The theory of market modernization of law

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 141-172

  Cooter, Robert D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030163278     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(96)00011-7     Document Type: Article

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