); also see John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
35. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Evaluatives and Directives," in G. Harman and J.J. Thomson, eds., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1996), ch. 7; see also "The Right and the Good," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997) and Goodness and Advice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
36. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Evaluatives and Directives," in G. Harman and J.J. Thomson, eds., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1996), ch. 7; see also "The Right and the Good," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997) and Goodness and Advice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
37. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Evaluatives and Directives," in G. Harman and J.J. Thomson, eds., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1996), ch. 7; see also "The Right and the Good," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997) and Goodness and Advice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
38. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, ch. 7.
39. See Eva F. Kittay, and D.T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987).
40. See J.M. Darley and T. Schultz, "Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition," Annual Review of Psychology 41 (1990).
41. See Susan Dwyer, "Moral Competence," in Philosophy and Linguistics, K. Murasugi and R. Stainton, eds., (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).
42. See Steven Pinker, "Language Acquisition," in L. Gleitman and M. Liberman, eds., Language, Vol. 1 of Invitation to Cognitive Science, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
43. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy and Linguistics," in K. Brinkmann, ed., Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. I: Ethics (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999).
44. See Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment," Psychological Review, 108 (2001).
45. David Hume, in L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Treatise on Human Nature, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), bk. 3, pt. 2, sect. 12.
46. See M. Ridley, op. cit.
47. See R. Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Pantheon, 1994).
48. T. Horowitz, "Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory," Ethics 108 (1998); also see Francis M. Kamm, "Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction," Ethics, 108 (1998).
49. T. Horowitz, "Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory," Ethics 108 (1998); also see Francis M. Kamm, "Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction," Ethics, 108 (1998).
50. See J.D. Greene, R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, and J.D. Cohen, "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment," Science 293 (2001).