Mobility and redistributive politics

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 95-120

  Hindriks, Jean ^a  

^a QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891382198     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00056     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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