Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 84, Issue , 2014, Pages 39-57

  Burchardi, Konrad B ^a   Penczynski, Stefan P ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Individual reasoning; Level k model; One shot games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892662944     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.005     Document Type: Article

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