Why preferences and institutions change: A systematic process analysis of credit rating in Germany

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 328-344

  Trampusch, Christine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Credit rating; Financial system; Germany; Institutionalism; Systematic process analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897413348     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12034     Document Type: Article

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