Computational analysis of connectivity games with applications to the investigation of terrorist networks

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 293-301

  Michalak, Tomasz P ^a,b   Rahwan, Talal ^c   Jennings, Nicholas R ^c   Szczepański, Piotr L ^d   Skibski, Oskar ^b   Narayanam, Ramasuri ^e   Wooldridge, Michael J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW   (Poland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^d WARSAW UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^e IBM RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COALITIONAL GAME; COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS; CONNECTED SUBGRAPHS; CONNECTIVITY GAMES; LARGER NETWORKS; SHAPLEY VALUE; TERRORIST NETWORKS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; COMPUTER GAMES; GAME THEORY; TERRORISM;

ALGORITHMS;

EID: 84896062539     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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