Free to punish: A motivated account of free will belief

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Volumn 106, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 501-513

  Clark, Cory J ^a   Luguri, Jamie B ^b   Ditto, Peter H ^a   Knobe, Joshua ^b   Shariff, Azim F ^c   Baumeister, Roy F ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

^d FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Free will; Moral reasoning; Moral responsibility; Motivation; Punishment

Indexed keywords

ADULT; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; DECEPTION; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MORALITY; MOTIVATION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PSYCHOLOGY; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; YOUNG ADULT;

ADULT; CULTURE; DECEPTION; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MORALS; MOTIVATION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84897904370     PISSN: 00223514     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0035880     Document Type: Article

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