Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: Insights from the 2007 tac Market Design competition

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 1061-1068

  Niu, Jinzhong ^a   Cai, Kai ^a   Parsons, Simon ^a   Gerding, Enrico ^b   McBurney, Peter ^c  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Double auction; Mechanism design; Trading agent competition

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ADAPTIVE STRATEGY; AUCTION MECHANISMS; DOUBLE AUCTION; MARKET DESIGN; MARKET DYNAMICS; MECHANISM DESIGN; TRADING AGENT COMPETITION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84899960104     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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