The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought

Law and History Review

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 113-146

  Dubber, Markus Dirk ^a  

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EID: 84998169799     PISSN: 07382480     EISSN: 19399022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/744322     Document Type: Article

References (131)

1. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (Rationale of Punishment), in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring (New York, 1962; 1830), vol. 1, 365, 398. Grotius's theory of punishment had already stressed the identity of humans in contrast to omniscient and omnipotent God. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, bk. 2, chap. 20, sect. 4 (Amsterdam, 1625). See also Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, bk. 8, chap. 3, sect. 8 (London, 1672); Christian Thomasius, Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae, 7th ed. (Halle, 1730; 1687), bk. 3, chap. 7, sect. 36; Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (New York, 1978), 55-56 (discussing John Howard). At least since Hobbes, intracommunal punishment was distinguished from extracommunal war. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 28 (London, 1651); John Locke, Of Civil Government, chap. 2, sect. 9 and chap. 7, sect. 88 (London, 1689.
2. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Fritz Medicus (Hamburg, 1967; 1796) (hereinafter Naturrechi), sect. 20, 254.
3. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (A ed. Riga, 1785; B ed. Riga, 1786), AB 70-71; G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin, 1821), sects. 36 (persons), 100. Hegel's work moves beyond the Enlightenment's universalist focus on abstract identity. For example, the Philosophy of Right captures the Hegelian transition from the universalist Enlightenment conception of punishment to more substantive conceptions of punishment in civil society and, eventually, the modern state. See Markus Dirk Dubber, “Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment,” Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1601-21.
4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters (New York, 1978; 1762), bk. 2, chap. 6, 67; see also Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten., chap. 7, 69; Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre) (A ed. Konigsberg, 1797; B ed. Konigsberg, 1798) (hereinafter Rechtslehre), vol. l,sect.49,A 170-72, B 201-2; see also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York, 1979; 1762), 233, 473.
5. Karl Marx, “German Ideology,” in Marx's Concept of Man, ed. and trans. Erich Fromm (New York, 1966), 206.
6. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AB 70-71.
7. See, e.g., Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (Oxford, 1989), 46-49.
8. Kant, Rechtslehre, A 195, B 225.
9. Fichte, Naturrecht, 253-56.
10. Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, Grundlage des Naturrechts, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1890; 1803) and Das System der Rechtsphilosophie (Vorlesungen iiber Rechtsphilosophie), ed. K. D. A. Roder (Leipzig, 1874), 317.
11. Karl David August Roder, Zur Rechtsbegriindung der Besserungsstmfe (Heidelberg, 1846) and Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten als Rechtsforderung: Eine Berufung aufden gesunden Sinn des deutschen Volks (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1864), 10-11.
12. Markus Dirk Dubber, “Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment,” Buffalo Law Review 43 (1995): 718-19.
13. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1978).
14. See below, 137-38.
15. Hegel pursued the idea of autonomy more consistently than had Kant. At one point, Kant suggested that the commission of a felony renders the offender incapable of being a citizen of the state {Rechtslehre, A 195, B 225). At another, he argued that the offender, strictly speaking, cannot punish himself because, given the separation of powers, he could not both originate the laws and be punished under them. It was the homo noumenon who legislated and the homo phaenomenon who was punished (See below., A 202-3, B 232).
16. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sects. 90-104.
17. See, e.g., Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AB 17-88, and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), 51-59. For an early application of Kant's categorical imperative to state punishment, see Christoph Carl Stiibel, System des allgemeinen peinlichen Rechts (Einleitung in die peinliche Rechtswissenschaft) (Leipzig, 1795), vol. 1, sect. 6.
18. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AB 70-71.
19. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sect. 35; see Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, “Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism,” Political Theory 19 (1991): 551.
20. See generally Dubber, “Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment,” 1601-21.
21. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sect. 100.
22. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts., sect. 97 Addition.
23. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts., sect. 100.
24. J. D. Mabbott, “Freewill and Punishment,” in Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, ed. Richard I. Aaron and Hywel David Lewis (London, 1956), 303; Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose (New Haven, 1981), 15.
25. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, sect. 227 Addition.
26. See Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, vol. 7 of Raccolta dei classici criminalisti (Milan, 1823; 1764), sect. 3,48; Kant, Rechtslehre, sect. 49, A 170-72, B 201-2; Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, 1960), 378; see also Das Offenburger Programm der siidwestdeutschen Demokraten vom 10. September 1847, in Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 1, ed. Ernst Rudolf Huber (Stuttgart, 1961), 262; Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 28. Mdrz 1849, para. 179, in Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 1, 322. For the United States, cf. Vikram David Amar, “Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting,” Cornell Law Review 80 (1995): 218-21; Akhil Reed Amar, “Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms,” University of California at Davis Law Review 28 (1995): 1169, 1172, 1177.
27. Fichte, Naturrecht, sect. 20, 253-56.
28. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, sect. 2, 43-14. For earlier versions of the consent argument, see Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, bk. 2, chap. 20; Hobbes, Leviathan, chap.
29. 28; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social (Paris, 1966; 1762), bk. 2, chap. 5, 71-72; see also Eberhard Schmidt, Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der deutschen Strafrechtspflege, 3d ed. (Gottingen, 1965), 164; Christian Reinhold Kostlin, Neue Revision der Grundbegrijfe des Kriminalrechts (Tubingen, 1845), 794. For later exponents, see, e.g., Hans Ernst von Globig and Johann Georg Huster, Abhandlung von der Criminal-Gesetzgebung (Zurich, 1783), 37-38; Gaetano Filangieri, La scienza della legislazione (2d ed., Venice, 1796), bk. 3, pt. 2, chap. 25, at 3-12; Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach, Revision der Grundsdtze des positiven peinlichen Rechts (Chemnitz, 1799), vol. 1, 53-54, and Uber die Strafe als Sicherungsmittel vor kiinftigen Beleidigungen des Verbrechers (Chemnitz, 1800), 95-97; Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (Zurich, 1977; 1818), vol. 1, sect. 62, 433.
30. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, 140-42,152. For contrary views, see. e.g., Rousseau, Du contrat social, bk. 2, chap. 5, 72; Globig and Huster, Abhandlung von der Criminal-Gesetzgebung, 64-72; Filangieri, La scienza della legislazione, bk. 3, pt. 2, chap. 29, at 24-25, 40-43.
31. Fichte, Naturrecht, sect. 20, 254.
32. Fichte uses the terms vogelfrei, exlex, hors de la loi (Naturrecht.). See also F. C. Th. Hepp, Darstellung und Beurtheilung der deutschen Strafrechts-Systeme, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und der Strafgesetzgebungs-Wissenschaft, pt. 1, no. 1 (Die Vertrags-und die Abschreckungstheorieen) (2d ed., Heidelberg, 1844), 39; Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, bk. 2, chap. 20, sect. 3 (offenders, through their criminal act, have excluded themselves from the community of humans and entered the community of beasts). For a classification of offenders according to their degree of “wildness” and an explicit analogy between offenders and wild animals, both inspired by Fichte, see Karl von Grolman, Ueber die Begriindung des Strafrechts und der Strafgesetzgebung nebst einer Entwicklung der Lehre von dem Maasstabe der Strafen und der juridischen Imputation (GieBen, 1799), 128, 129.
33. Rousseau, Du contrat social, bk. 2, chap. 5, at 72.
34. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. W. D. Halls (London, 1984) and The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method, trans. W. D. Halls, ed. Steven Lukes (London, 1982); George Herbert Mead, “The Psychology of Punitive Justice,” American Journal of Sociology 23 (1918): 577.
35. Fichte, Naturrecht, sect. 20, 255.
36. The Division of Labour in Society., sect. 20, 266. Fichte even proposed permitting the inmate to set the projected date of his expiation and thus of his release (269-70).
37. Published two years after the opening of Philadelphia's Penitentiary House in 1794, Fichte's prescribed methods of expiatory imprisonment resembled those recommended by the early American prison reformers in several respects, including reformation through work-already familiar from the English and Dutch “houses of correction” of the mid-sixteenth century-and the all-important segregation of prisoners from the outside population. The Division of Labour in Society., 268-69; Hinrich Riiping, Grundrifi der Strafrechtsgeschichte, 2d ed. (Munich, 1991), 74.
38. See below, 139-41.
39. Hepp, Darstellung und Beurtheilung der deutschen Strafrechts-Systeme (punishment as “Rechtswohlthat”), 43.
40. See below, 138.
41. See, e.g., Schmidt, Einfiihrung, 308 (citing Herbert Dannenberg, Liberalismus und Strafrecht im 19. Jahrhundert unter Zugrundelegung der Lehren Karl Georg v. Waechtlers. Abhandlungen des Kriminalistischen Instituts der Universitat Berlin, 4th ser., no. 1 [1925]).
42. See, e.g., Benjamin Rush, An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments Upon Criminals, and Upon Society (Philadelphia, 1787), 10-11.
43. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, sect. 16, 146.
44. See also Fichte, Naturrecht, 270.
45. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1823), 175-76.
46. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation., 195.
47. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation., 170.
48. The early prison reformers’ use of pain for reformative purposes was not limited to the psychological realm. Whippings were seen as conducive to rehabilitative efforts and continued in American penitentiaries long after they had been transformed into institutions of rehabilitation. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 3, 52. As Simone Weil put it over a century later, it was through the infliction of pain that the offender's conscience was awakened in the first place, thus enabling him to regard the punishment as an honor and a “supplementary form of education.” According to Weil, punishment was but “a method for getting justice into the soul of the criminal by bodily suffering.” Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (London, 1952), 21. In 1793, William Bradford reported with approval the Danish practice of sentencing infanticides to lifelong incarceration in a workhouse, interrupted only by annual whippings “on the day when, and the spot where, the crime was committed.” William Bradford, An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1793), 40. This Danish practice could have been taken straight out of Bentham's infamous schedule of analogous punishments based on considerations of specific deterrence. Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (Rationale of Punishment), 365, 407-9. According to Bentham's illustrative schedule, the arsonist was to be burnt, the poisoner poisoned, and the forger to have his hand “transfixed by an iron instrument fashioned like a pen; and in this condition he may be exhibited to the public, previously to undergoing the punishment of imprisonment.” An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation…, 408.
49. Bradford, Enquiry, 32.
50. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 294.
51. The new penitentiaries, particularly those based on the Philadelphia model, so well reflected the role of pain in early “correctional” science that reports about inmates who had been driven mad by extended periods of solitary confinement were quite common (Gehorsamster Bericht der Gefdngnifi-Commission, den Bau eines allgemeinen Gefdngnisgebdud.es betreffend [Frankfurt, 1840], 31) and remain common today. See, e.g., Maitland Zane, “Psychiatrist Criticizes Pelican Bay Prison,” San Francisco Chronicle, 13 October 1993, at A17; Jim Doyle, “Criticism of Pelican Bay in Court,” San Francisco Chronicle, 30 September 1993, C8; Claire Cooper, “Pelican Bay State Prison Isolation Inmates Traumatized,” Sacramento Bee, 30 September 1993, A4; Justin Zimmerman, “Prison Official Defends Pelican Bay,” UPI, 21 September 1993; “Pelican Bay,” 60 Minutes, CBS, 12 September 1993 (transcript on file with author). As early as 1789, John Howard had warned that a system of continuous solitary confinement “is more than human nature can bear, without the hazard of distraction or despair.” Bradford, Enquiry, 71, n. 13 (quoting John Howard, An Account of the Principal Lazarettos in Europe [London, 1789], 169). Occasional warnings of the devastating psychological effect of solitary confinement were duly noted, but generally ignored. Gehorsamster Bericht der Gefdngnifi-Commission, 31. The Auburn system, in which inmates were housed in single cells but worked and ate together, later came to be preferred over the Philadelphia system of complete solitary confinement not because it proved less painful to inmates but because it was cheaper to maintain and could even turn a profit by forcing inmates to work in large prison factories instead of having them cobble shoes in their lonely cells. Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990 (Chicago, 1993), 26; Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 55. At any rate, the communal treadwheels of Auburn prisons proved no less hazardous to the inmates’ physical health than solitary confinement did to their psychological well-being. Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, 177.
52. See below, 133-35.
53. C. S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment,” Res Judicatae 6 (1953): 224, 227.
54. The most extensive discussion of Krause's and Roder's work on punishment is Peter Landau, “Die rechtsphilosophische Begriindung der Besserungsstrafe,” in Strafgerechtigkeit: Festschrift fur Arthur Kaufmann zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Fritjof Haft, Winfried Hassemer, Ulfrid Neumann, Wolfgang Schild, and Ulrich Schroth (Heidelberg, 1993), 473. For a brief English language discussion of Roder, see Klas Lithner, “Pioneers in Criminology: Karl Roeder-A Forgotten Prison Reformer,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 59 (1968): 219.
55. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 10-11.
56. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten., 9-10.
57. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten., 13.
58. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten…, 13-14.
59. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten…., 14.
60. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten…., 34.
61. The rehabilitationists were not the first to characterize punishment as treatment beneficial to the offender. Already Plato had argued that punishment treated the offender's moral disease revealed through his crime. See, generally, Mary Margaret Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment (Berkeley, 1981), chap. 11. In Plato, one also already finds the distinction between curables and incurables and their respective treatments, rehabilitation and incapacitation. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten……, 186-89, 198-99. Plato's account even foreshadows the rehabilitationists’ classification of criminal punishment as a matter of public hygiene {Laws 735). Unlike the rehabilitationists, however, Plato nowhere denied the painful nature of punishment. For later analogies between crime and disease, and punishment and medical treatment, see, e.g., Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, bk. 2, chap. 20, sect. 6 (citing Plutarch's definition of punishment as medicine for the soul); Benedict Carpzov, Practica nova rerum criminalium imperialis Saxonica (1635), pt. 3, qu. 101, nn. 1, 13, 14; Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, bk. 8, chap. 3, sect. 9 (quoting Plato, Gorgias); Thomasius, Institutiones Jurisprudentiae Divinae, bk. 3, chap. 7, sects. 100-30; Globig and Huster, Abhandlung von der Criminal-Gesetzgebung, 10.
62. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 34-35.
63. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten., 31-33.
64. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten., 39.
65. Karl Marx, more famous than Roder for standing Hegel rightside up, praised Hegel's punishment theory for placing the offender's right at its core. Karl Marx, “Capital Punishment,” in Articles on Britain, 150-53 (quoted in Marx and Engels on Law, ed. Maureen Cain and Alan Hunt [London, 1979], 193-96, 195). Ultimately, Marx dismissed Hegel's theory as lex talionis in fancy metaphysical garb. John Lekschas, “Der Mensch in der Hegelschen Strafrechtstheorie und im sozialistischen Strafrecht,” Staat undRecht 19.7(2) (1970): 1618; Ossip K. Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie (2d ed. West Berlin, 1975), 99.
66. See, e.g., Franz von Liszt, “Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht,” Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 3 (1883): 1, 45 (so-called “Marburger Programm”). This argument has lost much of its force in a world of medical malpractice suits and explicit consent requirements that protect surgeons against criminal liability for assault and battery. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law sect. 35.10(5).
67. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 13-19.
68. Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten., 2 (quoting F. v. Wick, Uber Strafe und Besserung [1853], 1 ff.).
69. On the euphemism of modern rehabilitative treatment programs in the United States, see Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 51.
70. By the 1920s the word “punishment” was well on its way to becoming a taboo in American writing on punishment. Writers competed for the most hypocritical neologism. See Sheldon Glueck, “Principles of a Rational Penal Code,” Harvard Law Review 41 (1928)
71. (“peno-correctional treatment”); Albert J. Harno, “Rationale of a Criminal Code,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 85 (1937): 554 (same); Herbert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, “A Rationale of the Law of Homicide,” Columbia Law Review 37 (1937): 701-61 (pt. 1), 1261-1325 (pt. 2) (“treatment” [731, 1262, 1295, 1305, 1311, 1313-17], “unpleasant treatment” [752], “punitive treatment” [753 n. 378], “incapacitative and reformative treatment” [758], “incapacitative and curative-reformative treatment” [759], “compulsory treatment” [1261], “painful treatment” [1264], “rigorous treatment” [1302], “punitive treatment” [1306]). In an influential 1936 article, Alfred Gausewitz not only called for “disabling and curative treatment” instead of punishment but also insisted that the Wisconsin criminal code “be amended by striking out the word ‘punishment’ and inserting in lieu thereof the word ‘restraint.’” Alfred L. Gausewitz, “Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, Part I,” Wisconsin Law Review 11 (1936): 346, 364, 378.
72. For a similar distinction between “police regulations to prevent crime” and “ordinary criminal laws prohibiting and punishing an act or acts as a crime or crimes” in a New York case of the time, see In re Forbes, 11 Abb. Pr. 55, 19 How. Pr. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) (second emphasis added).
73. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 26.
74. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 16 (quoting Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, De la legislation, in Oeuvres completes, vol. 9, 326 [1789]).
75. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 20, 22-24; cf. Glueck, “Principles of a Rational Penal Code,” 453, 477 (calling for indeterminate sentences, “so that, if necessary, such treatment may be modified, much as the physician modifies treatment, in the light of progress”).
76. The “measures of security and rehabilitation” were not recognized in the German Penal Code until November of 1933. See Hans-Heinrich lescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1988), 74-75. But their origin can be traced directly to the efforts of the “modern” or “sociological” school of criminal law around Franz v. Liszt (1851-1919), which promoted the virtues of rehabilitative and incapacitative treatment against the “classical” retributive school represented most prominently by Karl Binding (1841-1920). Liszt and his followers, much like other early criminologists at the time, called for the indefinite incapacitation of incurable offenders regardless of their desert. The twotrack system represented a compromise between the modern and classical schools by maintaining the proportionality limitation for most offenders while abandoning it in cases of exceptional dangerousness. On Liszt and his school, see below, 140.
77. German Penal Code, sect. 42a (a.R).
78. German Penal Code., sect. 61.
79. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, 78; Kohlrausch, “Sicherungshaft,” Zeitschriftfiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 44 (1924): 21, 33 (“Etikettenschwindel”); see also below, note 123.
80. Wash. Rev. Code sect. 71.09.010.
81. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (en bane) (“Sexually Violent Predator Statute” not punishment). Contra Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (“Sexually Violent Predator Statute” constitutes punishment). Contrast In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. App.), aff'd, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996) (“Sexually Dangerous Persons Statute” not punishment); State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995) (“Sexually Violent Person Commitments Statute” not punishment); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995) (same) with In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996) (“Sexually Violent Predator Act” constitutes punishment), cert, granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). Several other recent cases, including some involving civil in rem forfeitures in drug cases, have tested the courts’ willingness to call a punishment a punishment. The results have been mixed. Contrast Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996) (“Sex Offender Registration Act” not punishment); Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Sex Offender Registration Act” not punishment); State v. Hickam, 668 A.2d 1321 (Conn. 1995) (license suspension not punishment), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996); State v. Cole, 906 P.2d 925 (Wash. 1995) (civil in rem forfeiture of drug proceeds not punishment); United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387 (2d Cir.) (same), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 1888 (1996); Covelli v. Commissioner, 668 A.2d 699 (Conn. 1995) (drug tax not punishment), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2577 (1996) with Taylor v. Department of Corrections, 908 F. Supp. 92 (D.R.I. 1995) (fee for probation services constitutes punishment), rev'd, 101 F.3d 780 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995) (civil in rem forfeiture of drug proceeds constitutes punishment), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996); United States v. 9844 South Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Stratemeyer v. State, 668 A.2d 948 (Md. App. 1995) (same), rev'd, One 1984 Ford Truck, 681 A.2d 527 (Md. App. 1996); Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind. 1995) (drug tax constitutes punishment), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996); In re P.S., 661 N.E.2d 329 (111.) (civil in rem forfeiture of drug conveyance constitutes punishment), vacated, Illinois v. Kimery, 116 S. Ct. 2577 (1996).
82. Rush, Enquiry, 10-11.
83. That isolation contrasted sharply with the gregarious, if not necessarily sanitary, conditions of some eighteenth-century prisons. Accounts of American and English prisons reveal that inmates were allowed to ply their trade, to receive frequent visits from family members, friends, and prostitutes, could gamble, keep pets, and occasionally were known to stage riots to protest the poor quality of the beer served by the tapster in the prison taproom. See Joanna Innes, “The King's Bench in the Later Eighteenth Century: Law, Authority and Order in a London Debtors’ Prison,” in An Ungovernable People: The English and Their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. John Brewer and John Styles (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980), 251; Michael Ignatieff, “State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment,” in Social Control and the State, ed. Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (New York, 1983), 75; W. J. Sheehan, “Finding Solace in Eighteenth-Century Newgate,” in Crime in England: 1550-1800, ed. J. S. Cockburn (Princeton, 1977), 229; P. Linebaugh, “The Ordinary of Newgate and His Account,” in Crime in England, 246; Negley K. Teeters, The Cradle of the Penitentiary: The Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, 1773-1835 (Philadelphia, 1955), 46; David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Boston, 1971), 55-56; John Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and Architecture of Mind in Eighteenth-Century England (Chicago, 1987), 218-28.
84. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Treatise II: An Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good (London, 1725), 165; Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, vol. 2 (London, 1737-38), 420; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888; 1749), 316-20, 369-71, 470-76; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 9th ed. (London, 1801; 1759); Rousseau, Emile; David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London, 1777; 1751), 146; see also David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Chicago, 1990), 221, 233, 236; David Marshall, The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury, Dafoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (New York, 1986); John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1988); Karen Halttunen, “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American History,” American Historical Review 100 (1995): 303; Norman S. Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976): 195.
85. Caleb Lownes, “An Account of the Alteration and Present State of the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania,” in Bradford, Enquiry, 73, 83.
86. No feature of prison life, however, was considered to be more disagreeable than the “coarse fare.” Bradford, Enquiry, 32. See Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (Rationale of Punishment), 365, 421 (ranking “Confinement to disagreeable diet” as first and “Total exclusion from society” as fourth on a list of seven “Accessory Evils, commonly attendant on the Condition of a Prisoner”).
87. Lownes, “Account,” 73, 76-77. The gangs of wheelbarrow men were the first offspring of the punishment reform effort in late eighteenth-century Phildalphia. From 1786 until 1790, four years before the opening of the “Penitentiary House,” offenders convicted of noncapital felonies cleaned the streets of Philadelphia with “an iron collar around their necks and waist to which a long chain is fastened and at the end a heavy ball.” Michael Meranze, “The Penitential Ideal in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 108 (1984): 431-32 (quoting “Diary of Ann Warder, March 30, 1787,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 18 [1894]: 60). Their heads shaved, the wheelbarrow men wore conspicuous clothes (“an infamous habit”) that indicated the nature of their crime. Lownes, “Account,” 73, 76.
88. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. 1, 1-5; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 319, 371, 385. For an example of a similar contemporary account of empathic judgment, see Martin L. Hoffman, “Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and Development,” in The Development of Affect, ed. Michael Lewis and Leonard Rosenblum (New York, 1987); see also Empathy and Its Development, ed. Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer (Cambridge, 1987).
89. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 316-20, 359, 604; Dubber, “Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment,” 1612-14; see also Randall McGowen, “Punishing Violence, Sentencing Crime,” in The Violence of Representation: Literature and the History of Violence, ed. Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse (London, 1989), 144, 146 (role of empathy and identification in the criminal law reform movement in early nineteenthcentury England); Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, 260 (discussing Burke's theory of rhetoric as producing identifications); Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public (Glencoe, 111., 1956; 1929), 4; Manfred Rehbinder, Rechtssoziologie, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1989), 172.
90. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 462-79 (relying on Adam Smith, Piaget, and Kohlberg); see also Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, 221, 236 (expansion of empathy in the eighteenth century).
91. Rousseau, Emile, 233; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 476 (citing Kant); Jiirgen Habermas, “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 116 (discussing Kohlberg, Rawls, and G. H. Mead).
92. So Caleb Lownes in 1793 appealed to this shared characteristic in support of his reform proposals: “Some seem to forget that the prisoner is a rational being, of like feelings and passions with ourselves.” Lownes, “Account,” 82-83. For a less secular variation on the identification theme, consider the admonition by the influential British prison reformer John Howard in 1777 that “A felon is a man and by men should be treated as a man.” John Howard, The State of Prisons in England and Wales (London, 1777), 12 (quoted in Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, 56). Howard saw the relevant identity of persons not in their common rationality, but in their common temptation by sin and their common failure to resist that temptation. Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, 55-56. Punishment in seventeenth-century England and New England similarly had proceeded from the assumption that judge and offender were both identical as potential sinners. The spectators at a seventeenth-century New England public execution were all sinners, potential and actual. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, 207; Lincoln Faller, Turned to Account: The Forms and Functions of Criminal Biography in Late Seventeenth-and Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1987), 54; Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, 15-16; Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865 (New York, 1989), 43. See also Adam Jay Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America (New Haven, 1992), 32-35.
93. See Innes, “The King's Bench,” 257.
94. Meranze, “The Penitential Ideal in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” 442 (quoting Pennsylvania Gazette, 26 September 1787).
95. Cf. Michael Meranze, Laboratories of Virtue: Punishment, Revolution, and Authority in Philadelphia, 1760-1835 (Chapel Hill, 1996), 60, 156, 176 (class distinctions in late eighteenth-century Philadelphia).
96. Giinter Haber, “Probleme der StrafprozeBgeschichte im Vormarz: Ein Beitrag zum Rechtsdenken des aufsteigenden Biirgertums,” ZeitschriftfUr die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 91 (1979): 590.
97. Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain, 120-33.
98. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 462-79; Habermas, “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,” 116.
99. Simon, Poor Discipline.
100. Dubber, “Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment,” 720-22. The empathic identification between antiwar protesters and prison inmates optimistically invoked by Francis Allen in his brilliant little book on rehabilitationism (The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 31, 63) unfortunately has proved as ephemeral and inconsequential as earlier instances of bourgeois identification with the bourgeois objects of criminal punishment, such as debtors and political prisoners. It ended as soon as the last antiwar protester was released from prison and the threat of punishment for his sympathizers had dissipated.
101. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 34; see also Liszt, “Der Zweckgedanke,” 45; Glueck, “Principles of a Rational Penal Code,” 453, 461, 462, 469 (punishment to be used only “by trained scientists, and only where ‘indicated,’ as the physicians would say”; punishment “but one of numerous ‘medicines’ or devices that are more and more being put at the disposal of trained experts”; arguing against capital punishment on the ground that “it is short-sighted to destroy our ‘laboratory material’ without study”); Harno, “Rationale of a Criminal Code,” 549, 550, 555, 562 (comparing the criminal to “a man with a contagious disease” and criminality to “matters of sanitation and health”).
102. Roder, Besserungsstrafe und Besserungsanstalten, 12-14. Solitary confinement, for example, was recommended as the proper treatment for offenders because ‘“isolation is the best means of acting on the moral nature of children… ’” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 294 [quoting Edouard Ducpetiaux]). The reaction to rehabilitationism since the mid-1970s has reversed the inspirational flow, while retaining the analogy between juvenile and adult punishment. See Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 8.
103. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 297-302.
104. Discipline and Punish., 299.
105. Harno, “Rationale of a Criminal Code,” 549, 550.
106. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 296-97.
107. Discipline and Punish., 299.
108. Landau, “Die rechtsphilosophische Begrtindung der Besserungsstrafe,” 473, 481 (citing Krause, Das System der Rechtsphilosophie, 317).
109. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 296-97’.
110. Glueck, “Principles of a Rational Penal Code,” 467.
111. See Meranze, Laboratories of Virtue, 200-202 (1797 proposal to assign offenders to four categories, “who shall neither lodge, eat, or associate together”).
112. See above, 135.
113. Meranze, “The Penitential Ideal in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” 442 (quoting Pennsylvania Gazette, 26 September 1787); see also Lownes, “Account,” 78.
114. Gehorsamster Bericht der Gefangnift-Commission,9.
115. David Garland, Punishment and Welfare (Gower, 1985), 40-11.
116. Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830-1914 (Cambridge, 1990), 229.
117. On phrenology in the United States, see W. David Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora (Ithaca, NY, 1965), 236-37; David Brion Davis, Homicide in American Fiction, 1798-1860 (Ithaca, NY, 1957), 25-26; see generally Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 41.
118. Liszt, “Der Zweckgedanke.”
119. Wechsler and Michael, “A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (pt. 1),” 758.
120. Gausewitz, “Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, Part I,” 374, 378, 382; see also Glueck, “Principles of a Rational Penal Code,” 461, 478.
121. Sam Fulwood, “Scholars Gather to Debate Genetics-Crime Research,” Los Angeles Times, 23 September 1995, A14; see also James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York, 1985); Sarnoff A. Mednick, Terrie E. Moffitt, and Susan A. Stack, eds., The Causes of Crime: New Biological Approaches (Cambridge, 1987).
122. The persistence of capital punishment in the United States is not to the contrary. Paradoxically, rehabilitationism's medical model of punishment remains most influential in the infliction of the one punishment that can never rehabilitate, the death penalty. See Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Pain of Punishment,” Buffalo Law Review 44 (1996): 545.
123. James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime, 2d rev. ed. (New York, 1983), 152-55;Peter W. Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse, Selective Incapacitation (Santa Monica, 1982), 52-53; Joan Petersilia, Peter W. Greenwood, and Marvin Lavin, Criminal Careers of Habitual Felons (Washington, D.C., 1978), xiv.
124. Dubber, “Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment,” 711.
125. Rudolf Quanter, Deutsches Zuchthaus-und Gefangniswesen von den altesten Zeiten bis in die Gegenwart (Leipzig, 1905), 192.
126. Ernst-Walter Hanack, “Zur Problematik einer Sonderstrafe fur Riickfalltater,” in Programmfiir ein neues Strafgesetzbuch: Der Alternativ-Entwurf der Strafrechtslehrer, ed. Jiirgen Baumann (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1968), 100,103; Klaus Laubenthal, Strafvollzug (Berlin, 1995), 14, 17-18.
127. King V. Greenblatt, 52 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) (operation of “Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons” at the “Massachusetts Correctional Institution” in Bridgewater, Massachusetts).
128. Schmidt, Einfiihrung, 381-82, 397.
129. Robin West, “Narrative, Responsibility, and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases From the 1989 Term,” Maryland Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 1 (1990): 161.
130. Bradford, Enquiry, 5.
131. See Stephen D. Sowle, “A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the Age of Prisons,” New York University Review of Law and Social Change 21 (1994): 497, 503.