A framework for aggregating influenced CP-nets and its resistance to bribery

Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 668-674

  Maran, A ^a   Maudet, N ^b   Pini, Maria Silvia ^a   Rossi, Francesca ^a   Venable, Kristen Brent ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PIERRE ET MARIE CURIE   (France)

^c Tulane University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE DECISION; CP-NETS; MULTI-AGENT SETTING; STABLE STATE; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 84893392851     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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