Measuring beliefs in centimeters: Private knowledge biases preschoolers' and adults' representation of others' beliefs

Child Development

Volumn 84, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 1846-1854

  Sommerville, Jessica A ^a   Bernstein, Daniel M ^a,b   Meltzoff, Andrew N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b KWANTLEN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ARTICLE; ATTITUDE; COMPREHENSION; CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIAL; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; DEPTH PERCEPTION; FEMALE; HUMAN; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; PHYSIOLOGY; PRESCHOOL CHILD; PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE; RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL; THEORY OF MIND;

ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ATTITUDE; CHILD, PRESCHOOL; COMPREHENSION; FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE; SPACE PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 84887376727     PISSN: 00093920     EISSN: 14678624     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12110     Document Type: Article

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