On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence

Erkenntnis

Volumn 79, Issue S3, 2014, Pages 647-665

  Roche, William ^a  

^a TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899896284     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9564-y     Document Type: Article

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