The evolution and formation of amicus curiae networks

Social Networks

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 82-96

  Box Steffensmeier, Janet M ^a   Christenson, Dino P ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b USA   (United States)

Author keywords

Amicus curiae briefs; Coalition strategies; Exponential random graph model; Interest groups; Longitudinal networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888065523     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2012.07.003     Document Type: Article

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