Democracy, law and governance

Democracy, Law and Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-268

  Lenoble, Jacques ^a   Maesschalck, Marc ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

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EID: 84899402332     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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