A model of influence in a social network

Theory and Decision

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 69-96

  Grabisch, Michel ^a   Rusinowska, Agnieszka ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ LUMIÈRE LYON 2   (France)

Author keywords

Decisional power; Influence function; Influence index; Social network

Indexed keywords

DECISIONAL POWER; FINAL DECISION; GROUP DECISION; INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS; INFLUENCE INDEX; POINT OF DEPARTURES; SOCIAL NETWORKS;

KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; SUBSIDENCE;

METHOD OF MOMENTS;

EID: 77955383345     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9109-z     Document Type: Article

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