A Decision Delayed: Britain’s Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961–68

English Historical Review

Volumn 117, Issue 472, 2002, Pages 569-595

  Jones, Matthew ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84900052643     PISSN: 00138266     EISSN: 14774534     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ehr/117.472.569     Document Type: Article

References (92)

1. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (London, 1988), p. 294.
2. Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900–1970 (London, 1991), p. 9.
3. Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850–1995, 3rd ed. (London, 1996), p. 343.
4. See Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Volume Two, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966–68 (London, 1976), entry for 1 January 1967, pp. 181–2. See also entry for 4 January 1968, p. 635, for reference to the ‘four pygmies’, Michael Stewart, George Brown, James Callaghan and Denis Healey, who had been ‘running our foreign policy for the last three years’. The pervasiveness of notions of a Bevinite core group controlling external policy is reflected in recent work such as Jeffrey Pickering’s, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (London, 1998), see, e.g. pp. 137, 156.
5. See, e.g. Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964–1970 (London, 1989), pp. 308–9.
6. David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London, 1991), p. 231. See also John Darwin, ‘Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez’, in Carl Bridge (ed.), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s (Carlton, 1991), p. 155.
7. Holland, Pursuit of Greatness, pp. 320–21, and for the original presentation of this argument see Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London, 1973), pp. 215, 285.
8. The origins, development and ramifications of the Malaysia–Indonesia confrontation have been traced in the present author’s Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge, 2001), as well as in John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–5 (London, 2000).
9. These were points echoed in the comments of Field Marshal Lord Carver, the C[ommander]in-C[hief] Far East, 1967–69, to an Institute of Contemporary British History Witness seminar, see ‘The East of Suez Decision’, ed. Peter Catterall, Contemporary Record, 7, 3, (1993), 623. It should also be emphasized that Darby has highlighted the influence of American opinion in strengthening the resolve of Conservative and Labour Governments to remain east of Suez, see Philip Darby, ‘East of Suez reassessed’, in John Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London, 1977), p. 60.
10. See the present author’s, ‘Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961–63,’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 28, (2000), 85–109; Milton Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia (Ithaca, 1964); Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region, 1945–65 (Kuala Lumpur, 1974).
11. The final report of this exercise can be found at C(60)35, 29 Feb. 1960, containing FP(60)1, 24 Feb. 1960, CAB[INET] 129/100, P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice].
12. See Macmillan notes on D(60)32, 33 and 35, c.4 August 1960, and eventual Macmillan minute for Watkinson, M. 314/60, 21 August 1960, PREM[IER] 11/2946, PRO. The key lines of British official thinking for this period, and the years ahead, have been authoritatively and rigorously presented in David Easter, ‘British Defence Policy in South East Asia and the Confrontation, 1960–66,’ (unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1998).
13. See D(60)10th mtg, 16 and 17 Oct. 1960, CAB 131/24, PRO.
14. Home minute for Macmillan, PM/60/138, 27 Dec. 1960, CAB 21/5901, PRO.
15. See CC(61)32nd mtg, 16 June 1961, CC(61)37th mtg, 30 June 1961, CAB 128/35; C(61)89, 29 June 1961, CAB 129/105; FP(A)(61)1st mtg, 24 July 1961, CAB 134/1932, PRO.
16. See Macmillan memorandum, ‘Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future’, 29 Sept. 1961, FP(61)1st mtg, 6 Oct. 1961, and also FP(61)2nd mtg, 10 Oct. 1961, PREM 11/1929, PRO.
17. Macmillan minute for Home, M. 222/61, 8 July 1961, PREM 11/3739, PRO; the Foreign Secretary did not feel it was the right moment to ‘decide now to quit the Far East’, see Home minute for Macmillan, PM/61/96, 14 July 1961, ibid.
18. Selkirk to Macmillan, 9 May 1961, PREM 11/3737, PRO.
19. See Selkirk to Macmillan, 6 March 1962; Selkirk to Home, 9 Sept. 1963, F[oreign] O[ffice] 800/897, PRO.
20. See Federation of Malaysia: joint statement by Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya, Cmnd. 1563 (London, 1961), and see Macmillan’s comments regarding the public and private interpretations of the agreement, CC(61)65th mtg, 23 Nov. 1961, CAB 128/35, PRO.
21. Significantly also Macmillan and Sir Robert Menzies came to the joint conclusion in this period that if the Geneva conference failed they would make no commitment to military operations in Laos: see record of conversation, 4 June 1962, GEN 768, CAB 130/186, PRO.
22. See Selkirk to Macmillan, 17 Jan. 1963, PREM 11/4346, PRO.
23. See Trend minute for Macmillan, 2 April 1963, PREM 11/4189; Macmillan minute for Home, M.131/63, 3 April 1963, D1193/13G, FO 371/169734; Trend minute for Macmillan, 23 April 1963, PREM 11/4347; Trend minute for Macmillan, 18 June 1963, PREM 11/4731; D(63)8th mtg, 19 June 1963, CAB 131/28, PRO.
24. Macmillan to Selkirk, 5 August 1963, PREM 11/4188, PRO.
25. Thorneycroft minute for Macmillan, Annex A to DOP(O)(63)3, 2 Oct. 1963, CAB 148/16, PRO.
26. See the conclusions reached in CP(64)5, ‘Policy Toward Indonesia’, 6 Jan. 1964, CAB 129/116, and subsequent discussions in the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, DO(64)1st mtg, 14 Jan. 1964, CAB 148/1.
27. See e.g., Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1967), pp. 407–9, and in general, the present author’s ‘US relations with Indonesia, the Kennedy–Johnson transition, and the Vietnam connection, 1963–65,’ Diplomatic History, 26.2 Spring 2002, 249–80.
28. See the Prime Minister’s remarks to the Cabinet, CM(64)12, 18 Feb. 1964, CAB 128/38, PRO.
29. Wright minute for Home, 17 Feb. 1964, PREM 11/4794, PRO.
30. OPD(64)10, ‘British Policy Towards South East Asia’, 19 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/17, PRO. The Foreign Office study ran in parallel with the work of the Long Term Study Group, which Trend had set-up in May 1964 to produce a report for the next government on defence policy. The final report appears most notable for the conservative and very hesitant nature of its conclusions: see Saki Dockrill, ‘Britain’s Power and Influence: Dealing with Three Roles and the Wilson Government’s Defence Debate at Chequers in November 1964,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11, (2000), 211–40. Although note that Trend himself, in a reflection of views he had held since early 1963, was quick to advise the new Prime Minister that ‘if we have a choice of area in which to reduce our politico–military commitment, we should choose Singapore,’ see Trend minute for Wilson on Chequers meeting papers, 17 Nov. 1964, PREM 13/18, PRO.
31. See SC(64)46, 31 Dec. 1964, PLA18/9, FO 371/177824, PRO.
32. See e.g. ‘British Policy in Indo-China’, 3 August 1964, FO 371/175069, PRO.
33. PMV(W)(64)2nd mtg, 7 Dec. 1964, CAB 133/266, PRO.
34. PMV(W)(64)4th mtg, 8 Dec. 1964, ibid. This was also when Gordon Walker had originally come to Washington hoping to argue that British support on Vietnam should be based on the merits of US policy, rather than be seen as a quid pro quo for American backing over the defence of Malaysia.
35. Gordon Walker diary entry, 6 March 1965, Robert Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries, 1931–1971 (London, 1991), pp. 303–4.
36. See Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore, 1998).
37. See MISC 17/6th mtg, 13 June 1965, CAB 130/213, PRO. Trend was eager to see the government decide on a complete pull-out from South East Asia.
38. Healey to Wilson, 13 August 1965, PREM 13/431, PRO. See also the conclusions reached by senior ministers after their emergency gathering at RAF Culdrose in Cornwall, MISC 76/1st mtg, 15 August 1965, CAB 130/239, PRO.
39. See MISC 75/2, 13 August 1965, CAB 130/239, for the preliminary report of the official working party on Singapore’s departure; OPD(65)123, 25 August 1965, CAB 148/22; OPD(65)37th mtg, 31 August 1965, CAB 148/18, PRO.
40. For the quadripartite talks see QT(65)1st mtg, 3 Sept. 1965, IM1193/154G, and FO to Washington, No 6981, 8 Sept. 1965, IM1193/140G, FO 371/181529; Wilson’s reactions are recorded in MISC 78/1st mtg, 6 Sept. 1965, CAB 130/239, PRO; for American perspectives see Blouin memoranda for McNaughton, 7 and 13 Sept. 1965, NSF, Country File, Singapore memos, box 281; London to State Dept., No 1000, 4 Sept. 1965, and London to State Dept., No 1024, 7 Sept. 1965, N[ational] S[ecurity] F[ile], C[ountry] F[ile], UK Cables, vol. VI, 7/65–9/65, box 208, L[yndon] B. J[ohnson] L[ibrary].
41. Record of a meeting between Healey and Stewart, 15 Sept. 1965, Z2/347G, FO 371/184513, PRO.
42. On the sterling crisis in the summer of 1965, see Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964–70: A Personal Record (London, 1971), pp. 169–74; on the Americans and support for the pound in general see, John Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: Vietnam, the Pound and East of Suez,’ Journal of American Studies, 30, 2, 1996, 211–32.
43. ‘British Sterling Crisis’, Ball memorandum, 6 August 1965, NSF, CF, UK Balance of Payments Crisis, 1965, box 215, LBJL.
44. In infamous fashion, Bundy had wanted to tell the Cabinet Secretary that ‘a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth for Sterling,’ see Bundy memorandum for Johnson, 28 July 1965, and see also Bundy memorandum for Johnson, 2 August 1965, NSF, memos for the President, McGeorge Bundy, box 4, LBJL.
45. Some of these issue have been dealt with, though not to the current author’s satisfaction, in Jeremy Fielding, ‘Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defence Reviews of 1966,’ Diplomatic History, (1999), 23, 4, 633–56.
46. See London to State Dept., SECUN 5, 9 Sept. 1965, NSF, CF, UK Cables, vol VI, 7/65–9/65, box 208, LBJL.
47. Record of conversation between Wilson and Ball, 4 pm, 8 Sept. 1965; note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 10.25 pm, 9 Sept. 1965; note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 11.15 pm, 9 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/2450, PRO. The American version of the final Wilson-Ball meeting has the latter saying, ‘it would be a great mistake if the U[nited] K[ingdom] G[overnment] failed to understand that the American effort to relieve sterling was inextricably related to the commitment of the UKG to maintain its commitments around the world,’ see London to State Dept., SECUN 5, 9 September 1965, NSF, CF, UK Cables, vol VI, 7/65–9/65, box 208, LBJL.
48. OPD(65) 41st mtg, 23 Sept. 1965, CAB 148/18, and see OPD(65)131, 20 Sept. 1965, CAB 148/22, PRO.
49. See Ponting, Breach of Promise, pp. 52–3.
50. Trend minute for Wilson, 21 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431, PRO.
51. Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: volume one, Minister of Housing, 1964–66 (London, 1975), entry for 14 Feb. 1966, p. 456.
52. Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964–70 (London, 1984), entry for 18 July 1966, p. 148.
53. See Healey’s comments at MISC 17/8th mtg, 13 Nov. 1965, CAB 130/213, PRO.
54. Healey minute for Wilson, MO/25/2/71, 19 June 1966, PREM 13/1454, PRO.
55. See FO brief for Wilson’s visit to Washington, PMV(W)(66)12, 26 July 1966, CAB 133/347, PRO.
56. Crossman Diaries, 1966–68, entry for 9 Dec. 1966, p. 156.
57. Castle Diaries, entry for 28 Jan. 1965, p. 5.
58. Brown minute for Wilson, 26 August 1965, PREM 13/431, PRO.
59. Crossman Diaries, 1964–66, entry for 15 June 1966, p. 540.
60. Palliser minute for Wilson, 3 Sept. 1966, PREM 13/1454, PRO.
61. OPD(67)14th mtg, item 2, confidential annex, 22 March 1967, CAB 148/30, PRO. It was estimated that the withdrawal would produce savings of £150–200 million annually by 1970–71, and up to £300 million by the mid-1970s.
62. Record of conversation between Brown and Bundy, 20 March 1967, PREM 13/1454, PRO.
63. See records of conversation between Brown and Rusk, and Brown and McNamara, 18 April 1967, PREM 13/1455, PRO.
64. Record of quadripartite ministerial talks, 20 April 1967, ibid.
65. Memorandum of conversation, 20 April 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs (Washington, 2000), 51. The American record of this meeting can be usefully compared to the British version cited in note 64 above.
66. See Rusk to Brown, 1 May 1967, and Palliser minute, 3 May 1967, PREM 13/1455.
67. Minute on Johnson and Wilson meeting, 25 April 1967, ibid.
68. London to State Dept., No 9326, 10 May 1967, NSF, CF, UK Cables, vol. XI, box 211, LBJL.
69. See Wilson, The Labour Government, pp. 495–500.
70. Palliser minute for Wilson, 12 May 1967, PREM 13/1455, PRO.
71. Bruce to Rusk, 8 May 1967, quoted in Ponting, Breach of Promise, p. 43.
72. See Bator memorandum for Johnson, 14 July 1966, NSF, CF, UK Memos, vol. VIII, box 209, LBJL.
73. Record of a meeting between Wilson and Johnson at the White House, 2 June 1967, PMV(W)(67), PREM 13/1906, PRO. See also the Foreign Office brief for Wilson’s visit, PMV(W)(67)7(Revise), 31 May 1967, CAB 133/366, PRO.
74. Rusk memorandum for Johnson, 31 May 1967, NSF, CF, UK: Wilson Visit, 6/2/67, box 216, LBJL.
75. ‘East of Suez’, State Department background paper for Wilson visit, 29 May 1967, ibid.
76. CC(67)36th mtg, 6 June 1967, CAB 128/42, PRO.
77. Palliser minute, ‘My Washington Reconnaissance’, 1 June 1967, PREM 13/1906, PRO.
78. See Darwin, British and Decolonisation, pp. 291–3.
79. See record of a meeting at the State Department, 11 Jan. 1968, PREM 13/2081, PRO.
80. See Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life (London, 1993), pp. 324–6.
81. Palliser minute, 13 May 1967, PREM 13/1455, PRO.
82. Washington to FO, No 115, 9 Jan. 1968, PREM 13/2081, PRO.
83. Record of a meeting at the State Department, 11 Jan. 1968, ibid. The President did dispatch a final protest to Wilson, but there was little belief in the State Department that it would have any effect, see memorandum for Johnson, ‘British Withdrawal from the Far East and Persian Gulf’, 11 Jan. 1968, NSF, CF, UK Memos, vol. XIII, box 212, LBJL.
84. Dean to Gore-Booth, 2 Feb. 1968, PREM 13/2454, PRO.
85. See, e.g., Castle Diaries, entry for 12 Jan. 1968, p. 355.
86. See Ziegler, Wilson, p. 285.
87. See Crossman Diaries, 1966–68, entry for 13 Feb. 1968, pp. 678–9; record of conversation between Wilson and Johnson, 8 Feb. 1968; record of conversation between Wilson and Pearson, 10 Feb. 1968, PREM 13/2455, PRO.
88. On the severe strains operating on the Johnson Administration during this period, see Washington to FO, No 386, 31 Jan. 1968, PREM 13/2454, PRO, and Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, 1995), pp. 416–27.
89. See Thomson to Wilson, T.20/68, 12 Jan. 1968, PREM 13/2081, PRO.
90. See, e.g. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 293–4. The evidence presented in this article makes it very difficult to sustain Jeffrey Pickering’s contention that, for Wilson, moves towards Europe ‘did not equate with a simultaneous desire to abandon Britain’s commitments in the wider world’ or that senior ministers did not make a connection between EEC entry and an alternation in Britain’s overseas role. Assertions such as ‘Healey, Brown, and Callaghan . . . had unambiguous Bevinite roots and, as later events would verify, continued to stand resolutely behind the east of Suez role,’ simply do not hold up beside the documentary record, see Pickering, East of Suez, p. 156.
91. Minutes of a meeting held in the Foreign Secretary’s room, House of Commons, 20 Dec. 1967; note of a record of telephone conversation between Wilson and Jenkins, 25 Dec. 1967, PREM 13/1999, PRO. In his memoirs, Jenkins paints a different picture than the official record of the meeting of 20 December, noting that Brown, Healey and Thomson (with the Chiefs of Staff in attendance) ‘all proceeded to defend Britain’s worldwide role with an attachment to imperial commitments worthy of a conclave of Joseph Chamberlain, Kitchener of Khartoum and George Nathaniel Curzon – although it would be difficult to allocate the analogies’. However, Jenkins also qualifies this caricature by pointing out that Brown made many reasonable remarks, while Healey was shouting mainly for the benefit of the Chiefs of Staff; in addition, Jenkins again emphasizes that the crucial ‘cliffhanger’ decision (and where Healey later threatened resignation) was over the F-111 cancellation. See Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London, 1991), pp. 224–7.
92. Kuala Lumpur to C[ommonwealth] R[elations] O[ffice], No 3, 14 April 1964, D1051/43, FO 371/175067, PRO.