Positive results for mechanism design without money

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

Volumn 2, Issue , 2013, Pages 1165-1166

  Cole, Richard ^a   Gkatzelis, Vasilis ^a   Goel, Gagan ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GOOGLE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

Prior Free Mechanism Design; Proportional Fairness

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

APPROXIMATION FACTOR; MECHANISM DESIGN; PROPORTIONAL FAIRNESS; SOCIAL WELFARE; STRATEGY PROOFS; TWO AGENTS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84899444271     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (2)

1. M. Guo and V. Conitzer, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors, AAMAS, 2010, pp. 881-888.
2. L. Han, C. Su, L. Tang, and H. Zhang, On strategy-proof allocation without payments or priors, WINE, 2011, pp. 182-193.