The influence of secrecy on the communication structure of covert networks

Social Networks

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 126-137

  Lindelauf, Roy ^a,b   Borm, Peter ^b   Hamers, Herbert ^b  

^a NETHERLANDS DEFENCE ACADEMY   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Balanced tradeoff; Covert networks; Information; Multi objective optimization; Network design; Non balanced tradeoff; Secrecy; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 62549142647     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2008.12.003     Document Type: Article

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